Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence

ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, Petitioners,

vs.

SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014


"In fine, we agree with the rulings of the HLURB, OP and the CA that respondents are entitled to the relief sought. Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency.23 Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative functions, latitude which includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within their special competence.24"

Indispensable parties

ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, Petitioners,

vs.

SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014


"As to petitioners' claim that they are merely necessary parties and that there must be a prior judgment directing and commanding the developer Silverland Realty & Development Corporation to enforce its contractual obligations, we are not convinced.

Respondents have sued not only the petitioners but also the developer corporation and the homeowners' association. That Silverland Realty & Development Corporation and Silverland Village 1 Homeowners Association did not file their answer, did not divest the HLURB of jurisdiction over the case. We agree with respondents that petitioners are indispensable parties for they were the ones who built and operate the church inside the subdivision and without them no final determination can be had of the action. Petitioners are the ones who will be affected by the judgment. In fact, they are the ones who are prohibited from using the subject property as a church."

Development permit - "While the construction and establishment of any church is not prohibited within a subdivision, the same should be located in an area designed or allowable in the approved development plan for the purpose."

ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, Petitioners,

vs.

SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014


"On the second issue, we uphold the ruling that petitioners cannot use #46 of Silverlane Street for religious purposes or as a location of a church.

Here, as noted by the HLURB, the Development Permit indicates the use of the property as residential except for the designated open spaces. Petitioners do not deny that the building built beside the lot of Annie and Joel Geronimo is used as a church and that other religious activities are performed there. Clearly, this usage contravenes the land use policy particularly prescribed in the subdivision plan and in the Development Permit. Respondents, as subdivision lot owners, are entitled to assert that the use of the said property for religious activities be enjoined since it clearly violates the intended use of the subject lot.

Also, we find no fault on the part of the CA in affirming the HLURB’s act of taking judicial notice of the Development Permit issued for the project. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies.20 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.21

The issue of taking judicial notice of the Development Permit was also properly discussed and justified by the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB, First Division, to wit:

With respect to the assailed documents which the Office relied upon to arrive at its conclusion, Rule X, Section 6 of the HLURB Rules of Procedure provides:

Section 6. Summary resolution. – With or without the position paper or draft decision, the Arbiter shall resume (sic) the cases on bases of the pleadings and pertinent records of the case and of the Board.

The Regional Office can therefore take judicial notice of all documents forming part of its official records. The rule is in accord with Section 22 of Chapter IV, Book VI of Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.

Neither can the argument that herein respondents are not bound by the development permit as this is only between the government and the developer, be held valid. To accept such rationalization would be to say that buyers, after acquiring title to a subdivision property, are free to set aside all zoning and development plans the government has deemed appropriate for the area in consideration of the general welfare.

Respondents, in deciding to acquire property in a subdivision project, are deemed to have accepted and understood, that they are not merely trying to possess a property but are in fact joining a unique community with a distinctive lifestyle envisioned since its development.

While the construction and establishment of any church is not prohibited within a subdivision, the same should be located in an area designed or allowable in the approved development plan for the purpose.22"

HLURB jurisdiction

ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, Petitioners,

vs.

SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014

"On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the present controversy. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.11 We have ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties.12

We explained the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction in Christian General Assembly, Inc. v. Spouses Ignacio13 in this wise:

Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344, "EMPOWERING THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRIT OF EXECUTION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ITS DECISION UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957," clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB in the following specific terms:

SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi- judicial authority must also be determined by referring to the terms of P.D. No. 957, "THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ PROTECTIVE DECREE." Section 3 of this statute provides:

x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. – The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.

In Maria Luisa Park Association,Inc. (MPLAI) v. Almendras,14 we also ruled that:

The provisions of P.D. No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts. (Emphasis supplied)

And in Spouses Chua v. Ang,15 we held that:

The law recognized, too, that subdivision and condominium development involves public interest and welfare and should be brought to a body, like the HLURB, that has technical expertise. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB, on the other hand, is empowered to interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights of private parties under these contracts. This ancillary power, generally judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts to the extent that the pertinent HLURB laws provide.

Viewed from this perspective, the HLURB’s jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations of parties under subdivision and condominium contracts comes out very clearly. x x x

In the present case, respondents are buyers of a subdivision lot from subdivision owner and developer Silverland Realty & Development Corporation. Respondents’ action against Silverland Realty & Development Corporation was for violation of its own subdivision plan when it allowed the construction and operation of SACC.16 Respondents sued to stop the church activities inside the subdivision which is in contravention of the residential use of the subdivision lots. Undoubtedly, the present suit for the enforcement of statutory and contractual obligations of the subdivision developer clearly falls within the ambit of the HLURB’s jurisdiction. Needless to stress, when an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body.17 Split jurisdiction is not favored.18

Thus, respondents properly filed their complaint before the HLURB. The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer, or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations tomake the subdivision a better place to live in.19"

The trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


"We now determine whether or not the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, to wit: evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength and nighttime, were established.

The trial court ruled as follows:39

"The killing was qualified and characterized:

1) with evident premeditation because the killing was pre-planned (upon the victim's refusal to give liquor on credit at about ten o'clock in the evening, the accused roused with anger or showed signs of wrath followed by cool utterance or intention to follow the victim home, and finally after the lapse of about three hours or at one o'clock early dawn, they killed her — the accused had sufficient time to reflect dispassionately upon the consequences of their contemplated act); 2) with treachery because the malefactors took the defenseless victim at the main door of the house while on her way down and one of them thrust her with a knife and dragged (her) to the dark (sic) creek to finish her (off); 3) with abuse of superior strength because the victim (a woman) was attacked with a deadly weapon; and 4) by nocturnity because the accused took advantage of the darkness."

We hold that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. There is evident premeditation when the following requirements are proved: (a) the time when the appellant decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act showing that the appellant clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the appellant to reflect upon the consequences of the act. Evident premeditation must, like the crime itself, be proved beyond reasonable doubt.40

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that appellant Hermosa was slighted by the refusal of the victim to extend credit in his favor. He gave her a dagger look. However, such behavior by itself is insufficient to prove that the appellants had determined, at that time, to kill the victim.41 At most, it only proved the motive for the killing.”

CONSPIRACY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


"We sustain the trial court's finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime. It exists when, at the time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its execution.38 Macuibelle testified that appellant Abelinde clubbed the victim's carabao. Thereafter, he joined appellant Hermosa who was then at the main door of the victim's house. They acted in unison in dragging the victim from her house to the creek where they finally finished her off. Their conduct clearly showed their mutual intent to kill the victim.”

CHILD WITNESS - "In the new Child Witness Rule, every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


"The oft repeated rule is that the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect because of its direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and to determine if they are telling the truth or not.22 This opportunity enables the trial judge to detect better that thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court.23 Thus, the trial judge's evaluation of the competence and credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the records that his judgment is erroneous.24

X x x.

We give full faith and credit to her testimony. She was young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was honest and sincere. It cannot be suspected as a concocted story, impressed upon her by other people.

We should not take Macuibelle's testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. Indeed, the time when we degrade a child witness testimony is now passé. In the new Child Witness Rule,26 every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.27

Nonetheless, the appellants impugn the testimony of Macuibelle on the ground that she did not immediately tag them as the culprits when the investigating officer arrived at the scene. They also contend that it was improbable for the eyewitness to see the assailants of the victim because they would have put off the lamp she was carrying to avoid recognition.

We are not convinced. The alleged delay in identifying the appellants is more apparent than real. It is clear from the records that the appellants were identified by Macuibelle as the persons responsible for the death of the victim. She failed to mention their names when the police first arrived at the scene, but a few hours later, she told the police that the appellants were the assailants. In fact, the appellants were immediately arrested shortly after the discovery of the crime.28

Failure to immediately reveal the identity of the perpetrator of a felony will not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness.29 Even adult witnesses sometimes would not reveal at once the killers of their loved ones for one reason or another.30 Fear of the criminal is one such reason.31

We stress that the identity of the appellants was well established. Macuibelle positively identified them. The victim was then at the main door of their house when the appellants forcibly dragged her. She saw them from a distance of about six (6) meters. The lamp held by the victim provided the light that gave Macuibelle the chance to recognize the appellants.32 She was also familiar with them because they were neighbors. The possibility that she was mistaken as to their identity is nil.

We note, too, that appellant Abelinde claimed that his father and the victim were relatives. If that were true, then it is more unlikely for Macuibelle and her siblings to impute a grievous offense against him unless they are certain as to his involvement in the crime. Even appellant Hermosa could not think of any reason why Macuibelle pointed to him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.33 Her lack of ill motive bolsters her credibility.

The appellants also discredit Macuibelle because she went back to sleep after witnessing the stabbing of her mother. For the appellants, such behavior meant she did not witness the incident.

Again, we disagree. Macuibelle was only eight (8) years old when she witnessed the shocking incident. Despite her plea, no one came to help them when the appellants attacked the victim and dragged her from their house. She was helpless and afraid. She knew her brother Zaldy and sister Marither were not around to protect her. After the traumatic incident, it is difficult to fault her when he chose to go back to sleep and wait for her siblings to arrive the next day. Her behavior is not irrational.34

The appellants further insist that Macuibelle is not a credible witness because, contrary to her claim that the victim was stabbed on the chest, the medical report of Dr. Ching showed that the wounds of the victim were mostly located on the neck. Moreover, appellants suggest that the stabbing incident must have transpired first before the victim shouted for help, thus, when Macuibelle woke up later, she did not really see what happened to the victim.

The argument does not impress. The exact location of the victim's wounds does not destroy Macuibelle's testimony that appellant Hermosa was the one who stabbed the victim and, with Abelinde's help, dragged her to the nearby creek where they finally finished her off. The misdescription of where appellant Hermosa stabbed the victim does not mean the witness perjured herself. The violent incident happened fast. Macuibelle just woke up and witnessed the bloody assault. It was a traumatic experience for the eight-year old girl. She cannot be expected to have a perfect memory of an event she may even want to forget.”