Friday, May 1, 2020
Bigamy - "It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent. G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000.
“x x x.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."
X x x.
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."
The elements of this crime are as follows:
"1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity."7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.8 Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries9 of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been characterized as "conflicting." [Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J.]. In People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845, September 28, 1954, a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033, February 28, 1957, which involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315, 326, January 30, 1971 [See also Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615, June 30, 1970], Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525,529, May 30, 1983, however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499, August 19, 1986, the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, 145 SCRA 229, October 28, 1986, the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy."
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages." [People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845, 847, September 28, 1954, per Paras, CJ. See also People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033, 1034-1035, February 28, 1957, per Labrador, J.].
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 1986, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6, 11, July 3, 1992, per curiam, which involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage [Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 829]:
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
X x x.”
Psychological incapacity not proven - The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent. G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005.
“x x x.
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32
X x x.”
Foreign divorce - Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent. G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005.
“x x x.
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
X x x.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
X x x.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
X x x.
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855].
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
X x x.”
False affidavit of cohabitation in marriage - "Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. "
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008. Companion case: FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. G.R. No. 179474, March 28, 2008.
“x x x.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919 (1999).. To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. [People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082]. This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law [Act No. 3613], whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. [Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.].
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. [Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310].
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law [Ninal vs. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000).], as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. [Report of the Code Commission, p. 80].
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."
One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001)] but reasonably construed. [Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999)]. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.]. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508]. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review. [Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605]. It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999)]. Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. [People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082]. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. [Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001)]. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. [Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000)]. There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. [Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38)].
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [Niñal v. Bayadog, supra]. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001)] but reasonably construed. [Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999)]. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.]. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508]. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review. [Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605]. It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999)]. Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. [People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082]. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. [Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001)]. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. [Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000)]. There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. [Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38)].
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [Niñal v. Bayadog, supra]. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.
x x x."
RA 9271 - “Quarantine Act of 2004.”
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9271]
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE REGULATORY CAPACITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH IN QUARANTINE AND INTERNATIONAL HEALTH SURVEILLANCE REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 123 OF 1947, AS AMENDED
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled.
SECTION. 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the “Quarantine Act of 2004.”
SEC. 2. The Bureau of Quarantine. — The Bureau of Quarantine under the Department of Health (DOH), with the category of a first-class line bureau, shall have a nationwide scope of function and international commitment in accord with the International Health Regulations (IHR) of the world Health Organization (WHO).
SEC. 3. Jurisdiction and the Functions of the Bureau. — The examination at ports of entry and exit in the Philippines of incoming and outgoing vessels and aircraft, the necessary surveillance over their sanitary conditions, as well as over their cargoes, passengers, crews, and all personal effects, and the issuance of quarantine certificates, bills of health or other equivalent documents shall be vested in and be conducted by the Bureau. This Bureau shall have authority over incoming vessels and outgoing vessels both domestic and foreign, including those of the army and navy, their wharfage and anchorage, and over aircraft and airports, insofar as it is necessary for the proper enforcement of the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 4. Authority to Promulgate and Enforce Rules and Regulations and Provide Penalties for Their Violations. — (a) The Director of the Bureau with the approval of the Secretary of Health, is authorized to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission or spread of “public health emergencies of international concern” from foreign countries into the Philippines or from one (1) domestic seaport/airport to another. For purposes of implementing these regulations, the Director of Bureau may provide intervention strategies such as health education and advisories, inspections, fumigation, disinfection, pest extermination, vaccination for international travel, medical examination of aliens/foreigners for immigration purposes and destruction of animals or articles found to be infected or contaminated as to be sources of infection to human beings in coordination with other concerned quarantine agencies such as veterinary quarantine, plant quarantine, etc. and other measures as in his judgment may be necessary.
(b) Regulations prescribed under this section shall provide for the apprehension, detention or surveillance for the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission or spread of such public health emergencies of international concern as may be specified from time to time in Department Orders by the Secretary of Health upon the recommendation of the international health surveillance.
(c) Whenever it is deemed necessary for the protection of the public health of the nation from public health emergencies of international concern, immunization and other preventable measures against these diseases shall be mandatory on all persons arriving all any seaport/airport of entry in the Philippines.
(d) The Secretary of Health upon the recommendation of the Director of the Bureau may prescribe examination of any individual believed to be infected with a disease of international concern on board vessels and aircraft entering any seaport or airport in the Philippines. Such rules and regulations may provide that if upon examination, any such individual is found to be infected or has been exposed to infection considered as dangerous contact, he may be isolated aboard a vessel, in a hospital with facilities for infectious diseases, at a quarantine station, or at any isolation facility, and in such a manner as may be prescribed by the said regulations.
SEC. 5. Prohibition of Entry of Hazardous Cargo and Materials. — Whenever the Director of the Bureau determines that there is an existence of any public health emergency of international concern in a foreign country and that there is imminent danger of the introduction of hazardous cargoes or materials into the Philippines, he, in coordination with the Bureau of Customs and other concerned agencies, may recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Health, the prohibition of its entry for public health interest.
SEC. 6. Quarantine Stations. — The Director of the Bureau shall control direct and manage all quarantine stations, grounds and anchorages, and designate their boundaries. With the approval of the Secretary of Health, he shall establish such additional quarantine stations, grounds and anchorages if, in his judgment, these are necessary to prevent the introduction of diseases of international concern into the country. The Director, in the same manner may also order the closure of non-functional quarantine, stations, grounds and anchorages. ATcaEH
SEC. 7. Quarantine Documents/Clearances of Vessels and Aircraft. — (a) All vessels or aircraft from foreign ports arriving at any port of the Philippines shall be required to submit the required maritime declaration of health/general declaration and other documents as prescribed by the regulations.
(b) All ocean-going vessels or international aircraft from foreign seaports/airports calling at any seaport or airport in the Philippines to disembark its passengers or discharge its cargo, or for other purposes must secure a quarantine clearance in compliance with the health regulations. This quarantine certificate or/clearance: (Pratique) shall be a prerequisite to customs clearance.
(c) After compliance with the quarantine laws and regulations is all vessels or aircraft leaving any seaport or airport of the Philippines shall secure quarantine outgoing clearance. This certificate/clearance shall also be a prerequisite to customs clearance of outgoing vessels and aircraft.
SEC. 8. Penalties. — (a) Any person who violates any regulation prescribed in this Act shall forfeit to the Bureau of Quarantine a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos ₱50,000.00) or be imprisoned for not more than one (1) year or both at the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) Any vessel or aircraft that violates any provision this Act shall forfeit to the Bureau of Quarantine a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
SEC. 9. Authority to Utilize Income. — The Bureau of Quarantine shall be authorized to use at least fifty percent (50%) of the income generated, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
SEC. 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The DOH shall promulgate the implementing rules and regulations of this Act within sixty (60) days after the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 11. Separability Clause. — In the event any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of said provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
SEC. 12. Repealing Clause. — Republic Act No. 123 of 1947, as amended, and all acts, rules and regulations regarding foreign and local quarantine not consistent with this Act are hereby repealed.
SEC. 13. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA
Speaker of the House
of Representatives (Sgd.) FRANKLIN M. DRILON
President of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of S. No. 2749 and H. No. 6116 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on February 6, 2004 and February 7, 2004, respectively.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Representatives (Sgd.) OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of the Senate
Approved: MAR 19, 2004
(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
Co-ownership by all legal heirs of the estate of decedent - Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
See - https://www.manilatimes.net/2020/03/18/legal-advice/dearpao/selling-a-co-owned-property/703914/
"x x x.
You are also a co-owner of the property pursuant to the rule on succession. Under Article 774 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, it is stated that:
“Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.”
It is important to emphasize that you became a co-owner of the said property upon the death of your father. This is in consonance with Article 777 of the said Code, which states that “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.”Corollary to the above-mentioned provisions of law is Article 493 of the same Code, which provides that:
“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
This law was expounded by the court in the case of Philippine National Bank vs. Garcia, et al. (GR 182839, June 2, 2014), where the Supreme Court through Associate Justice Arturo Brion stated that:
“While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical adjudication. An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners. What a co-owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. xxx”
Applying the above-quoted decision in your situation, you and your siblings and your
mother became the co-owners of the land upon the death of your father. Your mother, being a co-owner, cannot dispose or sell the entire property. She can only sell her undivided aliquot share, which is limited to the portion that may be allotted to her upon partition.
x x x."
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