Participation in killing the victim.

"Xxx.

Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess' disclaimer of participation in killing the victim. It was she who bound the hands and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess' company, brought the victim to the scene of the crime and thereafter returned to the car, her and Estacio's hands were bloodied.

Parenthetically, prosecution witness Arlene Francisco, Maritess' friend who visited her in prison, testified that Maritess admitted having killed Chua.37 And the prosecution presented letters from Maritess to Estacio, written from prison, where she admitted the deed.38

Xxx."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. G.R. NO. 171655, July 22, 2009.

Source :

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2009/jul2009/gr_171655_2009.php

State witness

"Xxx.

Respecting the assigned error in discharging Sumipo as a state witness, the same does not lie.

The conditions for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are as follows:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; andcralawlibrary

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.32

These conditions were established by the prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other than appellants who had personal knowledge of the acts for which they were being prosecuted. Only he could positively identify appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. He does not appear to be the most guilty. He did not participate in planning the commission of the crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was joking when she said, "Diretsong dukot na rin kay Charlie." He tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan. He did not participate in the actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from the attempts to extract ransom from the victim's family.

Sumipo's testimony was corroborated on material points. The victim's mother testified regarding the demands for ransom.33 Cesar Moscoso, an employee of Casa Leonisa, testified to seeing the victim, Estacio, and Maritess at the bar-restaurant on the day and at the time in question.34 Henry Hong, the victim's cousin who arrived at Pizza Hut, Greenhills ahead of the victim's brother during the scheduled delivery of the ransom, testified to seeing Estacio there with companions.35 And the victim's skeletal remains were found at the scene of the crime upon Estacio's information and direction.

And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at any time, been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Even assuming arguendo that the discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was erroneous, such error would not affect the competency and quality of his testimony.36

Xxx."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. G.R. NO. 171655, July 22, 2009.

Source :

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2009/jul2009/gr_171655_2009.php

Special complex crime of kidnapping with murder not the proper offense

"Xxx.

The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were convicted was erroneously designated.

Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, defined in the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.28

In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That appellants' intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create noise.29 The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants' prior acts as kidnapping.

People v. Padica30 instructs:

We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of Masilang, et. al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first killed him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only murder.

That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended to kill the victim can be readily deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the victim intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim's family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation among the felons who had killed the victim around five hours earlier.

x x x The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of movement would at most constitute coercion.31 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.

This Court's finding that the offense committed is Murder notwithstanding, the resulting penalty is the same. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The use of a motor vehicle, having been alleged in the Information and proven, can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. There being one generic aggravating circumstance, the resulting penalty is death. In view, however, of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

Xxx."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. G.R. NO. 171655, July 22, 2009.

Source :

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2009/jul2009/gr_171655_2009.php

Findings of fact

"Xxx.

Findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court because of the trial court's unique advantage in observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor, deportment, and conduct of the witnesses as they testify.26 This Court need not thus pass upon the findings of fact of the trial court, especially if they have been affirmed on appeal by the appellate court, as in the present case.27 Nevertheless, the Court combed through the records of the case and found no ground to merit a reversal of appellants' conviction.

Xxx."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. PABLO L. ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG, Appellants. G.R. NO. 171655, July 22, 2009.

Source :
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2009/jul2009/gr_171655_2009.php

The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her.

"Xxx.

The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.

Xxx."

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors, petitioners,v s. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Respondents. G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976.

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

"Xxx.

Respondent Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that ejectment, being an action involving recovery of real property, is a real action which as such, is not extinguished by the defendant's death.

. . . The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.12

There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party, which death did not extinguish the deceased's civil personality.13 More significantly, a judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.14 Thus, we have held that:

. . . In such a case and considering that the supervening death of appellant did not extinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. There is no showing that the appellate court's proceedings in the case were tainted with irregularities.

It appears that petitioners are heirs of Adela Salindon. In fact, it was because of this relationship that the petitioners were able to transfer the title of Adela Salindon over the subject lot to their names. . . . Considering all this, the appellate decision is binding and enforceable against the petitioners as successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action (Section 49 [b] Rule 39, Rules of Court). Furthermore, . . . judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their relatives, or privies who derive their right of possession from the defendants (Ariem v. De los Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). Under the circumstances of this case, the same rule should apply to the successors-in-interest . . . .15

Xxx."

ABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA NEPOMUCENO, Respondents. G.R. No. 121510, November 23, 1995.

The defendant in an ejectment case having died before the rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its failure to effectuate a formal substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment, does not invalidate such judgment where the heirs themselves appeared before the trial court, participated in the proceedings therein, and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant, it undeniably being evident that the heirs themselves sought their day in court and exercised their right to due process.

"Xxx.

The need for substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process accruing to every party in any proceeding.8 The rationale underlying this requirement in case a party dies during the pendency of proceedings of a nature not extinguished by such death, is that

. . . the exercise of judicial power to hear and determine a cause implicitly presupposes in the trial court, amongst other essentials, jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. That jurisdiction was inevitably impaired upon the death of the protestee pending the proceedings below such that unless and until a legal representative is for him duly named and within the jurisdiction of the trial court, no adjudication in the cause could have been accorded any validity or binding effect upon any party, in representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court which is the very essence of the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process.9

We are not unaware of several cases10 where we have ruled that a party having died in an action that survives, the trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. This general rule notwithstanding, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant. Attending the case at bench, after all, are these particular circumstances which negate petitioner's belated and seemingly ostensible claim of violation of her rights to due process. We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment. Such had been the general rule established not because the rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Viewing the rule on substitution of heirs in this light, the Court of Appeals, in the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, thus expounded:

Although the jurisprudential rule is that failure to make the substitution is a jurisdictional defect, it should be noted that the purpose of this procedural rule is to comply with due process requirements. The original party having died, he could not continue to defend himself in court despite the fact that the action survived him. For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be substituted for the deceased. The real party in interest is the one who would be affected by the judgment. It could be the administrator or executor or the heirs. In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the defense for the deceased. Substitution is important because such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process. Such substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which may be called the formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process of letting the substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they should therefore actively participate in the defense of the deceased. This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is the heart of the procedural rule because this substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect to the purpose of the rule. It is this court's view that compliance with the substantive aspect of the rule despite failure to comply with the formal aspect may be considered substantial compliance. Such is the situation in the case at bench because the only inference that could be deduced from the following facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in the defense of the deceased after his death:

1. The original lawyer did not stop representing the deceased. It would be absurd to think that the lawyer would continue to represent somebody if nobody is paying him his fees. The lawyer continued to represent him in the litigation before the trial court which lasted for about two more years. A dead party cannot pay him any fee. With or without payment of fees, the fact remains that the said counsel was allowed by the petitioner who was well aware of the instant litigation to continue appearing as counsel until August 23, 1993 when the challenged decision was rendered;

2. After the death of the defendant, his wife, who is the petitioner in the instant case, even testified in the court and declared that her husband is already deceased. She knew therefore that there was a litigation against her husband and that somehow her interest and those of her children were involved;

3. This petition for annulment of judgment was filed only after the appeal was decided against the defendant on April 3, 1995, more than one and a half year (sic) after the decision was rendered (even if we were to give credence to petitioner's manifestation that she was not aware that an appeal had been made);

4. The Supreme Court has already established that there is such a thing as jurisdiction by estoppel. This principle was established even in cases where jurisdiction over the subject matter was being questioned. In the instant case, only jurisdiction over the person of the heirs is in issue. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the court more easily than jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the person may be acquired by the simple appearance of the person in court as did herein petitioner appear;

5. The case cited by the herein petitioner (Ferreria et al. vs. Manuela Ibarra vda. de Gonzales, et al.) cannot be availed of to support the said petitioner's contention relative to non-acquisition of jurisdiction by the court. In that case, Manolita Gonzales was not served notice and, more importantly, she never appeared in court, unlike herein petitioner who appeared and even testified regarding the death of her husband.11

Consequently, we rule that, as in the case at bench, the defendant in an ejectment case having died before the rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its failure to effectuate a formal substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment, does not invalidate such judgment where the heirs themselves appeared before the trial court, participated in the proceedings therein, and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant, it undeniably being evident that the heirs themselves sought their day in court and exercised their right to due process.

Xxx."

FABIANA C. VDA. DE SALAZAR, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA NEPOMUCENO, Respondents. G.R. No. 121510, November 23, 1995.

Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

"Xxx.

Thus, this petition for review where the only issue is whether or not the RTC decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of Juan Napere. Petitioner alleges that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the heirs because of its failure to order their substitution pursuant to Section 17,4 Rule 3 of the Rule of Court; hence, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered by the trial court are null and void.

The petition must fail.

When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules require the substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter’s legal representative.

The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that survives the death of the defendant. Notably, the counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty to inform the court of his client’s death and the names and addresses of the heirs. The trial court, however, failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Nonetheless, despite this oversight, we hold that the proceedings conducted and the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid.

The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party.5 The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.

Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.6

Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process.7 The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process.8 It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.9 Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein.10 Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.11

Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased.12 In such case, there is really no violation of the right to due process. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support of one’s defense.13 When due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.14

In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court and the judgment rendered therein because the petitioner, who was, in fact, a co-defendant of the deceased, actively participated in the case. The records show that the counsel of Juan Napere and petitioner continued to represent them even after Juan’s death. Hence, through counsel, petitioner was able to adequately defend herself and the deceased in the proceedings below. Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process as would nullify the proceedings and the judgment thereon can be invoked only by the heirs whose rights have been violated. Violation of due process is a personal defense that can only be asserted by the persons whose rights have been allegedly violated.15 Petitioner, who had every opportunity and who took advantage of such opportunity, through counsel, to participate in the trial court proceedings, cannot claim denial of due process.

Xxx."

CAPITOLINA VIVERO NAPERE, petitioner,v s. AMANDO BARBARONA and GERVACIA MONJAS BARBARONA, Respondents. G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008.

Death of a party - a complaint for recovery of possession of real property is an action which survives the death of a party.

"Xxx.

Petitioners assert that the trial court failed to comply with the clear language of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court which provides as follows:

"Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs."16

Petitioners allege that, as there was no appointed administrator for the estate of the deceased defendant, the trial court should have ordered the heirs to appear personally before it and manifest whether they were willing to substitute Glicerio. Petitioners further aver that if none of the heirs appeared or manifested to act as substitutes, the trial court should have ordered the adverse party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased who should appear for and on behalf of the deceased's interest.

Petitioners also harp on their failure to receive a copy of the Spouses Mariano's motion for substitution of Glicerio as well as the Order of the trial court admitting the motion. Petitioners argue that, even if they received a copy of the Order, the same did not grant the Spouses Mariano's motion for substitution. Since they were not aware of the purported substitution because of the lack of service on them of the motion and the Order, petitioners insist that the entire proceedings in the trial court were void for lack of jurisdiction over their persons.

It must be pointed out that, contrary to the Spouses Mariano's view, their complaint for recovery of possession of real property is an action which survives the death of a party.17 Such being the case, the rule on substitution of a deceased party is clearly applicable.

Under the express terms of Section 17 of the old Rules, in case of the death of a party and due notice is given to the trial court, it is the duty of the court to order the deceased's legal representative or heir to appear for the deceased.18 Otherwise, "the trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after trial, are null and void."19

Non-compliance with the rule on substitution of a deceased party renders the proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. In other words, a party's right to due process is at stake, as we enunciated in Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals,20 thus —

"We should not lose sight of the principle underlying the general rule that formal substitution of heirs must be effectuated for them to be bound by a subsequent judgment. Such had been the general rule established not because the rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein." (Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving a notice of Glicerio's death, failed to order the appearance of his legal representative or heirs. Instead, the trial court issued an Order merely admitting respondents' motion for substitution. There was no court order for Glicerio's legal representative to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for Glicerio. Neither did the respondents ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did Glicerio's heirs ever ask to be substituted for Glicerio. Clearly, the trial court failed to observe the proper procedure in substituting Glicerio. As a result, contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision, no valid substitution transpired in the present case.21

Thus, we rule that the proceedings and judgment of the trial court are void as to Felicidad, Glicerio, Jr., Bener and Julito. There is no iota of proof that they were apprised of the litigation against Glicerio. There is no indication that they authorized Atty. Pardalis to represent them or any showing that they appeared in the proceedings. Given these facts, the trial court clearly did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Such being the case, these heirs cannot be bound by the judgment of the trial court, as we have pronounced in Ferreria, et al. v. Vda. de Gonzales, et al.,22 thus —

"Inasmuch as Manolita Gonzales was never validly served a copy of the order granting the substitution and that furthermore, a valid substitution was never effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over Manolita Gonzales for the purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as legal representative of the estate of her mother Manuela."

However, despite the trial court's failure to adhere to the rule on substitution of a deceased party, its judgment remains valid and binding on the following heirs, namely, Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto. Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, shared in the case and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant.23 This is precisely because, despite the court's non-compliance with the rule on substitution, the heirs' right to due process was obviously not impaired.24 In other words, the purpose of the rule on substitution of a deceased party was already achieved. The following facts indicate plainly that there was active participation of these heirs in the defense of Glicerio after his death.

First, Salvador and Concepcion were among the original defendants in the case. Needless to state, the trial court, even before Glicerio's death, already acquired jurisdiction over the persons of these heirs. Hence, the rule on substitution of a deceased party is no longer required as to Salvador and Concepcion because they were already impleaded as defendants. In fact, Salvador, a lawyer son of Glicerio, was also one of the counsels for defendants.

Second, the lengthy testimonies of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto show that they defended their deceased father. Both Concepcion and Salvador testified in defense not only of themselves but also of their deceased father. As to Ernesto, while he was dropped as a defendant, he testified and admitted that he was one of the substitutes of Glicerio, thus —

"INTERPRETER: Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

WITNESS: ERNESTO BRIOSO, 45 years old, widower, farmer and residing at Puro-Batia, Libmanan, Camarines Sur.

INTERPRETER: Your witness is now ready.

ATTY. PARDALIS: With the permission of the Honorable Court.

COURT: Proceed.

Q: Are you one of the defendants in this case who was substituted for the late Glicerio R. Brioso?

A: Yes sir.

xxx xxx xxx"25

This shows that Ernesto understood that he was a substitute defendant in the case.

Third, Atty. Pardalis continued to represent Glicerio even after the latter's demise. Acting on Glicerio's behalf, Atty. Pardalis presented the testimonies of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto, to prove, among others, that Glicerio no longer had any interest in the Properties. These pieces of evidence clearly negate petitioners' contention that Atty. Pardalis ceased to be Glicerio's counsel upon the latter's death.

Assuming that Atty. Pardalis no longer represented Glicerio after his death, he remained as counsel for Salvador, Concepcion and Marcos. He should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings absent any formal substitution of Glicerio. Yet, despite the court's alleged lack of jurisdiction over the persons of his clients, Atty. Pardalis never bothered to challenge the same, not until after the trial court rendered its adverse decision.

Lastly, Atty. Pardalis received a copy of respondents' motion for substitution and the trial court's Order admitting the motion. Upon receipt of the motion and the Order, Atty. Pardalis should have immediately opposed the same for failure to comply with the rule on substitution. However, Atty. Pardalis did not question the motion and the Order, not until after the trial court rendered its decision. His long silence, which certainly binds his clients, can be construed as defendants' submission to the court's jurisdiction. The acquiescence of defendants and their counsel on the trial court's jurisdiction effectively precluded them from questioning the proceedings in the trial court.

In Ferreria et al. v. Vda. de Gonzales, et al.,26 Manolita Gonzales (one of the heirs of deceased defendant) was not served notice and, more importantly, never appeared in court, unlike Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto who appeared and even testified regarding their father's interest in the Properties. In sum, with the active participation of Salvador, Concepcion and Ernesto, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Accordingly, the proceedings and the decision of the trial court are valid with respect to these heirs.

As regards Marcos Nolasco, he was impleaded as a defendant primarily because he and Concepcion were among the actual possessors of the Properties. It was even defendants' contention that the complaint was defective for failure to implead Marcos as he was an indispensable party.27 Accordingly, the Spouses Mariano impleaded Marcos as a defendant, without whom no final determination can be had of the action.28 With Marcos' inclusion as a party, it is beyond dispute that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, the proceedings and judgment of the trial court are valid and binding upon Marcos.

Xxx."

GLICERIO R. BRIOSO, substituted by FELICIDAD Z. BRIOSO, BENER Z. BRIOSO, JULITO Z. BRIOSO, GLICERIO Z. BRIOSO, JR., and ERNESTO Z. BRIOSO, CONCEPCION B. NOLASCO, MARCOS NOLASCO and SALVADOR Z. BRIOSO, petitioners, vs. SALVADORA RILI-MARIANO and LEONARDO C. MARIANO, Respondents. G.R. No. 132765, January 31, 2003.

Warrantless search and arrest; a waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

G.R. No. 220732, September 06, 2016

ELMER G. SINDAC @ "TAMER," PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.


"xxx.

Section 2,[23] Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),[24] Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.[25]

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.[26]

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied with:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.[27]

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.[28]

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.[29]

In this case, the Court finds that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on the person of Sindac. Based on the records, the arresting officer, PO3 Peñamora, himself admitted that he was about five (5) to ten (10) meters away from Sindac and Cañon when the latter allegedly handed a plastic sachet to the former. Suspecting that the sachet contained shabu, he and PO1 Asis rushed to Sindac to arrest him. PO3 Peñamora's testimony on direct examination reveals:[30]

[Prosecutor Cherry May P. Avellano (Fiscal Avellano)]: Where did this selling of shabu take place?

[PO3 Peñamora]: At Poblacion Uno, Real, Quezon, ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: How did you know that there were selling of shabu that took place at Poblacion Uno, Real, Quezon [(Poblacion Uno)]?

[PO3 Peñamora]: We followed him from Ungos to [Poblacion Uno], ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: Where in particular did you proceed in [Poblacion Uno] wherein you followed him?

[PO3 Peñamora]: Along the national road, ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: When you saw [Sindacl selling shabu, how far were you located to that person?

[PO3 Peñamora]: 5 to 10 meters ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: When you said there was selling of shabu, what was the participation of [Sindac] in the selling?

[PO3 Peñamora]: He was the buyer, ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: Who was the seller then?

[PO3 Peñamora]: Alladin Cañon alias Indong, ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: What did [Cañon] do when you said he was selling shabu to [Sindac]?

[PO3 Peñamora]: He handed the shabu to [Sindac], ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: And what did [Sindac] do when [Cañon] handed shabu to [Sindac]?

[PO3 Peñamora]: He took it, ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: What did he do after he took the shabu?

[PO3 Peñamora]: He kept the shabu in his hand, ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: After [Sindac] kept the shabu in his hand, what did you do next?

[PO3 Peñamora]: We approached them, ma'am.

x x x x

[Fiscal Avellano]: After you arrested [Sindac], what did you do next if there was any?

[PO3 Peñamora]: We searched his pocket ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: Were you the one who personally searched the pocket of [Sindac]?

[PO3 Peñamora]: No ma'am, we ordered him to put out his wallet?

[Fiscal Avellano]: Did he comply with your order?

[PO3 Peñamora]: Yes ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: What did he do?

[PO3 Peñamora]: He turned out his pocket and showed his wallet, ma'am.

COURT

[Presiding Judge Arnelo C. Mesa (Judge Mesa)]: What was the result of that turning over his pocket and showing his wallet?

[PO3 Peñamora]: From his wallet I saw a small plastic folded, Your Honor.

[Judge Mesa]: Upon seeing this small plastic folded inside the pocket of his wallet, what transpired next if any?

[PO3 Peñamora]: As a policeman, I suspected it as shabu so I ordered him to take out the small plastic, Your Honor.

x x x x

[Judge Mesa]: Was it containing something?

[PO3 Peñamora]: Yes, Your Honor.

[Judge Mesa]: What was the content?

[PO3 Peñamora]: Crystalline substance, Your Honor.

[Judge Mesa]: Was there a color of the crystalline substance?

[PO3 Peñamora]: Colorless, looks like a tawas, Your Honor.

[Judge Mesa]: After he took out and showed to you this folded small plastic, what transpired next?

[PO3 Peñamora]: I took it from him, Your Honor.

x x x x

[Fiscal Avellano]: After you took that plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, what did you do next if any?

x x x x

[PO3 Peñamora]: I concluded that it to be a suspected shabu and I informed him that I will bring him to the police station and we arrested him, ma'am.

[Fiscal Avellano]: After you arrested him, what did you do next?

[PO3 Peñamora]: We brought him to the Municipal Police Station, we entered the matter to the police blotter and we prepared a receipt for evidence seized, ma'am. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Considering that PO3 Peñamora was at a considerable distance away from the alleged criminal transaction (five [5] to ten [10] meters), not to mention the atomity of the object thereof (0.04 gram of white crystalline substance[31] contained in a plastic sachet), the Court finds it highly doubtful that said arresting officer was able to reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so as to prompt him to conduct a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and, thereupon, a warrantless search. These similar circumstances were availing in the cases of Comerciante v. People[32] and People v. Villareal[33] where the Court likewise invalidated the in flagrante delcito arrest and ensuing warrantless search. In this relation, it should also be pointed out that no criminal overt act could be properly attributed to Sindac so as to rouse any reasonable suspicion in the mind of either PO3 Peñamora or PO1 Asis that Sindac had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sindac's actuations of talking to and later on, receiving an unidentified object from Cañon, without more, should not be considered as ongoing criminal activity that would render proper an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Neither has the prosecution established that the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113 — that is, that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it - have been complied with. From the circumstances above-discussed, it is fairly suspect that PO3 Peñamora had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Sindac. According to jurisprudence, "the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested,"[34] which, however do not obtain in this case.

Based on the foregoing, it is, in fact, quite perceivable that PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis had proceeded to apprehend Sindac solely on account of information retrieved from previous surveillance operations conducted on Sindac's alleged drug dealing activities. Advancing to a warrantless arrest based only on such information, absent circumstances that would lead to the arresting officer's "personal knowledge" as described in case law, unfortunately, skews from the exacting requirements of Section 5, Rule 113. It is settled that "reliable information" alone - even if it was a product of well-executed surveillance operations - is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. It is further required that the accused performs some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,[35] which, as already discussed, is missing in the instant case.

In People v. Villareal,[36] the Court highlighted the importance of the "personal knowledge" requirement by elucidating that:[37]

To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person's reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person's previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5[,] Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure].

Verily, warrantless arrests conducted without this indispensable requisite should be struck down as unlawful, as in this case.

This is not the first instance where the Court, despite the existence of reliable information on the part of the arresting officer, invalidated a warrantless arrest of an accused on account of such officer's lack of personal knowledge that the accused has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In People v. Racho,[38] the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest made on the person of the accused despite a confidential agent explicitly identifying him as a drug-dealer. In that case, the Court noted that at the time of the arrest, the accused was neither committing a crime in the presence of the police officers nor acting in a suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Further, the Court held that the arresting officers were not impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant, especially considering that they received the "tipped information" a day before conducting a warrantless arrest on the accused. To the Court, the arresting officers had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant. As such, their failure to do so renders the warrantless arrest, as well as the search made incidental thereto, invalid, thus, resulting in the acquittal of therein accused.[39]

As a consequence of the Sindac's unlawful arrest, it follows that there could be no valid search incidental to a lawful arrest which had yielded the plastic sachet containing 0.04 gram of shabu from Sindac. Notably, while it is true that Sindac: (a) failed to question the legality of the warrantless arrest against him before arraignment; and (b) actively participated in the trial of the case, it must nevertheless be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a waiver ONLY as to any question concerning any defects in his arrest, AND NOT with regard to the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. In Homar v. People[40]:

We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.

However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.[41] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
All told, since the shabu purportedly seized from Sindac constitutes inadmissible evidence in violation of Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Sindac's conviction to be improper and therefore, acquits him.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2015 and the Resolution dated September 18, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 35413 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Elmer G. Sindac alias "Tamer" is ACQUITTED for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.


Xxx."

"Plain view" doctrine in lawful warrantless search

G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
BILLY ACOSTA, Accused-Appellant


"xxx.

Section 2,20 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure become "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),21 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.22

One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is when the "plain view" doctrine is applicable.1awp++i1 In People v. Lagman,23 this Court laid down the following parameters for its application":


Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.24 (Emphases supplied)

In this case, the first and third requisites were not seriously contested by Acosta. Instead, he argues that the second requisite is absent since the discovery of the police officers of the marijuana plants was not inadvertent as it was prompted by Salucana. After a careful review of the records, this Court is inclined to agree.

The testimonies of P/Insp. Gundaya, SPO4 Legaspi, and Salucana collectively paint the picture that the police officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the mauling incident armed with prior knowledge that he was also illegally planting marijuana:

Direct Examination

[Assistant City Prosecutor Alfredo Z. Gomez (ACP Gomez)]: Why did you know that marijuana plants are owned and planted by the accused Billy Acosta?

[P/Insp. Gundaya]: It was disclosed to us by his foster father Alfredo Salucana that Billy Acosta is cultivating marijuana plants.25 (Emphasis supplied)

Direct Examination

[ACP Gomez]: If you know who was the one who planted those marijuana plants?

[SPO4 Legaspi]: I do not have personal knowledge considering that we did not see the accused in this case cultivate the plants. However, we just have been in [sic] fed of the information by Alfredo Salucana that it was Billy Acosta who cultivated that plants.26 (Emphasis supplied)

Direct Examination

[Court]: And that was the only time that you resort to report the incident to the police because he hurt you?

[Salucana]: Yes, Sir.

Q: At that time you reported the matter to the police you also told the police that Billy Acosta was planting marijuana?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: That is why they went with you because of that report because he planted marijuana and he struck you with a piece of wood?

A: Yes, Sir.

x x x x

ACP Gomez: (continuing) Would you know of any reason why Billy Acosta would strike you with a wood?

[Salucana]: Because of the marijuana that I was able to pass.

x x x x

Q: Did you ever call the attention of Billy Acosta about the marijuana plants you testified to?

A: I told him that planting the marijuana plants is against the law.

Q: What was his response?

A: He told me that he will change when he will be imprisoned.27 (Emphases supplied)

It is clear from Salucana's testimony that he knew of Acosta's illegal activities even prior to the mauling incident. In fact, it may be reasonably inferred that the mauling incident had something to do with Acosta's planting of marijuana. It is also clear that Salucana apprised the police officers of the illegal planting and cultivation of the marijuana plants when he reported the mauling incident. Thus, when the police officers proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted to the fact that there could possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the argument that the discovery of the plants was inadvertent. In People v. Valdez,28 the Court held that the "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually "searching" for evidence against the accused, to wit:

Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.29 (Emphases supplied)

Verily, it could not be gainsaid that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers already knew that there could be marijuana plants in the area. Armed with such knowledge, they would naturally be more circumspect in their observations. In effect, they proceeded to Acosta's abode, not only to arrest him for the mauling incident, but also to verify Salucana's report that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana. Thus, the second requisite for the "plain view" doctrine is absent. Considering that the "plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case, the seized marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous tree.30

All told, since the marijuana plants seized from Acosta constitute inadmissible evidence in violation of Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the confiscated plants are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Acosta's conviction to be improper and therefore, acquits him.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 22, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01612-MIN is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Billy Acosta is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.

Xxx."

Lawful warrantless arrest

G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT, Accused-Appellant.

"xxx.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.34

One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.35chanrobleslaw

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied with:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and 

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.


Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.36

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. In Pestilos v. Generoso,37 the Court explained the requirement of immediacy as follows:

Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested; committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.

However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstance" under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.38 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)


In this case, records reveal that at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Din personally witnessed a robbery incident while he was waiting for his turn to have a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor. After his brief shootout with the armed robbers, the latter fled using a motorcycle and a red Toyota Corolla. Through an investigation and verification made by the police officers headed by PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, they were able to: (a) find out that the armed robbers were staying in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os; and (b) trace the getaway vehicles to Manago. The next day, or on March 16, 2007, the police officers set up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait where, at around 9:30 in the evening, the red Toyota Corolla being driven by Manago passed by and was intercepted by the police officers. The police officers then ordered Manago to disembark the car, and from there, proceeded to search the vehicle and the body of Manago, which search yielded the plastic sachet containing shabu. Thereupon, they effected Manago's arrest.

The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under Section 5 (b) above was present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery incident and even engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - the required element of immediacy was not met. This is because, at the time the police officers effected the warrantless arrest upon Manago's person, investigation and verification proceedings were already conducted, which consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects of the March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As the Court sees it, the information the police officers had gathered therefrom would have been enough for them to secure the necessary warrants against the robbery suspects. However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which - considering the lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements therefor. Thus, there being no valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling that Manago was lawfully arrested.

In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise erred in ruling that the incidental search on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said search was made even before he was arrested and thus, violated the cardinal rule on searches incidental to lawful arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made.

Xxx."

Search of a moving vehicle

"xxx.

For another, the Court similarly finds the RTC's ruling that the police officers conducted a lawful warrantless search of a moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota Corolla untenable.

In Caballes v. People,39 the Court explained the concept of warrantless searches on moving vehicles:

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military or police checkpoints - as in this case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.41 Case law further states that routine inspections in checkpoints are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches, and thus, permissible, if limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the Vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (e) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.42

It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not give police officers carte blanche discretion to conduct warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search - as opposed to a mere routine inspection - such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.43

In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police officers had already conducted a thorough investigation and verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where they reside; and (c) the ownership of the getaway vehicles used in the robbery, i.e., the motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla. As adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were already enough for said police officers to secure the necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects. Consequently, there was no longer any exigent circumstance that would have justified the necessity of setting up the checkpoint in this case for the purpose of searching the subject vehicle. In addition, it is well to point out that the checkpoint was arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago, who was already identified as the culprit of the robbery incident. In this regard, it cannot, therefore, be said that the checkpoint was meant to conduct a routinary and indiscriminate search of moving vehicles. Rather, it was used as a subterfuge to put into force the capture of the fleeing suspect. Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt the legal requirement of - procuring a valid search/arrest warrant given the circumstances of this case. Hence, the search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and on the person of its driver, Manago, was unlawful.

In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search incidental thereto, including that of his moving vehicle were all unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Manago must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.44

Xxx."

G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT, Accused-Appellant.

Subject matter jurisdiction

"It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.27"


G.R. No. 189570 July 31, 2013

HEIRS OF SANTIAGO NISPEROS, TEODORICO NISPEROS, RESTITUTA LARON, CARMEL IT A H. NISPEROS, VIRGILIO H. NISPEROS, CON CHIT A H. NISPEROS, PURIT A H. ISPEROS, PEPITO H. NISPEROS, REBECCA H. NISPEROS, ABRAHAM H. NISPEROS, IGNACIO F. NISPEROS, RODOLFO F. NISPEROS, RAYMUNDO F. NISPEROS, RENA TO F. NISPEROS, FE N. MUNAR, BENITO F. NISPEROS, REYNALDO N. NISPEROS, MELBA N. JOSE, ELY N. GADIANO, represented by TEODORICO NISPEROS, Petitioners,
vs.
MARISSA NISPEROS-DUCUSIN, Respondent.

Jurisdiction; DAR Secretary vs. DARAB

G.R. No. 189570 July 31, 2013

HEIRS OF SANTIAGO NISPEROS, TEODORICO NISPEROS, RESTITUTA LARON, CARMEL IT A H. NISPEROS, VIRGILIO H. NISPEROS, CON CHIT A H. NISPEROS, PURIT A H. ISPEROS, PEPITO H. NISPEROS, REBECCA H. NISPEROS, ABRAHAM H. NISPEROS, IGNACIO F. NISPEROS, RODOLFO F. NISPEROS, RAYMUNDO F. NISPEROS, RENA TO F. NISPEROS, FE N. MUNAR, BENITO F. NISPEROS, REYNALDO N. NISPEROS, MELBA N. JOSE, ELY N. GADIANO, represented by TEODORICO NISPEROS, Petitioners,
vs.
MARISSA NISPEROS-DUCUSIN, Respondent.


"xxx.

The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the DARAB.

Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the rule in force at the time of the filing of the complaint by petitioners in 2001, provides:

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:

x x x x

f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;

x x x x

However, it is not enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA registered with the Land Registration Authority for the DARAB to have jurisdiction. What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties.23

Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as "any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements" and includes "any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."

Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental,24 this Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all of the following indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.25

In the instant case, petitioners, as supposed owners of the subject property, did not allege in their complaint that a tenancy relationship exists between them and respondent. In fact, in their complaint, they described respondent as a "ward" of one of the co-owners, Maria, who is "not a bona fide beneficiary, she being not engaged in farming because she was still a minor" at the time the VLT was executed.26

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.27

Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an agrarian dispute among the parties, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is the DAR Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised by petitioners. As held in Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz:

The Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB.28 (Emphasis supplied.)

What the P ARAD should have done is to refer the complaint to the proper office as mandated by Section 4 of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000:

SEC. 4. Referral of Cases.- If a case covered by Section 2 herein is filed before the DARAB, the concerned DARAB official shall refer the case to the proper DAR office for appropriate action within five (5) days after said case is determined to be within the jurisdiction of the Secretary.

Likewise, if a case covered by Section 3 herein is filed before any office other than the DARAB, the concerned DAR official shall refer the case to the DARAB for resolution within the same period provided herein.

While it is true that the PARAD and the DARAB (which was upheld by the CA) thoroughly discussed in their respective decisions the issues pertaining to the validity of the VLT and the OCT/CLOA issued to respondent, the fact that they are bereft of jurisdiction to resolve the same prevents this Court from resolving the instant petition on its merits. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not allow a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.29 To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. The DAR must be given a chance to correct its administrative and procedural lapses in the issuance of the CLOA.30 Moreover, it is in a better position to resolve the particular issue at hand, being the agency possessing the required expertise on the matter and authority to hear the same.

WHEREFORE, the July 13, 2009 Decision and September 14, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105898 are SET ASIDE. The complaint is REFERRED to the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary for appropriate action.

Xxx."

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."

G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.


"xxx.

Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two provisions determine the resolution of this case.

The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified."1

Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil

The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.

The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.

Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.

There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?

Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:

SECTION 11. Official Ballot. – The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.

For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.

The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens’ arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.

Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee:


SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and national officials?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present periods.

SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, he’s already a candidate, and there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .

SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began (sic).

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we don’t provide that the filing of the certificate will not bring about one’s being a candidate.

SENATOR GONZALES. If that’s a fact, the law cannot change a fact.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readable ballots.

So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

x x x x

SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply immediately upon being a candidate?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just to afford the Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to change the campaign periods as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). That’s right.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But he will still not be considered as a candidate.

Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)

Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that —

The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)

Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:

x x x

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.

The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states —

x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.

In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads —

x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.

When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.

We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:

x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "‘candidate’ refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining one’s possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of the campaign period. x x x

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.5

The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The Decision states that:

x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period," does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity, However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.6 (Emphasis supplied)

It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

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