Participation in killing the victim.

"Xxx.

Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess' disclaimer of participation in killing the victim. It was she who bound the hands and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess' company, brought the victim to the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car, her and Estacio's hands were bloodied.

Parenthetically, prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess' friend who visited her in prison, testified that Maritess admitted having killed Chua.37 And the prosecution presented letters from Maritess to Estacio, written from prison, where she admitted the deed.38

Xxx."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. G.R. NO. 171655, July 22, 2009.

Source :

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2009/jul2009/gr_171655_2009.php

State witness

"Xxx.

Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state witness, the same does not lie.

The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; andcralawlibrary

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.32

These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other than appellants who had personal knowledge of the acts for which they were being prosecuted. Only he could positively identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He does not appear to be the most guilty. He did not participate in planning the commission of the crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was joking when she said, "Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie." He tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the attempts to extract ransom from the victim's family.

Sumipo's testimony was corroborated on material points. The victim's mother testified regarding the demands for ransom.33 Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at the time in question.34 Henry Hong, the victim's cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the victim's brother during the scheduled delivery of the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with companions.35 And the victim's skeletal remains were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacio's information and direction.

And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the competency and quality of his testimony.36

Xxx."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. G.R. NO. 171655, July 22, 2009.

Source :

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2009/jul2009/gr_171655_2009.php

Special complex crime of kidnapping with murder not the proper offense

"Xxx.

The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were convicted was erroneously designated.

Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, defined in the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.28

In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That appellants' intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create noise.29 The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants' prior acts as kidnapping.

People v. Padica30 instructs:

We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of Masilang, et. al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first killed him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only murder.

That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended to kill the victim can be readily deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the victim intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim's family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation among the felons who had killed the victim around five hours earlier.

x x x The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at most constitute coercion.31 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.

This Court's finding that the offense committed is Murder notwithstanding, the resulting penalty is the same. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The use of a motor vehicle, having been alleged in the Information and proven, can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. There being one generic aggravating circumstance, the resulting penalty is death. In view, however, of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

Xxx."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. G.R. NO. 171655, July 22, 2009.

Source :

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2009/jul2009/gr_171655_2009.php

Findings of fact

"Xxx.

Findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court because of the trial court's unique advantage in observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor, deportment, and conduct of the witnesses as they testify.26 This Court need not thus pass upon the findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they have been affirmed on appeal by the appellate court, as in the present case.27 Nevertheless, the Court combed through the records of the case and found no ground to merit a reversal of appellants' conviction.

Xxx."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. G.R. NO. 171655, July 22, 2009.

Source :
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2009/jul2009/gr_171655_2009.php