Ejectment case; sole issue is physical or material possession.

 "Well-settled is the rule that the sole issue for resolution in ejectment case relates to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of the claim of ownership by any of the parties.26 Even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, as in the case at bench, the courts may pass upon such issue but only to determine the issue of possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter.27 In any case, the adjudication of ownership, being merely provisional, does not bar or prejudice an action between the parties involving title to the subject property.28

In Co v. Military,29 the Court ruled:

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.30 (Italics supplied.)

Moreover, the Court emphasized in the case of Mangaser v. Ugay31 that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession only if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership, thus:

Before the Court continues any further, it must be determined first whether the issue of ownership is material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance — to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.32 (Italics supplied.)

Another case wherein both parties raised the issue of ownership as their basis of their respective right to possess the property in question is Sps. Dela Cruz v. Sps. Capco,33 wherein the Court reiterated the rule that where both parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property, thus:

"The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure." But "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property." Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that "[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.”34

Based on the aforementioned jurisprudence, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that an ejectment case is not the proper proceeding where contrasting claims of ownership by both parties exist. At the risk of repetition, the only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real property—prior physical possession and not title.35

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.36

Records reveal that petitioner was able to satisfactorily prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of all the elements of forcible entry. While it may be true that respondents occupied the property before 2012, it was without the knowledge of petitioner and respondents voluntarily left the premises after the latter learned of petitioner's ownership. More importantly, petitioner was already in prior peaceful occupation of the subject property when respondents forcibly entered it by using a bolt cutter, evicted the tenants therein, changed the padlocks, and placed a rent signage in front of the property. These were the acts of respondents that prompted petitioner to file a forcible entry case.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that their entitlement to possession over the subject property is based on their ownership rights as evidenced by an Affidavit of Acceptance for the Foreclosure of the Mortgage of Real Property dated March 15, 2005 executed by Pablo. The Court stresses that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is.37 Contrary to the conclusions of the RTC, the Court deems it inappropriate for the ejectment court to dwell on the issue of ownership considering that respondents' claim of ownership could not establish prior possession at the time when the subject property was forcibly taken from petitioner.

Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror, not even by the owners.38 Assuming arguendo that herein respondents are the real owners of the subject property, they had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject petitioner's tenants from the subject property. Their employment of illegal means to eject petitioner by force in entering the subject property by destroying the locks using bolt curt replacing the locks, and prohibiting the tenants to enter therein made them liable for forcible entry since prior possession was established by petitioner.

All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion as affirmed by the RTC that petitioner is better entitled to the material possession of the subject property and that she cannot be forcibly evicted therefrom without proper recourse to the courts."

G.R. No. 229076, September 16, 2020 

MA. LUZ TEVES ESPERAL, PETITIONER, VS. MA. LUZ TROMPETA-ESPERAL AND LORENZ ANNEL BIAOCO, RESPONDENTS.

Link: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_229076_2020.html

Question of Fact vs. Question of Law; Rule 45, petition for review on certiorari

 "At the outset, the Court reiterates that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, its jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. The Court explained the difference between a question of fact and a question of law in this wise:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.24

Here, petitioner argues that the CA erred in holding that the instant ejectment suit is not proper due to the contrasting claims of ownership by both parties. In other words, petitioner is raising the issue of whether the court can resolve an ejectment suit even if both parties claim ownership of the subject property. Clearly, the issue raised is a question of law.

Still, the Court will have to pass upon the factual findings in the case considering the conflicting or contradictory25 decisions of the CA and RTC; thus, the Court is constrained to make its own factual findings in order to resolve the issue presented before it."

G.R. No. 229076, September 16, 2020 

MA. LUZ TEVES ESPERAL, PETITIONER, VS. MA. LUZ TROMPETA-ESPERAL AND LORENZ ANNEL BIAOCO, RESPONDENTS.

Link: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_229076_2020.html

Seafarer's death benefit

"SC: Only Legal Spouse, Children May Receive Seafarer Death Benefits

July 2, 2024

The Supreme Court has ruled that benefits arising from a seafarer’s death under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) contract should be awarded only to the surviving legitimate spouse, despite being long estranged from the seafarer, alongside the seafarer’s legitimate and illegitimate children.

Thus held the Supreme Court’s Third Division in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa ordering the release of death benefits due the heirs of deceased seafarer Pedrito G. Macalinao (Pedrito).

Pedrito married Cerena in 1981. They had one child, Cindy. However, the spouses separated in fact after four years.

In 1990, with his marriage to Cerena still subsisting, Pedrito married Elenita. They had two children, Kenneth and Kristel.

Cerena herself contracted a second marriage in 1992, with Rene Paredes.

Elenita and Pedrito, a seafarer, lived together until his death in 2015 onboard the vessel of Excel Marine Co. Ltd./Fair Shipping Corporation (Excel Marine). His death benefits amounted to PHP 4,506,309.52, the only property he left upon his death.

In 2016, Cerena and Cindy filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the settlement of Pedrito’s estate, which included as a secondary issue the declaration of nullity of Pedrito and Elenita’s marriage.

The RTC ruled that the death benefits formed part of Pedrito’s estate and that under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of 2010 (POEA MC), they shall be divided among the beneficiaries in accordance with the rules on succession. The RTC held that Elenita, despite being the nominated beneficiary, is not entitled to Pedrito’s death benefits since their marriage is bigamous and void.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

The Supreme Court, however, held that the death benefits do not form part of Pedrito’s estate. Under Article 781 of the Civil Code, what forms part of the estate is property existing at the time of death.

However, in the case of the death benefits from the employment contract between Excel Marine and Pedrito, these benefits only arose upon Pedrito’s death and did not exist at the time of his death.

As to the division of the proceeds from the death benefits, Section 20.B.(3) of the POEA MC states that benefits for the seafarer’s death are payable to the seafarer’s beneficiaries consistent with the rules of succession under the Civil Code.

Such benefits are payable to the legal heirs not as inheritance but as proceeds from a death benefit.

The beneficiaries, however, must be determined in accordance with the rules of compulsory and intestate succession.

The Court held that Elenita is disqualified as a beneficiary since she is not Pedrito’s legal spouse, and their marriage was clearly bigamous and void from the beginning. Elenita’s supposed lack of knowledge of Pedrito’s subsisting marriage to Cerena is not a defense.

That Cerena herself entered into a bigamous marriage with another does not validate Pedrito and Elenita’s bigamous marriage. This, along with the fact that Cerena has been separated from Pedrito for 30 years, likewise does not disqualify Cerena, Pedrito’s legal wife, as one of his beneficiaries.

The Court acknowledged that, unlike the Social Security Act, Government Service Insurance System Law, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the POEA MC does not apply the test of dependency in determining the qualified beneficiary. However, this perceived gap in the law is for Congress to address, not the Court.

As to the distribution of the benefits among the legal heirs, the Court clarified that when the concurring primary compulsory heirs are the surviving spouse, one legitimate child, and illegitimate children, Article 892 of the Civil Code shall apply, subject to Article 895 of the same law, as amended by Article 176 of the Family Code.

Under Article 892, if only one legitimate child survives, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate. On the other hand, Article 895, as amended by the Family Code, provides that if illegitimate children survive with legitimate children, the shares for each of the former shall consist of one-half of the share of each legitimate child, provided that the share of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied.

The Court further clarified that the correct approach would be to determine and satisfy first the share of each legitimate child/ren, then the share of the surviving spouse in relation to the  number of legitimate children. Finally, the share of the illegitimate child/ren will be taken from the remaining free portion of the hereditary estate.

Thus, in the present case, the Court ordered that the proceeds from Pedrito’s death benefits be distributed as follows: one-fourth to Cerena; one-half to Cindy; one-eighth to Kenneth; and one-eighth to Kristel. (Courtesy of the Supreme Court Public Information Office)

FULL TEXT of G.R. No. 250613 (Macalinao v. Macalinao), April 3, 2024 at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/250613-elenita-v-macalinao-kenneth-v-macalinao-and-kristel-v-macalinao-vs-cerina-a-k-a-cerena-n-macalinao-and-cindy-n-macalinao/

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/250613-concurring-and-dissenting-opinion-justice-maria-filomena-d-singh/."

Supreme Court