" The Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 must be quashed as the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In adjudging that each of the Information in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 charges more than one offense, the CA rationalized that the acts constitutive of the crime of premature campaigning are covered by two separate paragraphs in Section 79, i.e., (1) and (5). It explained that these are two separate modes and constitute two (2) separate crimes. The CA noted that the use of the word "and" does not connote continuity, but rather, separation, theorizing that:
If the purpose of the information was to charge [respondents] of only one offense and their visitation of houses and holding of meetings were only in furtherance of their act of campaigning and soliciting votes, the informations should have used the words "by", "thru" or any other word of equivalent meaning instead of the word "and".42
Foremost, the Court disagrees with the aforementioned disquisition. Under prevailing laws and jurisprudence, premature campaigning is no longer punishable. It is for this reason that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 must be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.43
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069, the respondents were charged with two (2) counts of violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code or premature campaigning. Except with respect to the date of commission, the Informations identically recite the crime of premature campaigning to have been committed as follows: "engage[d] in a partisan political activity by campaigning and soliciting votes for the Totoy del Mundo Movement, within Barangay Talipapa of Quezon City and by visiting the houses of voters and thereafter holding a meeting for the purpose of soliciting votes for their favor."44
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code punishes election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period as defined under Section 79(b) of the same Code, viz.:
Sec. 79. Definitions. – As used in this Code:
x x x x
b. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
1. Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
2. Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
3. Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;
4. Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
5. Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
x x x x Emphasis supplied.
From the foregoing, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.45
In relation to the second element, Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties." Notwithstanding such definition, a person is considered as a "candidate" only at the start of the campaign period for which the certificate of candidacy is filed. The provision further qualifies that unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start such of the campaign period.46 In this sense therefore, there can be no scenario in which premature campaign may be committed, as there can be no "candidate" prior to the campaign period.
The Court in Penera v. COMELEC, et al.,47 explained that legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. This is because the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots.48 Furthermore, the Court expounded-
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is especially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
In layman's language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. x x x
x x x The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.49 (Emphasis supplied)
As stated in Penera, a review of legislative deliberations in the passage of the Omnibus Election Code and R.A. No. 9369, does not lend guidance with respect to the rationale behind the definition and enumeration of prohibited acts; thus, the Court cannot speculate and is left to apply the law as stated. Otherwise stated, the limitation with respect to how a candidate may be held liable for the offense of premature campaigning, irrespective of the motivation is a policy determination which the Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers.50
In accordance with the foregoing, the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 insofar as the facts alleged therein refer to the offense of premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election, which under the state of present law is "impossible" to commit, must be quashed. Consequently, there is no longer any reason for the Court to make a determination if these Informations each charge more than one offense. "
[ G.R. No. 212738. March 09, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ATTY. ANNA LIZA R. JUAN-BARRAMEDA, MISCHAELLA SAVARI, AND MARLON SAVARI, PETITIONERS, VS. RUFINO RAMOY AND DENNIS PADILLA, RESPONDENTS.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/mar2022/gr_212738_2022.html
