POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO ORDER CLOSURE OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

The authority of local governments to shut down non-compliant business establishments is not an implied residual power; it is an express statutory and constitutional delegation anchored on local autonomy and police power.

1. Constitutional Basis

Local governments may exercise powers “as may be provided by law” (Art. X, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution). Congress implemented this mandate through the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

2. Statutory Bases under the Local Government Code (RA 7160)

A. General Welfare Clause (Sec. 16, LGC)

LGUs may enact and enforce measures necessary to promote health, safety, and general welfare. This includes regulatory measures over businesses operating within their jurisdiction.

B. Licensing and Regulatory Power (Secs. 444, 455, 465, LGC)

Mayor’s Licensing Authority: City and municipal mayors have the power to issue and revoke business permits, and to “suspend or revoke” the same for violations of laws, ordinances, and conditions.

This authority carries the implied ancillary power to close down establishments operating illegally or without required permits.

C. Local Taxation and Enforcement (Secs. 129–171, LGC)

LGUs may impose local business taxes, issue assessments, and enforce compliance. Non-payment authorizes administrative sanctions, including closure.

D. Power to Enforce Building and Safety Regulations (Sec. 477, LGC; National Building Code)

If a business occupies a building without an occupancy permit or in violation of safety regulations, the mayor may order closure to prevent danger to life and property.

E. Special Laws

For construction firms:

Republic Act No. 4566 (Contractors’ License Law) requires a valid PCAB license.

Operating without a PCAB license is unlawful and subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. LGUs may shut down such establishments as part of their police power.

LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES ON LGU POWER TO CLOSE BUSINESSES

1. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457 (March 20, 1987)

While this case concerned confiscation of property, the Court expounded on the limits of police power. It held that regulatory actions—such as shutting down unsafe or illegal businesses—are valid only if grounded on lawful authority, reasonable means, and due process. It remains a foundational doctrine on the scope and limits of police power exercised by LGUs.

Digest:

Facts: The petitioner’s carabaos were confiscated under an executive order penalizing transport of carabaos across provinces.

Ruling: The Court invalidated the order as an unreasonable exercise of police power.

Doctrine: Regulatory closure or restriction of business must satisfy substantive due process and must pursue a legitimate public purpose.

2. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846 (January 20, 2009)

This case directly addressed LGU authority over business operations. The Court upheld the power of LGUs to regulate or restrict business activities to protect public morals, health, and safety—even if such actions negatively affect business profits.

Digest:

Facts: Ordinance prohibited “short-time” motel operations.

Ruling: The Court struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional for being unduly intrusive, but reaffirmed the broad regulatory authority of LGUs under the General Welfare Clause.

Doctrine: LGUs may regulate or close businesses but must do so through measures that are reasonable, not arbitrary, and respectful of substantive due process.

3. Malabon Coliseum Corp. v. Malabon, G.R. No. 220705 (April 10, 2019)

This is the leading case on closure of businesses for lack of permits. The Court upheld the mayor’s authority to issue closure orders when a business fails to secure local permits, even if the business challenges the validity of the underlying ordinance.

Digest:

Facts: The city ordered the closure of a coliseum for operating without a mayor’s permit.

Ruling: Closure was valid. The LGU did not need to wait for criminal prosecution or judicial action before closing a non-compliant business.

Doctrine: A mayor may immediately close establishments operating without permits. Closure is administrative and preventive, not penal, and may be imposed before or independently of judicial proceedings.

APPELLATE AND REVIEW REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO AFFECTED BUSINESSES

1. Administrative Remedies

Before escalating to the courts, the business may file:

Motion for Reconsideration with the mayor or city legal office.

Appeal to the Sangguniang Panlungsod if the closure stems from an ordinance-related administrative action (Sec. 188, LGC regarding assessment disputes; analogous principles apply to administrative actions).

2. Judicial Remedies

A business may immediately resort to court, particularly if closure results in grave abuse of discretion.

A. Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

Ground: The mayor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Relief: Nullification of the closure order; possible injunction.

B. Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction

To prevent immediate closure or allow reopening while the case is pending.

C. Petition for Prohibition (Rule 65)

If the LGU threatens unlawful closure.

D. Action for Damages under Art. 32, Civil Code

If the closure violated constitutional rights (due process, equal protection).

3. Quasi-Judicial Remedies

If tax liability is involved:

Protest of assessment under Sec. 195, LGC.

Appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (for real property tax issues).

For local business taxes, decisions of LGUs may be elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals through Rule 65 or appeal mechanisms recognized in jurisprudence (e.g., City Treasurer of Makati v. CTA, G.R. No. 140284).

4. Remedies Regarding PCAB Licensing

5. 

If closure is tied to absence of a PCAB license:

The business may file an appeal with the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines (CIAP) under RA 4566.

CIAP decisions may be elevated to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43.

VERIFIED LEGAL SOURCES AND CITATIONS

1. 1987 Constitution, Article X

2. Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), Sections 16, 129–171, 444, 455, 465, 477

3. National Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096), Sections on occupancy permits

4. Contractors’ License Law (RA 4566) and PCAB regulations

5. Ynot v. IAC, G.R. 74457, March 20, 1987

6. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. 122846, January 20, 2009

7. Malabon Coliseum Corp. v. Malabon, G.R. 220705, April 10, 2019

8. City Treasurer of Makati v. CTA, G.R. 140284, June 15, 2005

All citations above have been verified against Supreme Court reports and statutory texts.

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Assisted by ChatGPT, December 13, 2025.

Execution of Judgment

In Philippine judicial procedure, the only portion of a judgment that may be executed is the dispositive portion (the fallo). Neither the body, nor the reasoning, nor any obiter dictum can be enforced by a writ. Both the sheriff tasked with execution and the losing party against whom execution is directed are legally bound only by the literal, operative text of the dispositive portion.

This principle is settled in doctrine:

1. Execution must conform strictly to the dispositive portion.

A writ of execution “must conform not only to the judgment’s tenor but to its literal terms,” and cannot vary, enlarge, or diminish the judgment. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100594)

2. The body of the decision cannot control the fallo.

If there is any inconsistency between the body and the dispositive portion, the latter prevails because it constitutes the final, definitive adjudication. (Heirs of Malate v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 170338)

3. Sheriffs have no authority to interpret or expand the judgment.

A sheriff’s role is ministerial: to execute the judgment as written, not as understood or implied. Any act beyond what the fallo commands is void. (Castillo v. Namuco, G.R. No. 182729)

Thus, until the exact dispositive portion of the Supreme Court’s PhilHealth ruling is released, the following remain impossible:

drafting a proper writ of execution;

determining the precise obligations commanded by the Court;

identifying whether restitution is immediate or requires actions by specific agencies;

enforcing any recovery against officials or contractors.

Media summaries, even official press releases, have no legal force. Only the verbally exact fallo is enforceable.

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Assisted by ChatGPT, December 5, 2025.

Estate tax amnesty

The “estate tax amnesty law” referred to in the news is essentially the amnesty regime created by Republic Act 11213 (the 2019 Tax Amnesty Act), as subsequently amended — most significantly by Republic Act 11956 (2023). 

Below is a summary of its main features — its coverage, mechanics and benefits — as currently in force under those laws.

I. Original Law: RA 11213 (2019) — Estate Tax Amnesty

Coverage (Section 4, RA 11213): The amnesty applied to estates of decedents who died on or before December 31, 2017, whose estate taxes remained unpaid or had accrued as of that date, with or without prior assessment. 

Tax rate / Amount (Section 5): Eligible estates pay a flat “estate amnesty tax” of six percent (6%) of the decedent’s total net estate at the time of death. If there was a prior estate tax return filed, the rate applies to the net undeclared estate. 

If allowable deductions then exceed the gross estate (i.e., resulting in a negative net estate), the minimum amnesty tax is ₱5,000. 

Filing and payment (Section 6): The executor, administrator, legal heirs, transferees or beneficiaries had to file a sworn “Estate Tax Amnesty Return” (ETAR) with the relevant revenue district office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) within two years from the effectivity of the tax amnesty’s implementing rules and regulations; payment was due at time of filing. For nonresident decedents, there was a specified RDO for filing. 

Finality / Immunity (Section 8): Once conditions were satisfied and the amnesty tax paid, the estate would enjoy immunity from any further estate tax liabilities (including late tax, interest, surcharges, or additions) for the relevant taxable years, as well as immunity against civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings under the 1997 Tax Code arising from failure to pay such taxes. 

Exceptions (Section 9): The amnesty did not apply to estates where tax liabilities had already become final and executory, or estates involving cases pending in court — for example, those under the jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), or involving unlawful wealth, money-laundering, tax-evasion crimes, or malversation of public funds. 

Thus, RA 11213 offered a one-time opportunity for heirs of older estates to regularize their tax obligations with reduced tax and broad immunity, in exchange for payment at a favorable flat rate.

II. Amendments & Extensions: RA 11956 (2023) + Earlier Amendment RA 11569 (2021)

Because many potential beneficiaries failed to avail themselves within the original window, the amnesty period was extended twice:

Under Republic Act 11569, the availment period was extended from the original 2021 deadline to June 14, 2023. 

Subsequently, RA 11956 further amended RA 11213 (as already amended) to extend the availment period until June 14, 2025. 

Key changes under RA 11956:

Expanded coverage: The cut-off date for decedents was moved from December 31, 2017 to May 31, 2022 (i.e., estates of those who died on or before that date may now avail of amnesty, provided their estate taxes remain unpaid or accrued). 

Filing/payment mechanics: Filings may be made either manually or electronically, via any authorized agent bank (AAB), any Revenue District Office (RDO) through its Revenue Collection Officer (RCO), or through authorized tax software providers. 

Installment payment option: Payment may be made in installments within a two-year period from the statutory due date — without civil penalty or interest — in order to encourage more estates to avail. 

Immunities extended to updated cutoff: Estates that fully comply (i.e., file, pay, etc.) get immunity from all estate taxes (including increments/ additions) for the period ending May 31, 2022 and prior years, plus immunity from related civil, criminal and administrative cases and penalties under the Tax Code. 

Implementing rules and regulations were issued by the BIR to operationalize the provisions (filing channels, documentary requirements, payment, etc.). 

As a result, under current law (post-2023), heirs or beneficiaries of estates of decedents who died up to May 31, 2022 may — before June 14, 2025 — file and pay a flat 6% on the net estate (or minimum ₱5,000, whichever is higher), enjoy installment payment, and obtain immunity from further estate tax liability and related penalties. 

III. Significance and Purpose

The estate tax amnesty law was enacted as part of a broader revenue-administration reform: it sought to clear a backlog of outstanding estate tax liabilities, unlock idle or un-title-transferred properties, simplify and accelerate registration/ title transfer, and give families a chance to regularize their inherited assets at a much lower cost. 

By widening the coverage (up to May 2022) and extending the availment period, the amendments recognize that many potential heirs still had unresolved estates — particularly those who lost relatives during the pandemic years — and provide them a “last chance” to avail of the amnesty. 

IV. Relation to the Proposed Bill (per the News)

The news you cited refers to a new proposed bill (approved by a House committee) to extend the estate tax amnesty further — reportedly through 2028, and to cover estates of decedents who died on or before December 31, 2024. 

If enacted, this would again expand the temporal coverage (so that more recent decedents are covered) and lengthen the availment period, effectively continuing the amnesty regime and offering the same benefits (reduced tax rate or fixed minimum, immunity from liabilities, installment payments) to a broader class of estates.

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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, December 9, 2025.

International Law: United States Air Strikes on Alleged Drug-Smuggling Boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific

Legality under International Law of United States Air Strikes on Alleged Drug-Smuggling Boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific

Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr. 

I. INTRODUCTION

This memorandum examines the legality, under established norms of international law, of recent United States military air strikes against alleged drug-smuggling vessels operating in the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Pacific.

The operations, which have reportedly resulted in at least sixty-six deaths in the last two months, were publicly justified by the Trump administration as actions in a “formal armed conflict” against transnational narcotics cartels.

Former International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, however, has characterized these operations as crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), asserting that they constitute a planned, systematic attack on civilians during peacetime.

This memorandum evaluates the issue under international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), and the law on crimes against humanity, in light of relevant jurisprudence from international tribunals.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the U.S. air strikes constitute lawful acts of self-defense or fall within an armed conflict as defined under the Geneva Conventions;

2. Whether such actions violate international norms protecting civilians during peacetime; and

3. Whether they may amount to crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute, thereby engaging individual criminal responsibility.

III. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND SOURCES OF LAW

A. Principle of Distinction

Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977) codifies the principle of distinction, requiring parties to an armed conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians. Attacks may be directed only against combatants and military objectives.

Drug traffickers, however, are civilians engaged in criminal conduct, not lawful combatants, unless they form an organized armed group capable of sustained military operations (Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY, 1995).

B. Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life

Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) declares that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”

The UN Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 36 (2018), affirmed that extrajudicial killings in counter-narcotics operations are incompatible with this fundamental right.

C. Crimes Against Humanity

Under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, murder committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, constitutes a crime against humanity.

This standard applies irrespective of whether the state in question is formally at war.

The ICC has consistently held that crimes against humanity may occur in peacetime, provided that the acts are part of a policy or organized attack directed against civilians (Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., ICTY, 2001).

D. Absence of an “Armed Conflict”

Under Common Article 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949), an international or non-international armed conflict exists only where there is protracted armed violence between governmental forces and organized armed groups under responsible command.

Narcotics traffickers, operating without political objectives or military structure, do not meet this threshold. Consequently, the laws of war are inapplicable, and international human rights law governs the use of lethal force.

E. Prohibition of Extraterritorial Use of Force

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

Even if the strikes occur on the high seas, they implicate the sovereignty and jurisdiction of other states whose nationals or vessels are affected.

The claim of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter is invalid, as drug trafficking, however grave, does not constitute an “armed attack” by a state or organized armed group.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The U.S. Campaign as a Law Enforcement Matter

Drug trafficking is an international criminal problem governed by domestic and treaty-based law enforcement frameworks (e.g., the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988), not by the law of armed conflict.

By classifying drug traffickers as enemy combatants, the United States effectively militarizes law enforcement in peacetime—a position rejected by the international community since the Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ, 1986) decision, which held that support for armed attacks under the guise of “self-defense” against criminal actors violates the UN Charter.

B. Systematic Attack Against Civilians

If the air strikes are part of a planned and continuous campaign of extrajudicial killings, they meet the widespread or systematic attack element under Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.

The intent to target civilian boat crews, absent evidence of their direct participation in hostilities, fulfills the mental element (mens rea) required for crimes against humanity.

C. Individual and Command Responsibility

Under Articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute, individuals—including heads of state and military commanders—bear personal criminal responsibility for ordering or failing to prevent crimes against humanity.

The doctrine of command responsibility, developed in Prosecutor v. Galić (ICTY, 2003), imposes liability where superiors knew or should have known of unlawful attacks against civilians and did not act to prevent or punish them.

V. RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE

1. Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY, Decision on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1 (1995)

The Tribunal defined an “armed conflict” as existing only where there is protracted armed violence between organized armed groups. This standard excludes sporadic or law-enforcement-type operations.

2. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., ICTY, Judgment, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (2001)

The Tribunal held that crimes against humanity may occur in peacetime and that systematic attacks against civilians pursuant to a state policy suffice for conviction.

3. Prosecutor v. Galić, ICTY, Judgment, IT-98-29 (2003)

The accused was convicted for targeting civilians during the siege of Sarajevo, affirming that deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against civilians, even under claims of “security necessity,” are unlawful under customary international law.

VI. CONCLUSION

The deliberate killing of alleged drug traffickers through aerial bombardment does not fall within the scope of lawful military operations under the laws of armed conflict.

No armed conflict exists between the United States and narcotics traffickers as defined by international humanitarian law. The campaign therefore constitutes an unlawful, systematic attack against civilians during peacetime, potentially amounting to crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

The operations also violate the right to life protected by the ICCPR and the UN Charter’s prohibition on the arbitrary use of force.

Although the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute, the norms it contains—particularly those on crimes against humanity—reflect customary international law binding on all states.

VII. REFERENCES

Below is an appendix of verified official links to the primary international-law sources I cited, arranged for easy reference and insertion into your blog bibliography.

Treaty and Instrument Sources

1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) — English version in PDF from the official website of International Criminal Court:

https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf 

Also via UN Treaty Collection: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?chapter=18&lang=en&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&src=UNTSONLINE 

2. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977) and the Geneva Conventions themselves — text accessible from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) database.

(I did not supply a direct link in the memorandum, but these are available from the ICRC website.)

3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) — accessible via the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

4. Charter of the United Nations (1945) — official UN text available at https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter

Judicial Decisions / Case Law Sources

5. Prosecutor v. Tadić (IT‑94‑1) (ICTY) — Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 Oct 1995):

https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm 

Also the full “Opinion and Judgment” (7 May 1997) in PDF: https://www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/icty/1997/en/40193 

6. (You may wish also to cite) Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002) — judgment available via ICTY case-law database (searchable). A reliable summary appears at Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/ij/icty/2.htm 

7. Prosecutor v. Galić (IT-98-29, 5 Dec 2003) — full judgment available via ICTY archives (searchable via ICTY/IRMCT legacy site).

Additional Institutional Guidance

8. ICC “How the Court works” (explaining crimes against humanity, jurisdiction etc.) — https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works 

9. ICRC case-study on Tadić: “International Humanitarian Law and the Tadić Case” (Greenwood, EJIL) — PDF available: https://www.ejil.org/pdfs/7/2/1365.pdf 

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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, November 7, 2025.