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Wednesday, January 8, 2020
Foreign divorce decree; proofs of; recognition in Philippines
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.
“x x x.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
X x x.”
Par. 2, Art. 26, Family Code - "Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.
“x x x.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Dorn already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al. and Medina v. Koike.
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
X x x.”
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Dorn already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al. and Medina v. Koike.
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
X x x.”
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent. G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014.
“x x x.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
x x x x.”
Judicial separation of property
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent. G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014.
“x x x.
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.20 Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.
X x x.”
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.
X x x.”
Foreign divorce judgment - "The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. "
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent. G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014.
“x x x.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on certification where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
X x x.”
Partition - "Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court."
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners, vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents. G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011.
“x x x.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,15 and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.16 The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,17 to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share.18 Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.19 Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.20 This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).21
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.
In their separate comments,22 the respondents aver that each of the heirs had already received "a certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did not present any public document on the allocation among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Marta’s estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties had already been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the property sold adversely affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly decided with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,23 to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void.1âwphi1 But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husband’s other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.).
x x x.”
Possessor in good faith - "The signatures of Jacinta and of Ricardo (as witness) as well as her successful entry to the property appear to have comforted Dolores that everything was in order. Article 526 of the Civil Code provides that she is deemed a possessor in good faith, who is not aware that there exists in her title or mode of acquisition any flaw that invalidates it. "
DOLORES ALEJO, PETITIONER, V. SPOUSES ERNESTO CORTEZ AND PRISCILLA SAN PEDRO, SPOUSES JORGE LEONARDO AND JACINTA LEONARDO AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. No. 206114, June 19, 2017 ].
“x x x.
Nevertheless, We agree with the RTC and the CA when it held that the void Kasunduan constitutes a continuing offer from Jacinta and Dolores and that Jorge had the option of either accepting or rejecting the offer before it was withdrawn by either, or both, Jacinta and Dolores.
The point of contention is whether Jorge accepted such continuing offer. If so, then the Kasunduan is perfected as a binding contract; otherwise, the Kasunduan remains void.
The RTC opined that Jorge's failure to expressly repudiate the Kasunduan and his demand that Dolores comply with her undertakings therein show Jorge's acceptance of the sale of the conjugal property. On the other hand, the CA noted that in varying the terms of the Kasunduan, i.e., in the time of payment and the purchase price, Jorge is deemed to have only qualifiedly accepted the same.
We agree with the CA.
It is undisputed that after the execution of the Kasunduan, Jorge sent two letters to Dolores: one, informing her that he did not consent to the sale; and the other, demanding that Dolores pay the balance of the purchase price on or before October 5, 1996 and failing which, the purchase price shall be increased to PhP700,000.
Clearly, Jorge's first letter was an outright and express repudiation of the Kasunduan. The second letter, while ostensibly a demand for compliance with Dolores' obligation under the Kasunduan, varied its terms on material points, i.e., the date of payment of the balance and the purchase price. Consequently, such counter-offer cannot be construed as evidencing Jorge's consent to or acceptance of the Kasunduan for it is settled that where the other spouse's putative consent to the sale of the conjugal property appears in a separate document which does not contain the same terms and conditions as in the first document signed by the other spouse, a valid transaction could not have arisen.[24]
Neither can Jorge's subsequent letters to Dolores be treated as a ratification of the Kasunduan for the basic reason that a void contract is not susceptible to ratification. Nor can Jorge's alleged participation in the negotiation for the sale of the property or his acquiescence to Dolores' transfer to and possession of the subject property be treated as converting such continuing offer into a binding contract as the law distinctly requires nothing less than a written consent to the sale for its validity. Suffice to say that participation in or awareness of the negotiations is not consent.[25]
As above intimated, a determination that the Kasunduan is void renders the other issues raised by Dolores academic, i.e., whether the doctrine of res judicata applies and whether the Spouses Cortez are buyers in bad faith; hence they merit no further discussion.
The CA Correctly Ruled that Dolores
is a Possessor in Good Faith
While the Kasunduan was void from the beginning, Dolores is, in all fairness, entitled to recover from the Spouses Leonardo the amount of PhP300,000 with legal interest until fully paid.
Moreover, the CA correctly appreciated Dolores' standing as a possessor in good faith. It appears that Dolores acted in good faith in entering the subject property and building improvements on it. Ricardo represented that Jacinta and Jorge wanted to sell the subject property. Dolores had no reason to believe that Ricardo and Jacinta were lying. Indeed, upon her own brother's prodding, Dolores willingly parted with her money and paid the down payment on the selling price and later, a portion of the remaining balance. The signatures of Jacinta and of Ricardo (as witness) as well as her successful entry to the property appear to have comforted Dolores that everything was in order. Article 526 of the Civil Code provides that she is deemed a possessor in good faith, who is not aware that there exists in her title or mode of acquisition any flaw that invalidates it.
Likewise, as correctly held by the CA, Dolores, as possessor in good faith, is under no obligation to pay for her stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment. She is further entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements introduced on the property with a right of retention until reimbursement is made. The Spouses Leonardo have the option under Article 546 of the Civil Code of indemnifying Dolores for the cost of the improvements or paying the increase in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.[26]
X x x.”
Sale by one Spouse of Conjugal Real Property is Void Without the Written Consent of the other Spouse
DOLORES ALEJO, PETITIONER, V. SPOUSES ERNESTO CORTEZ AND PRISCILLA SAN PEDRO, SPOUSES JORGE LEONARDO AND JACINTA LEONARDO AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. No. 206114, June 19, 2017 ].
“x x x.
The key issue in this case is whether the Kasunduan for the sale of a conjugal real property between Jacinta and Dolores as a continuing offer has been converted to a perfected and binding contract. For, if Jorge has not accepted or consented to the said sale, the Kasunduan is considered void rendering the other issues raised herein merely academic.
Sale by one Spouse of Conjugal Real Property is Void
Without the Written Consent of the other Spouse
Any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 thereof which provides:
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is therefore unequivocal when it states that the disposition of conjugal property of one spouse sans the written consent of the other is void. Here, it is an established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta and signed by her alone. By plain terms of the law therefore, the Kasunduan is void.
X x x.”
Dismissal of appeal - absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page references to the record.
DOLORES ALEJO, PETITIONER, V. SPOUSES ERNESTO CORTEZ AND PRISCILLA SAN PEDRO, SPOUSES JORGE LEONARDO AND JACINTA LEONARDO AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. No. 206114, June 19, 2017 ].
“x x x.
Dismissal of Appeal Lies within the Sound
Discretion of the Appellate Court
Technically, the CA may dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with the requirements under Sec. 13, Rule 44. Thus, Section 1, Rule 50 provides that an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee upon the ground, among others, of absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page references to the record.
Nevertheless, it has been consistently held that such provision confers a power, not a duty, on the appellate court.[22] The dismissal is directory, not mandatory, and as such, not a ministerial duty of the appellate court.[23] In other words, the CA enjoys ample discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal. What is more, the exercise of such discretion is presumed to have been sound and regular and it is thus incumbent upon Dolores to offset such presumption. Yet, the records before this Court do not satisfactorily show that the CA has gravely abused its discretion in not dismissing the Spouses Leonardo's and Spouses Cortez' appeals.
On the contrary, We are of the view that the ends of justice will be better served if the instant case is determined on the merits, after full opportunity to ventilate their respective claims and defenses is afforded to all parties. After all, it is far better to decide a case on the merits, as the ultimate end, rather on a technicality.
X x x.”
Possessor in good faith - Article 448, Civil Code
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners, vs. CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO, Respondents. G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010.
“x x x.
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale declared void is forever lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.23 As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on the affidavit of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a premonition that the requirement of consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent down payment on the selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them.24 What is more, they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code,25 of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase in value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.
X x x.”
Absence of marital consent - "Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. "
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners, vs. CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO, Respondents. G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010.
“x x x.
Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife.18 Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.22 This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe. Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based on fraud and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which applies to fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may be deemed given to the Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of action already prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in that they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that Rosario’s written consent to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the time they learned that her signature had been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale and get back their money plus damages. They never exercised the right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a false representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it turned out that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time she discovered the fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here. Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
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