"X x x.
Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." Thus runs paragraph 21. Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution. Implementing this constitutional precept is Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which in part provides that [a]ny court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise.
There should not be any misapprehension as to the concept of the term "pauper litigant". Under the Constitution and the rule just cited, a "pauper litigant" is not what the nomenclature literally means — that the petitioner must be so destitute as to have no means at all of even supporting himself. In Acar vs.
Rosal (March 18, 1967), 19 SCRA 625, which is an expositor Of the constitutional precept, our language is this — "As applied to statutes or provisions on the right to sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader meaning. It has thus been recognized that: 'An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be a pauper; the fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to his statement that he has not sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs' (14 Am. Jur. 31). It suffices that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), tho not a public charge. And the difference between 'paupers' and 'indigent' persons is that the latter are 'persons who have no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-supporting when able to work and in employment' (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913, 'Indigent', citing People vs. Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830). It is therefore in the sense of being indigent that 'pauper' is taken when referring to suits in forma pauperis. Black's Law Dictionary in fact defines pauper, thus: 'A person so poor that he must be supported at public expense; also a suitor who, on account of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend without being chargeable with costs' (p. 1284, emphasis supplied)."3
Not that the foregoing view stands alone. This concept of pauper litigant has been incorporated in recent (1969) legislations. In Republic Act 6033, "An Act Requiring Courts to Give Preference to Criminal Cases Where the Party or Parties Involved are Indigents", and Republic Act 6034, "An Act Providing Transportation and Other Allowances for Indigent Litigants" both approved on August 16, 1969.' Congress has defined the term "indigent" to refer to a person "who has no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for the subsistence of his family." Of particular interest is a third statute, Republic Act 6035, also approved on August 16, 1969, entitled "An Act Requiring Stenographers to Give Free Transcript of Notes to Indigent and Low Income Litigants and Providing a Penalty for the Violation Thereof". This refers to the transcript of stenographic notes of "a hearing before an investigating fiscal or trial judge or hearing commissioner of any quasi-judicial body or administrative tribunal." For, indeed, the term "indigent litigant" for the purpose of this statute (R.A. 6035) was given a more expansive meaning to include "anyone who has no visible means of support or whose income does not exceed P300 per month or whose income even in excess of P300 per month is insufficient for the subsistence of his family."
Of course, the present case came up before the decision in Acar vs. Rosal and the approval of the statutes just mentioned. Nonetheless, we believe that in the resolution of the issue involved we should not lose sight of the liberal views expressed in said decision and laws. For, these views are but expressions of the constitutional policy that prescribes denial of free access to the courts by reason of poverty. Which policy should be liberally applied, the better to approximate the constitutional intent.
There is in the record the affidavit of petitioner stating that he has neither property nor income. And yet, the municipal judge misconceived the impact of this affidavit by relying merely on a certificate of the municipal treasurer stating that a man by the name of Juan Enaje appears to own property. Such certificate was mistakenly given importance by the municipal judge. His Honor should have taken stock of petitioner's vehement assertion that he is not the Juan Enaje mentioned in those tax declarations; and that, in truth and in fact, he (petitioner) had no source of income at all.
Even on the assumption that petitioner owns property, he may still be an indigent,4 considering his sworn statement that he had no income. Under the standard set forth in Acar vs. Rosal as well as the recent legislations heretofore adverted to, it is the income of a litigant that is the determinative factor. For, really, property may have no income. It may even be a financial burden.
For the reasons given, we hold that the judges below committed a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to allow petitioner to prosecute his action in the inferior court as pauper litigant.
Xxx."
G.R. No. L-22109, January 30, 1970
JUAN ENAJE, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
VICTORIO RAMOS, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Gubat, SORSOGON, and FELIPE F. DUGAN, respondents-appellees.
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