PNP administrative cases; finality of disciplinary action; reinstatement and salary

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6975 December 13, 1990 -  "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990."

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

"Section 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. – The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That the regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary."

"Section 48. Entitlement to Reinstatement and Salary.– A member of the PNP who may have been suspended from office in accordance with the provisions of this Act or who shall have been terminated or separated from office shall, upon acquittal from the charges against him, be entitled to reinstatement and to prompt payment of salary, allowances and other benefits withheld from him by reason of such suspension or termination."

The arbitral award or judgment, dated July 12, 2016, was issued unanimously by the five members of the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

See - https://opinion.inquirer.net/123043/understanding-the-arbitral-award/amp


"x x x.

Understanding the arbitral award
Artemio V. Panganiban 
The arbitral award or judgment, dated July 12, 2016, was issued unanimously by the five members of the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (that is how the tribunal called itself). Alleging the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction, China refused to participate in the proceedings and does not recognize the award. To help readers understand the lengthy 501-page award, I will try to summarize it into three parts.

First, it rejected China’s “nine-dash line” and its claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over almost the entire South China Sea (SCS) for contravening the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). Consequently, the SCS is open to freedom of navigation by all countries.

Second, it upheld our maritime claims over the rocks, islets and other features in the Spratlys and declared unlawful the Chinese incursions into the UN-recognized baseline entitlements of our “archipelagic state,” namely, our 12-nautical-mile (NM) territorial sea, 24-NM contiguous zone, 200-NM exclusive economic zone and 350-NM extended continental shelf. This entire sea area along the west side of our country from Aparri to Sulu is collectively referred to as the West Philippine Sea (WPS).

Third, it held that none of the disputed maritime features is an “island” and, therefore, even if China occupies and has built structures on these features, it has no maritime rights over the WPS. It also ruled that Scarborough Shoal, located 124 NM west of Zambales, is a high-tide elevation with a protruding rock that generates only a 12-NM territorial sea. Though declared a traditional fishing area for Filipino, Chinese and Vietnamese fisherfolk, it was seized and is now occupied by China.

Note, however, that the Philippines did not ask for, and the tribunal did not award, any rights over the land areas, given that the arbitration was about maritime rights only, and did not include land occupations, reclamations and constructions.

Although they were not parties to the arbitration won by the Philippines, the great powers of the world now freely enjoy and enforce the first part of the award. American, Australian, British and Japanese warships, submarines and warplanes openly roam the SCS, ignoring Chinese warnings that they are violating China’s air space and maritime territory.

But they are not enforcing the second and third parts, which are left to our care. Neither are these two parts enforced by sheriffs and policemen. While we have defense pacts with the United States and other countries, there is no certainty that these powers will enforce the award unless, like us, they too are benefited.

True indeed is the teaching of Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple) of Great Britain that in international relations, there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests.

Verily, during World War II, Japan and Germany were the enemies of the United States while China and Russia were its allies. Now, their national interests have changed and no longer intersect; so have their status as friends and enemies. Their enemies yesterday are their friends today. And vice versa. Ditto for China. Its rhetoric and acts are always calculated to promote its interests.

By itself, the award cannot be used by the Philippines to prevent (much less oust) China from occupying the rocks above water at high tide in the SCS and from reclaiming land, constructing airports, seaports and other installations thereon, because, as I said, it covered only rights over water, not over land.

Unlike the great powers, the Philippines does not have the military capability to watch over and protect Filipinos who fish or exploit the natural resources in the WPS. True, it has concluded mutual defense pacts with the great powers like the United States.

Sadly, however, these treaties have no express provisions that obligate them to protect our maritime rights in the WPS. They will do so only if their national interests impel them to. After all, the American people pay taxes to protect their interests, not those of aliens. “America First” is their slogan.

How then can we enforce our maritime rights in the WPS? Ah, that’s a good topic for another column.

Comments to chiefjusticepanganiban@hotmail.com
x x x."

An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.

See - https://www.manilatimes.net/criminal-cases-are-separate-from-administrative-action/595203/

"Xxx.

The two cases are independent from each other. In the case Flores vs People of the Philippines (GR 222861, April 23, 2018), the Supreme Court, through Associate Justice Alexander Gesmundo, stated that:

“It is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. Given the differences in the quantum of evidence required, the procedures actually observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as the objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Hence, the exoneration in the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice versa.

“x x x.

“In the case at bar, the administrative case for grave misconduct filed against petitioner and the present case for simple robbery are separate and distinct cases, and are independent from each other. The administrative and criminal proceedings may involve similar facts but each requires a different quantum of evidence. In addition, the administrative proceeding conducted was before the PNP Internal Affairs Service and was summary in nature. In contrast, in the instant criminal case, the Regional Trial Court conducted a full-blown trial and the prosecution was required to proffer proof beyond reasonable doubt to secure petitioner’s conviction.

Furthermore, the proceedings included witnesses who were key figures in the events leading to petitioner’s arrest. Witnesses of both parties were cross examined by their respective counsels creating a clearer picture of what transpired, which allowed the trial judge to have a better appreciation of the attendant facts and determination of whether the prosecution proved the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.”

Applying the above-cited decision in your situation, the administrative case arising from the same act, which you filed against the respondent, is distinct from the criminal case. Thus, the dismissal of the administrative case does not affect the prosecution of the criminal case. The procedure in the administrative case is summary in nature and the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence, whereas, in the criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary.

Xxx."

R.A. 10071 - Prosecution Service Act of 2010

See - https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2010/ra_10071_2010.html


REPUBLIC ACT No. 10071

AN ACT STRENGTHENING AND RATIONALIZED THE NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010."

Section 2. Scope. - The constituent offices herein covered shall include the Prosecution Staff and the Regional, Provincial and City Prosecution Offices under the Secretary of Justice, that compose the National Prosecution Service as created and established in the succeeding sections.

Section 3. Creation of the National Prosecution Service. - There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service to be composed of the prosecution staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of regional prosecution offices, offices of the provincial prosecutor and offices of the prosecutor as are hereinafter Provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the preliminary investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws under the supervision of the Secretary of Justice, subject to the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 7 hereof.

Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. - The power vested in the Secretary of Justice includes authority to act directly on any matter involving national security or a probable miscarriage of Justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor and to review, reverse, revise, modify or affirm on appeal or petition for review as the law or the rules of the Department of Justice (DOJ) may provide, final judgements and orders of the prosecutor general, regional prosecutors, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.

For purposes of determining the cases which may be acted on, directly by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "national security" shall refer to crimes against national security as Provided under the Penal Code, Book II, Title 1, and other cases involving acts of terrorism as defined under the Human Security Act under Republic Act No. 9372.
Section 5. The Prosecution Staff and its Functions. - There shall be in the Office of the Secretary of Justice a prosecution staff that shall be composed of prosecuting officers in such number as herein below determined. It shall be headed by a Prosecutor General who shall be assisted by the following:

(a) Five (5) Senior Deputy State Prosecutors;

(b) Five (5) Deputy State Prosecutors;

(c) Thirty five (35) Senior Assistant State prosecutors;

(d) Eighty (80) Assistant State Prosecutors; and

(e) Twenty (20) Prosecution Attorneys.

The Prosecution Staff, which shall be under the control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice, shall have the following functions:

(1) Assist the secretary of Justice in the exercise of his/her appelate jurisdiction;

(2) Conduct the preliminary investigation and prosecution of criminal cases involving national security, those for which task forces have been created and criminal cases whose venues are transferred to avoid miscarriage of justice, all when so directed by the Secretary of Justice as public interest may require;

(3) Act as counsel for the People of the Philippines in any case involving or arising from a criminal complaint investigated by any of its prosecutors and pending before any trial court;

(4) Investigate administrative charges against prosecutors, other prosecution officers and members of their support staff;

(5) Prepare legal opinions on queries involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and special penal laws; and

(6) Monitor all criminal cases filed with the Office of the Prosecutor General; maintain an updated record of the status of each case, and adopt such systems and procedures as will expedite the monitoring and disposition of cases.

The Prosecutor General and Senior Deputy State Prosecutors shall act as a Selection and Promotion Board to screen for appointment or promotion to any prosecutorial position in the Office of the Prosecutor General. The regional prosecutor, provincial prosecutor or city prosecutor shall sit as a member of the Board whenever it considers applicants for positions in his/her office. The Prosecutor General shall be the chairperson of the Board.

Section 6. Regional Prosecution Office. - There shall be at each administrative region, except the National Capital Region (NCR), a Regional Prosecution Office to be headed by a Regional Prosecutor who shall be assisted by one (1) Deputy Regional Prosecutor, one (1) Senior Assistant Regional Prosecutor, three (3) Assistant Regional Prosecutors, and one (1) Prosecution Attorney.

For purposes of this regionalization, the NCR shall be placed under the administrative supervision of the Prosecutor General.

Section 7. Powers and Functions of the Regional Prosecutor. - The Regional Prosecutor shall, under the control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice, have the following powers and functions:

(a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules and regulations of the DOJ relative to the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his/her region;

(b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city prosecutors and other prosecuting officers for provinces and cities comprised within his/her region;

(c) Prosecute any case arising within the region;

(d) When so delegated by the Secretary of Justice, resolve with finality appeals from or petitions for review of judgements and orders of provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants within the region in cases where the offenses charged are cognizable by the municipal trial court. This notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from exercising his power or review over such resolutions of the regional Prosecutor in instances where lies grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Prosecutor, and from determining the extent of the coverage of the power of review of the Regional Prosecutors;

(e) Designate a prosecutor from any office of the provincial or city prosecutor within the region as Acting Provincial or City Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute a case in instances where parties question the partiality or bias of a particular city or provincial prosecutor or where the city or provincial prosecutor voluntarily inhibits himself/herself by reason of relationship to any of the parties within the sixth (6th) civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;

(f) With respect to his/her regional office and the offices of the provincial and city prosecutors within his region, he/she shall:

(1) Appoint such number of subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary; and approve transfer of subordinate personnel within the jurisdiction of the regional office and exercise disciplinary actions over them in accordance with the Civil Service law, other existing laws and regulations;

(2) Approve requests for sick, vacation and maternity and other kinds of leaves, with or without pay, for a period not exceeding one (1) year, for overtime services; for permission to exercise their profession or to engage in business outside of office hours; for official travel within the region for periods not exceeding thirty (30) days; and for claims and benefits under existing laws;

(3) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants and all other prosecuting officers of the provinces and cities within his/her region;

(4) Investigate administrative complaints against prosecutors and other prosecuting officers within the region and submit his/her recommendation to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof and where warranted, submit the appropriate recommendation to the office of the president for the latter's consideration;

(5) Approve attendance of personnel in conferences, seminars and other training programs within the region;

(6) Prepare the budget for the region for approval of the Secretary of Justice and administer the same;

(7) Approve requisition for supplies, materials and equipment, as well as books, periodicals and the like and other items for the region in accordance with the approved supply procurement program;

(8) Negotiate and conclude contracts for services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment and the likes within the budgetary limits set for the region;

(9) Within his/her region, monitor the submission of all reports as may be required by the Secretary of Justice;

(10) Coordinate with the regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies of the government and with local governments units in the region; and

(11) perform such other duties and functions as may be Provided by law or as may further be delegated by the Secretary of Justice.

Section 8. The Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - There still be for each province or city a Provincial Prosecutor or city Prosecutor, as the case may be, who shall be assisted by at least one (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor or Deputy City Prosecutor and such number of assistant and associate prosecutors as provided for hereinafter. Provided, however, That whenever a new province or city is created, it shall have a provincial prosecutor or city prosecutor, a deputy provincial prosecutor or deputy city prosecutor and such number of assistant and associate prosecutors as there are court branches therein at the ratio of two (2) prosecutors for each branch of regional trial court, one (1) prosecutor for each branch of metropolitan trial court or municipal trial court in cities, and one (1) prosecutor for every two (2) municipal trial courts in municipalities or branches thereof municipal circuit trial courts.

Upon the establishment of the new province or city, position items of Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the mother province in excess of the new equivalent pursuant to the ratio established above for the courts or branches thereof that remained to be served by the office shall be transferred automatically to the Office of the provincial Prosecutor or Office of the City Prosecutor for the new province or city, as the case may be: Provided, further, That when all or almost all of the regional trial court branches are seated at the city, the number of prosecutors for the city shall be proportional to the territorial jurisdiction covered by such branches of the courts.

In case a province is reverted to the mother province or a city is reconverted into a municipality for whatever reason, all the prosecution position items of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or Office of the City Prosecutor shall go to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the mother province: Provided, however, That the position title provincial prosecutor or city prosecutor for the former province or city shall be changed to Assistant Provincial Prosecutor or Associate Prosecutor, as the case may be, and shall have the corresponding rank provided in Section 15.

When the exigencies of the service so require, a province or city may create positions for special counsels whose salaries and other emoluments shall come exclusively from local funds.

Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - The provincial prosecutor shall:

(a) Be the law officer of the province or city, as the case may be:

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or any of his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and for this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to any trial court;

(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal actions, subject to the provisions of second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.

Section 10. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor Number of Prosecutors in Each Province. - There shall be for each of the following provinces the corresponding number of provincial prosecutor and his/her deputies, assistants and associates:

(a) Bulacan: (47)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Eighteen (18) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twenty-six (26) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(b) Pangasinan: (36)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Ten (10) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twenty-three (23) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(c) Cebu: (33)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Ten (10) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twenty (20) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(d) Leyte: (32)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Nine (9) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twenty (20) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(e) Quezon; Camarines sur: (31)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Nine (9) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Nineteen (19) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(f) Cagayan: (28)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Eight (8) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Seventeen (17) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(g) Nueva Ecija; Batangas; Laguna; Rizal: (26)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors

Eight (8) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Fifteen (15) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

(h) Iloilo: (24)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Fifteen (15) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(i) Cavite; Bohol: (23)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Fourteen (14) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(j) Isabela; Pampanga; Aklan: (22)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(k) Samar; Zamboanga Del Sur: (20)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Six (6) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Twelve (12) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(l) Northern Samar; Eastern Samar; (19)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Six (6) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Eleven (11) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(m) La Union; Lanao Del Sur: (18)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Eleven (11) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(n) Ilocos Sur: (17)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Ten (10) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(o) Benguet; Camarines Norte; Negros Oriental: (16)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Nine (9) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(p) Nueva Vizcaya; Misamis Oriental: (15)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Four (4) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Nine (9) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(q) Ilocos Norte; Antique; Negros Occidental; Cotabato: (14)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Four (4) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Eight (8) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(r) Albay; Zamboanga Del Norte; Lanao Del Norte: (13)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Four (4) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Seven (7) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(s) Abra; Surigao del Sur; Davao Oriental; Sulu: (12)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Seven (7) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(t) Zambales; Oriental Mindoro; Masbate; Sorsogon; Southern Leyte; Capiz; Tawi-tawi: (11)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Six (6) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(u) Tarlac; Occidental Mindoro; Palawan; Surigao del Norte; Agusan Del Norte; Maguindanao: (10)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Five (5) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(v) Davao Del Sur; Sultan Kudarat: (9)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Four (4) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(w) Ifugao; Quirino; Bataan; Romblon; Misamis Occidental; Bukidnon: (8)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Three (3) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(x) Mt. Province; Marinduque; Catanduanes; Zamboanga Sibugay; Agusan del Sur; South Cotabato: (7)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Three (3) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(y) Aurora; Biliran; Compostela Valley: (6)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

Two (2) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

Two (2) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(z) Batanes; Kalinga; Apayao; Camiguin; Basilan; Davao del Norte; Sarangani; (4)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors

One (1) Associate Provincial Prosecutors

(aa) Guimaras; Siquijor; Dinagat Islands: (3)

One (1) Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy Provincial Prosecutor

One (1) Associate Provincial Prosecutor

After the approval of this Act, there shall be for each province one (1) deputy provincial prosecutor for every twenty-five (25) prosecutors of a fraction thereof. When an office of the provincial prosecutor has more than one (1) deputy provincial prosecutor, the incumbent deputy provincial prosecutor first appointed shall be called senior deputy provincial prosecutor.

Section 11. Office of the City Prosecutor. Number of Prosecutor for Each City. - There shall be for each of the following cities the corresponding number of City Prosecutor and his/her deputies, assistants and associates.

(a) Manila: (178)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Deputy City Prosecutors

Seventy-four (74) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Ninety-six (96) Assistant City Prosecutors

(b) Quezon City: (109)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Five (5) Deputy City Prosecutors

Forty-eight (48) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Fifty-five (55) Assistant City Prosecutors

(c) Makati: (107)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Five (5) Deputy City Prosecutors

Fifty (50) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Fifty-one (51) Assistant City Prosecutors

(d) Cebu: (42)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Seventeen (17) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Twenty-two (22) Assistant City Prosecutors

(e) Pasig: (37)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Sixteen (16) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Eighteen (18) Assistant City Prosecutors

(f) Iloilo: (36)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Twenty (20) Assistant City Prosecutors

(g) Caloocan: (35)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Nineteen (19) Assistant City Prosecutors

(h) Pasay: (31)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Fifteen (15) Assistant City Prosecutors

(i) Bacolod; Davao; Cagayan de Oro: (30)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Fourteen (14) Assistant City Prosecutors

(j) Naga (Camarines Sur): (27)

One (1) City Prosecutor

Two (2) Deputy City Prosecutors

Twelve (12) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Twelve (12) Assistant City Prosecutors

(k) Paranaque: (23)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Thirteen (13) Assistant City Prosecutors

(l) Marikina: (22)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Twelve (12) Assistant City Prosecutors

(m) Las Pinas: (21)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Senior Assistant City Prosecutors

Seven (7) Assistant City Prosecutors

(n) Mandaluyong: (16)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Senior Assistant City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant City Prosecutors

(o) Valenzuela; Muntinlupa; Taguig: (15)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Senior Assistant city Prosecutors

Six (6) Assistant City Prosecutors

(p) Malabon and Navotas: (13)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Five (5) Senior Assistant city Prosecutors

Six (6) Assistant City Prosecutors

(q) San Juan: (10)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Four (4) Senior Assistant city Prosecutors

Four (4) Assistant City Prosecutors

(r) Baguio; San Fernando (Pampanga); Antipolo; Dumaguete: (20)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Assistant City Prosecutors

Eight (10) Associate City Prosecutors

(s) Cabanatuan; Legaspi: (19)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Assistant City Prosecutors

Nine (9) Associate City Prosecutors

(t) Batangas: (18)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Eight (8) Assistant City Prosecutors

Eight (8) Associate City Prosecutors

(u) Angeles: (17)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant City Prosecutors

Eight (8) Associate City Prosecutors

(v) Tacloban; Zamboanga: (16)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Seven (7) Assistant City Prosecutors

Seven (7) Associate City Prosecutors

(w) Iligan: (15)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Six (6) Assistant City Prosecutors

Seven (7) Associate City Prosecutors

(x) Laoag: San Fernando (La Union); Tuguegarao; Lucena; Iriga; Roxas: (14)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Six (6) Assistant City Prosecutors

Six (6) Associate City Prosecutors

(y) Dagupan; Olongapo; Calamba; General Santos: (13)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant City Prosecutors

Six (6) Associate City Prosecutors

(z) Tagbilaran; Butuan (12)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant City Prosecutors

Five (5) Associate City Prosecutors

(aa) Urdaneta; Puerto Prinscesa: (11)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Five (5) Assistant City Prosecutors

Four (4) Associate City Prosecutors

(bb) Dipolog: Pagadian: (10)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Four (4) Assistant City Prosecutors

Four (4) Associate City Prosecutors

(cc) San Jose Del Monte: San Pablo: Masbate: Mandaue: (9)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant City Prosecutors

Four (4) Associate City Prosecutors

(dd) Santiago; Malolos; Meycauayan; Tarlac; Sorsogon; Oroquieta: (8)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant City Prosecutors

Three (3) Associate City Prosecutors

(ee) Gapan; Balanga; Lipa; Ligao;Tabaco;Lapu-Lapu;Tagum: (7)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Three (3) Assistant City Prosecutors

Two (2) Associate City Prosecutors

(ff) San Jose; Cavite; Talisay (Cebu) : (6)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Two (2) Assistant City Prosecutors

Two (2) Associate City Prosecutors

(gg) Candon; Vigan; Alaminos;Cauayan; San Carlos (Pangasinan); Tanauan; Calapan; San Carlos (Negros Occidental); Clabayog; Ormoc; Ozamis; Malaybalay; Cotabato; Gingoog; Digos; Koronadal; Kidapawan; Marawi: (5)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

Two (2) Assistant City Prosecutors

One (1) Associate City Prosecutor

(hh) Surigao: (4)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

One (1) Assistant City Prosecutor

One (1) Associate City Prosecutor

(ii) Palayan; Science City of Munoz; Sta. Rosa; Tagaytay; Trece Martirez; Passi; Bago; Cadiz; Himamaylan; Kabankalan; La Carlota; Silay; Sagay; Danao; Toledo; Bais; Bayawan; Canlaon; Tanjay; Maasin; Dapitan; Isabela; Tangub; Panabo; Island Garden City of Samal; Bislig; Tacurong: (3)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

One (1) Associate City Prosecutor

(jj) Escalante; Sipalay; Talisay (Negros Occidental); Victorias; Valencia: (2)

One (1) City Prosecutor

One (1) Deputy City Prosecutor

After the approval of this Act, there shall be for each city one (1 deputy city prosecutor for every twenty-five (25) prosecutors or a fraction thereof. When an Office of the City Prosecutor has more than one (1) deputy city prosecutor, the incumbent deputy city prosecutor first appointed shall be called senior deputy city prosecutor first appointed shall be called senior deputy city prosecutor.

Section 12. Realignment of the Position Items. - Upon the approval of this Act, the Prosecutor General shall transfer vacant excess position items of prosecutors to the cities within the province or to the province of which the cities used to be municipalities or to other cities within the province: Provided, however, That if the position items are occupied , they shall be transferred as soon as they become vacant or when the incumbent prosecutors consent to their transfer.

When new cities or provinces are created and court branch seats are realigned or redistributed, the Secretary of Justice shall correspondingly realign position items of prosecutors to the new cities or provinces from the provinces where cities are located or the provinces used to be part of, without prejudice to the provision of Section 8 hereof.

After the approval of this Act, branches of the Regional Trial Court that are seated t the city and hitherto try and hear criminal cases filed by either the office of the provincial prosecutor or office of the city prosecutor shall proportionally divide themselves into branches where criminal and other cases filed , and those to be prosecuted and or defended by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor shall be exclusively raffled to, tried and heard, and branches where criminal and other cases filed, and those to be prosecuted or defended by the Office of the City Prosecutor shall be exclusively raffled to, tried and heard. Upon such division, the Secretary of Justice shall also realign position items of prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Office of the City Prosecutor affected.

Section 13. Automatic Creation of Positions of Prosecutor. - Whenever new courts or branches thereof are created, there shall be automatically created for the province or city where such courts or branches are seated positions of assistant and associate prosecutors in such number determined pursuant to the ratio established in Section 8 hereof: Provided, however, That if the branches of a regional trial court shall be seated at a city outside the metropolitan area established by law, the number of positions shall be distributed between the city and the province where the city is located according to the territorial jurisdiction covered by such branch: Provided, further, That in case the branches created are of regional trial court, not less than one-half of the corresponding prosecutors shall have the rank of Prosecutor III If the province or city has at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors, including the additional, or the city is in a metropolitan area established by law, and the rest, Prosecutor II; otherwise, they may have the ranks of Prosecutor II and Prosecutor I.

Section 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor General shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments, and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and shall be appointed by the President.

Section 15. Ranks of Prosecutors. - The Prosecutors in the National Prosecution Service shall have the following ranks:

RANK POSITION/TITLE
Prosecutor V (1) Senior Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Regional Prosecutors; and
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors, and City Prosecutors of cities within a metropolitan area established by law.
Prosecutor IV (1) Deputy State Prosecutors;
(2) Deputy Regional Prosecutors;
(3) Provincial Prosecutors or City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with less than twenty-five (25) prosecutors; and
(4) Deputy Provincial Prosecutors or Deputy City Prosecutors of provinces or cities within a metropolitan area established by law.
Prosecutor III (1) Senior Assistant State Prosecutors and Senior Assistant Regional Prosecutors;
(2) Deputy Provincial or Deputy City Prosecutors of provinces or cities with less than twenty- five (25) prosecutors; and
(3) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutors or Senior Assistant City Prosecutors.
Prosecutor II (1) Assistant State Prosecutors;
(2) Assistant Regional Prosecutors; and
(3) Assistant Provincial Prosecutors or Assistant City
Prosecutor I (1) Associate Provincial Prosecutors or Associate City Prosecutors.


Whenever a province or city shall have had at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors or a city shall have been made a part of a metropolitan area established by law, each level of the prosecution position items of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or Office of the City Prosecutor thereof shall be automatically upgraded one rank higher and shall have the corresponding position titles provided in this section.

Section 16. Qualifications, Ranks, and Appointments of Prosecutors, and other Prosecution Officers. - Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor V shall have the same qualification for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade, and salaries, allowances, and emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a n associate justice of the Court of Appeals.

Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefit as those of a Judge of the Regional Trial Court.

Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor III shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefit as those of a Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor II shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefit as those of a Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in cities.

Prosecutor with the rank of Prosecutor III shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefit as those of a Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court in municipalities.

Any increase after the approval of this Act in the salaries, allowances or retirement benefits or any upgrading of the grades or levels thereof of any or all of the Justices or Judges referred to herein to whom said emoluments are assimilated shall apply to the corresponding prosecutors.

All the above prosecutors shall be selected from among qualified and professionally trained members of the legal profession who are of proven integrity and competence. They shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and shall serve until they reach the age of sixty five (65) years old: Provided, however, That the ages of "seventy (70) years" and "sixty-five (65) years" and the years of service "twenty (20) years" provided in Republic Act No. 910, as amended, and other retirement laws for judges shall be understood as "sixty-five (65) years" and "sixty (60) years," and fifteen (15) years," respectively, when applied to prosecutors.

A prosecution attorney or special counsel shall be a member of the bar in good standing and shall have a salary under Salary Grade 25. Such prosecution officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice: Provided, however, That with respect to a special counsel, his/her appointment shall be upon the recommendation of the provincial governor or city mayor and with the endorsement of the provincial prosecutor or city prosecutor, as the case may be.

Subject to Section 20 hereof, the salaries and allowances of regional, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, and the members of the prosecution staff, including the prosecution attorneys, shall be paid entirely out of national funds and included in the annual appropriations of the DOJ: Provided, however, That this provision is without prejudice to the grant of allowances to the above-mentioned prosecutors by their respective local governments in amounts not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of their basic salaries; Provided, further, That the whole of the allowances or portion thereof, whether granted by the national or local government shall be exempt from the income tax.

The salaries, allowances and other emoluments herein fixed shall not apply to officers other than those of prosecutors in the National Prosecution Service, notwithstanding any provision of law assimilating the salaries of other officers to those herein mentioned.

Section 17. Continuation in Office of Prosecutors. - Upon approval of this Act, the prosecuting officers, including the prosecution attorneys, in the present prosecution staff shall continue in office to discharge the functions under this Act, and the position titles Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor are respectively renamed Prosecutor General and Senior Deputy State Prosecutor. All prosecutors who have the ranks of Prosecutor III and Prosecutor II in the existing prosecution staff shall be called Senior Assistant State Prosecutors and Assistant State Prosecutors, respectively, under this Act.

The Regional, Provincial or City Prosecution Office established as teach of the regions, provinces or cities pursuant to law is retained and renamed Regional Prosecution Office, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or Office if the City Prosecutor, as the case may be.

All regional, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall continue in office to discharge their functions under this Act.

All Assistant Prosecutor who have the ranks Prosecutor Iv, Prosecutor II, Prosecutor II and Prosecutor I in each of the existing regional, provincial and city prosecution offices shall be known by the position titles provided in Section 15 hereof: Provided, however, That in provinces or cities with at least twenty-five (25) prosecutors and in cities within a metropolitan area established by law all assistant prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor I before the enactment of this Act shall be upgraded to Prosecutor II upon the approval of this Act and shall bear the title Assistant Provincial Prosecutor or Assistant City Prosecutor, as the case may be.

Section 18. No Demotion or Diminution of Salary. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed to demote a prosecutor or to diminish his salary. In the event that all the incumbent prosecutors are not accommodated by the number of position items allocated, the excess incumbents shall continue in the service until they are accommodated, transferred or separated.

Section 19. No Undermining of Security of Tenure. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed to allow the transfer, except as Provided herein or in case of temporary assignment, as public interest may require, of any prosecutor to any place or station or to undermine the security of tenure of incumbent prosecutors as provided in the laws. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed three (3) months without his or her written consent. No Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor shall be detailed or assigned to another office or station, except in a concurrent capacity and with his or her written consent.lawphil

Section 20. Special Allowances. - The special allowances granted to the members of the National Prosecution Service under Republic Act No. 9279 shall continue to be given to them subject to the provisions hereof: Provided, however, that the amount not supported by the funding source specified in Section3 thereof to complete the equivalent of hundred percent (100%) of the basic salary shall be paid through appropriations included in the budget of the DOJ: Provided, further, That when the amount being supported by the said funding source shall have been also included in the General Appropriations, the fees authorized under said Section 3 shall no longer be collected.

Section 21. Retirement Benefits. - When a prosecutor, who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service either in the National Prosecution Service or in any branch of government, or in both, retires for having attained the age of sixty-five (65) years or resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his/her office, he/she shall, during the residue of his/her natural life, in the manner hereinafter Provided, receive a retirement pension based on the highest monthly salary, plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances, which he/she was receiving at the time of his/her retirement or resignation.

When a prosecutor has attained the age of sixty (60) years and has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in government, the last five (5) years of which must have been continuously rendered in the prosecution service, he/she shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his/her natural life the same benefits Provided for in this section: Provided, however, that those with less than fifteen (15) years of service in the government shall be entitled to a pro-rata pension computed as follows:
No. of years
In Government15 years Basic Pay Plus the Highest Monthly Aggregate of Transportation, Living and Representation Allowances


Section 22. Conditions. - To maintain entitlement to the pension herein Provided, no prosecutor, during the time he/she is receiving said pension, shall appear as counsel before any judicial or quasi-judicial or quasi-judicial agency in any civil case wherein the Government or any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof is an adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his/her office, or collect any fee for his/her appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the government , whether national, provincial, or municipal or to any of its legally constituted officers. When a prosecutor covered under this Act shall assume an elective public office, he/she shall not, upon assumption of office and during his/her term, retrieve the monthly pension or any of the allowance due to him/her.

Section 23. Automatic Increase. - All pension benefits of retired prosecutors of the National Prosecution Service shall be automatically increased whenever there is an increase n the salary and allowance of the same position from which he retired.

Section 24. Retroactivity. - The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and 16 hereof shall be granted to all those who retired prior to the effectivity of this Act.

Section 25. Applicability. - All benefits heretofore extended under Republic Act No. 910, as amended, and all other benefits that may be extended by the way of amendment thereto shall likewise be given to the prosecutors covered by this Act.

Section 26. Appropriation. - There is hereby appropriated initially the sum of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) from the funds of the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated for the organization and operational expenses of the Office of the Prosecutor General for a period of one (1) year form the effectivity of this Act. The said amount shall be added to the annual budget of the DOJ.

Section 27. Repealing Clause. - All acts, laws, decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions and regulations or any part thereof which are inconsistent with any provision of this Act are hereby repealed and/or modified accordingly.

Section 28. Separability Clause. - If for any reason, any selection or provision of his Act is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions of this Act which are not affected shall continue in full force and effect.

Section 29. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.

(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE
President of the Senate

This Act was passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on August 24, 2009 and January 26, 2010, respectively.

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP
Secretary General
House of Represenatives

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES
Secretary of Senate

Approved:

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

Lapsed into law on April 08, 2010
without the signature of the President,
in accordance with Article VI
Section 27 (1) of the Constitution

Gift to public officers and employees

Read:

1. Article XI, 1987 Constitution [accountability].

2. Sec. 3 (c), RA 6713

"(c) 'Gift' refers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or any act of liberality, in favor of another who accepts it, and shall include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof. It shall not include an unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor from a public official or employee."

3. Sec. 7 (d), RA 6713

"(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.

As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:

(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy; X x x."

4. Sec. 14, RA 3019

"Section 14. Exception. Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act. X x x "

New requirements for Filipino law students who will graduate from foreign law schools and who intend to take the Philippine bar examinations

Site - https://news.mb.com.ph/2019/08/13/sc-sets-added-requirements-for-bar-exams-for-filipino-graduates-of-foreign-schools/


"x x x.

SC sets added requirements for bar exams for Filipino graduates of foreign schools
By Rey Panaligan
Published August 13, 2019, 4:48 PM

The Supreme Court (SC) has added new requirements for Filipino law students who will graduate from foreign law schools and who intend to take the Philippine bar examinations.

Starting 2023 bar examinations, the SC said Filipinos who will graduate from foreign law schools must submit certifications “on completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority, and completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.”

This is on top of an earlier requirement that they have to submit a certification that they completed satisfactorily the program on clinical legal education.
The prescribed courses in law schools are civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, and legal ethics, and clinical legal education program.

Among other things, the original text of Section 5 of Rule 138 on bar admission stated: “No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.”

The additional requirements were contained in its July 23, 2019 SC issuance as a revision to a resolution dated June 25, 2019 on the amendment to Rule 38 Section 5 in relation to the revision of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.
The June 25 amendment added “clinical legal education program” on the list of courses an applicant must satisfactorily complete before being admitted to the bar examinations.

The Revised Law Student Practice Rule in its June 25, 2019 amendment provides that starting next year, law students who have been certified to have completed their first year law courses can also engage in a limited practice of law under the supervision of a lawyer.

The new rule is a modification of Rule 138-A which provides that a law student “who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum… may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.”

The SC said the amendment “ensures access to justice of the marginalized sectors, enhances learning opportunities of law students by instilling in them the value of legal professional social responsibility, and prepares them for the practice of law.”

It also said the amendment “addresses the need to institutionalize clinical legal education program in all law schools in order to enhance, improve, and streamline law student practice, and regulate their limited practice of law.”

x x x."

The government apparatus was weaponized against Leila De Lima

See - https://opinion.inquirer.net/123356/free-sen-leila-de-lima?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook#Echobox=1566009871


"x x x.

Free Sen. Leila de Lima

By: Solita Collas-Monsod - @inquirerdotnet
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 05:10 AM August 17, 2019


Let us admit, Reader, that our attention span is short, and sometimes our memory as well. This is why I am again writing about the case described by Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio as “one of the grossest injustices ever perpetrated in recent memory in full view of the Filipino people and the whole world.”

I am talking about Sen. Leila de Lima, who is now over 900 days in incarceration, who was shown on TV recently escorted by PNP officers to visit her ailing mother in Bicol.

She is not the only victim of President Duterte’s vindictiveness—others are former chief justice Meilou Sereno, Sister Patricia Fox and Maria Ressa—all of them tremendous assets of our country, all of them having to hurdle tremendous obstacles and difficulties to serve the country they love.

Leila de Lima first earned the ire of President Duterte in 2009 when he was still mayor of Davao City, and she was chair of the Human Rights Commission investigating the Davao Death Squad (DDS) activities. According to Edgar Matobato, a self-confessed member of the DDS, the DDS had planned to kill her while she was to inspect a DDS murder scene. The plot failed because she did not go deep into the place.

The second time Leila earned his ire was when he was already President and she was a newly elected senator. As chair of the Senate committee on justice and human rights, she intended to investigate the extrajudicial killings taking place in his war against drugs.

How did the President show his anger? At first, he didn’t name De Lima, but he talked about a female government official he was “going to destroy in public.” Soon after that, he released the so-called “drug matrix” purportedly showing that De Lima was at the heart of the drug trade operations inside the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa City. He later apologized to the other officials he had implicated, admitting that the administration had been “negligent in counterchecking.” Only De Lima was not exonerated—in effect, she was the only person left in the “matrix.”

What was the basis of this matrix? Well, in 2014, while she was justice secretary, she led raids on the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa and removed the luxurious environment of 19 drug lords—saunas, cell phones, television sets, etc. These drug lords were then used to pin the drug charges against her. No good deed goes unpunished.

The government apparatus was then weaponized against her.

Weaponizing the legislature: (1) The pro-Duterte majority in the Senate removed her as chair of the Senate committee on justice and human rights. (2) The House allowed the secretary of justice to preside over its meetings, getting affidavits from the drug lords who claimed that she had demanded money for her senatorial campaign. And they were more interested in asking details of her love life than anything else.

Weaponizing the executive: (1) Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre II, apparently in exchange for the testimony of the drug lords, ordered the prison administration to give them back their perks. (2) During the preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice, he accepted the affidavits that the drug lords had executed for the House. (3) He refused to acknowledge that a government official of her rank should have been brought to the Ombudsman. (4) The first charge against her was illegal drug trading. Why? The drug lords said that she had taken money from them, so the charges should have been bribery. But illegal drug trading is not bailable, while bribery is. (5) Without proof of illegal drug trading, they “amended” the charges to conspiracy to commit illegal drug trading.

Weaponizing the judiciary: (1) The judges ordered warrants for her arrest without determining probable cause. The warrants were issued almost immediately after charges were filed. (2) The Supreme Court, her last resort, showed how anxious they were to please the President—when they could not even agree on what she was charged with—when they dismissed her petition.

In effect, President Duterte marshaled all his weaponry against Leila de Lima. An abuse of power. A waste of Philippine resources. Let’s stop this moro-moro. Free her. Now.

solita_monsod@yahoo.com

x x x."

Read more: https://opinion.inquirer.net/123356/free-sen-leila-de-lima#ixzz5zD5X5INe
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Damages unpaid by Mayor Antonio Sanchez

See - https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/oct2001/gr_121039_2001.html


G.R. Nos. 121039-45            October 18, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.

R E S O L U T I O N

MELO, J.:

Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our January 25, 1999 decision, penned by Justice Antonio M. Martinez, affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by Branch 70 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellants Mayor Antonio Sanchez, George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Pepito Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and additionally, ordering each of them to pay the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) to the heirs of the two victims as additional indemnity. While accused-appellants Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration, it was only on December 6, 1999 that the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment thereto. And since Justice Martinez had retired earlier on February 2, 1999, in accordance with A.M. No. 99-8-09 promulgated by the Court on February 15, 2000, the motions for reconsideration filed by accused-appellants was assigned by raffle only on September 18, 2001 to herein ponente for study and preparation of the appropriate action.

In his motion for reconsideration, Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity and that the principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan presented by the prosecution are lacking in credibility. He likewise contends that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter vis-à-vis his whereabouts on the night of the felony should have been given full faith and credit as against the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan. Lastly, Mayor Sanchez seeks the reconsideration of the amount of the "gargantuan" damages awarded on the ground that the same have no factual and legal bases.

In the same vein, accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit, in their motion for reconsideration, maintain that prosecution witnesses Centeno and Malabanan have been sufficiently impeached by prior inconsistent statements allegedly pertaining to material and crucial points of the events at issue. Not only that, they assert that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecution’s version of events.

Preliminarily, it may be observed that, except for the issue of civil damages raised by Mayor Sanchez, accused-appellants have not presented any issue new or different from that which they had previously raised before the trial court and this Court. Moreover, the issues they have raised have been discussed at length and passed upon by both the court a quo and by this Court. Thus, on the charge that accused-appellant Sanchez is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity, in our January 25, 1999 decision, citing People vs. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), we declared:

We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field… The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality… Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino et al. vs. Alejandro et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez, having failed, in his motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on the part of the trial judge. Not only that, accused-appellant’s case has been exhaustively and painstakingly reviewed by the Court itself. Accused-appellant Sanchez has not shown by an iota of proof that the Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by publicity in affirming the sentence of conviction imposed by the trial court. 

The charge of conviction by publicity leveled by accused-appellant has thus no ground to stand on.

As to the claim that witnesses Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility and that they were sufficiently impeached by prior inconsistent statements, the same is old hat, to say the least. It is hornbook doctrine in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate courts will respect these findings considering that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial (People vs. Mendoza, 332 SCRA 485 [2000]). In the instant case, then Judge Harriet Demetriou found both Centeno and Malabanan to have testified in a frank, spontaneous, and straightforward manner; and that despite gruelling cross-examination by a battery of defense lawyers, their testimony never wavered on the substantial matters in issue.

As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan, suffice it to say that the points raised have all been carefully and assiduously examined, not only by the trial court but also by the Court itself, and that the inconsistencies were found to refer to minor and collateral matters. It is well-settled that so long as the witnesses’ declarations agree on substantial matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the witnesses’ credibility nor the verity of their testimony (People vs. Agomo-o, 334 SCRA 279 [2000]). Accused-appellants have not shown in their motions for reconsideration new evidence to warrant disregard for the above-rule, nor have they shown that the Court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of weight and circumstance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case.

Accused-appellant Sanchez’s argument that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter, Ave Marie Sanchez, as to his whereabouts on the night of the crime should be given full faith and credence is likewise unavailing. While it is true that statements of children are accorded great probative value, it is likewise true that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. Where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, it deserves but scant consideration (People vs. Waggay, 218 SCRA 742 [1993]). Moreover, accused-appellant Sanchez’s alibi cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution that he was at Erais Farm that fateful night. The alibis of accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit are even worse, not having been corroborated by any other evidence. The assertions of these accused-appellants as to their innocence are thus entitled short shrift from this Court.

Accused-appellant Sanchez’s asseverations as to the amount of damages awarded is, however, meritorious. The trial court awarded the Sarmenta family P50,000.00 as civil liability for the wrongful death of Eileen Sarmenta, P106,650.00 for the funeral expenses they incurred, and P3,276,000.00 for the loss of Eileen Sarmenta’s earning capacity; or a total of P3,432,650.00 as actual damages. On the other hand, the Gomez family was awarded by the trial court a total of P3,484,000.00 as actual damages, broken down as follows: P50,000.00 for the wrongful death of Allan Gomez, P74,000.00 for the latter’s funeral, and P3,360,000.00 for the loss of the latter’s earning capacity.

Similarly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the sum of P2,000,000.00 to the Sarmenta family and another P2,000,000.00 to the Gomez family as moral damages. Lastly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the Sarmenta and Gomez families the sum of P164,250.00 and 191,000.00, respectively, for litigation expenses incurred.

The Court, in its decision dated January 25, 1999, affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. However, we also ordered each accused-appellant to pay the respective heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez an additional indemnity of P350,000.00 each, stating that since each accused-appellant had been found guilty of seven counts of rape with homicide, jurisprudence dictated that for each count, each accused-appellant is liable for civil indemnity of P50,000.00, or a total of P350,000.00.

Since the trial court’s award of actual damages to the Gomez and Sarmenta families already included civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, to order each accused-appellant to pay an additional P350,000.00 as civil indemnity would be "double recovery" of damages on the part of the Gomez and Sarmenta families for the same act or omission. Thus, the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court must each be deducted from the amount of actual damages due to the Gomez and Sarmenta families.

As for funeral expenses, the Court had occasion to declare in People vs. Timon (281 SCRA 577 [1997]) that "burial expenses, which are by nature actual expenses must be proved. Since no proof of burial expenses was ever presented in the instant case, its award will not be allowed." It is a settled rule that there must be proof that actual or compensatory damages have been suffered and evidence of its actual amount (People vs. Nablo, 319 SCRA 784 [1999]). While the funeral expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family were supported by the appropriate receipts, the same is not true for the funeral expenses incurred by the Gomez family. Not having been duly receipted, the amount of P74,000.00 awarded to the Gomez family as funeral expenses must, perforce, be deleted. However, as the heirs of Allan Gomez clearly incurred funeral expenses, P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages should be awarded. This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification (see People vs. Candare, 333 SCRA 338 [2000]).

The award of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00, representing the alleged loss of earning capacity of Sarmenta and Gomez, respectively, also merit review. Eileen Sarmenta, at the time of her death, was a graduating student of the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB), majoring in Food and Nutrition for Large Animals. Allan Gomez was likewise a senior student of the College of Agriculture of UPLB, majoring in Beef Production. The trial court, using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, pegged the life expectancy of Sarmenta, 21 years old at the time of her death, and Gomez, 19 years old at the time of his death, at 39.1 and 40.6 years, respectively. Believing that the victims would have earned a monthly salary of P15,000.00 and incurred living expenses of P8,000.00 per month, the trial court awarded P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 as the amount recoverable by the Sarmenta and Gomez families, respectively, for the loss of the earning capacity of Eileen and Allan.

While accused-appellant Sanchez contends that the awards of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 are baseless in fact and law, no evidence having been adduced to prove that the victims had any actual income at the time of their demise, it is well-settled that to be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or death, be gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money (People vs. Teehankee, supra). Likewise, the fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of the same (People vs. Quilang, 312 SCRA 314 [1999]; People vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690 [1999]). On the part of Eileen Sarmenta, her mother testified that Eileen had an offer for employment from Monterey Farms. On the other hand, Allan Gomez’s mother testified that her deceased son planned to work on a private farm after graduation.

Moreover, in Cariaga et al. vs. LTB and Manila Railroad Co. (110 Phil. 346 [1960]), the Court awarded compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity to Edgardo Cariaga, a 4th year medical student at UST, stating that while his scholastic record may not have been first rate, it was, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have finished the course, would have passed the board in due time, and that he could have possibly earned as a medical practitioner the minimum monthly income of P300.00.

Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB, the country’s leading educational institution in agriculture. As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims would have graduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived them of their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are entitled to compensation. Difficulty, however, arises in measuring the value of Sarmenta’s and Gomez’s lost time and capacity to earn money in the future, both having been unemployed at the time of death. While the law is clear that the deceased has a right to his own time — which right cannot be taken from him by a tortfeasor without compensation — the law is also clear that damages cannot be awarded on the speculation, passion, or guess of the judge or the witnesses. In this case, Eileen Sarmenta’s mother testified that for a new graduate of UPLB, the basic salary was more or less P15,000.00 per month. Allan Gomez’s mother, on the other hand, testified that her son could have easily gotten P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 per month. Clearly, the testimony of said witnesses are speculative, insufficient to prove that in 1993, Sarmenta and Gomez would have indeed earned P15,000.00 a month had they managed to graduate. However, considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in due time from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to assume that in 1993 they would have earned more than the minimum wage. All factors considered, the Court believes that it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income that the two would have earned in 1993 at P8,000.00 per month (or P96,000.00/year) and their deductible living and other incidental expenses at P3,000.00 per month (or P36,000.00/year). Hence, in accordance with the formula adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]), and using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the loss of Sarmenta and Gomez’s earning capacity is to be computed as follows:

Net earning capacity	=	Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income – Living Expenses)
		where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 – the age of the deceased)
Heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:
	=	2/3 (80-21) x (96,000 – 36,000)
	=	39.353 x 60,000
	=	P2,361,180.00
Heirs of Allan Gomez:
	=	2/3 (80-19) x (96,000 – 36,000)
	=	40.687 x 60,000
	=	P2,441,220.00

As to the award of P2,000,000.00 each as moral damages to the Sarmenta and Gomez families, these must also be reduced, the same being excessive. While the assessment of moral damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each case (Article 2216, Civil Code), the purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted (Dela Serna vs. CA, 233 SCRA 325 [1994]). The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatever with the wealth or the means of the offender. The death caused by a beggar is felt by the parents of the victim as intensely as that caused by the action of a wealthy family. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, thus reduces the amount of moral damages awarded to the heirs of Eileen Gomez and Allan Sarmenta to P1,000,000.00 each. As to the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, the same is reasonable and justified, this case having dragged on for over eight years.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused-appellants for seven counts of rape with homicide and the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them for each of said counts, with MODIFICATION that the accused be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims as follows:

To the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:
1. Death indemnity	P 350,000.00
2. Moral damages	1,000,000.00
3. Funeral expenses	106,650.00
4. Loss of earning capacity	2,361,180.00
5. Attorney’s fees & litigation expenses	164,250.00
Total	P 3,982,080.00
To the heirs of Allan Gomez:
1. Death indemnity	P 350,000.00
2. Moral damages	1,000,000.00
3. Nominal damages	10,000.00
4. Loss of earning capacity	2,441,220.00
5. Attorney’s fees & litigation expenses	191,000.00
Total	P 3,992,220.00

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

SC Calls for Possible Statutory Amendments on the Maximum Penalty for Lascivious Conduct Against Minors Under RA 7610

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/3747/


"x x x.

SC Calls for Possible Statutory Amendments on the Maximum Penalty for Lascivious Conduct Against Minors Under RA 7610

May 22, 2019

The Supreme Court En Banc has directed that a copy of its March 12, 2019 decision in People v. Tulagan, GR No. 227363, be furnished Congress as reference for possible statutory amendments on the maximum penalty for lascivious conduct under RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act).

Specifically, the Court referred to the maximum penalty for lascivious conduct under RA 7610, Section 5(b), Article III when the child victim is under 12 years of age (reclusion temporal medium) and when the victim is 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances, i.e., are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition (reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua) under Section 3(a).

The Court noted that despite the clear intent of RA 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, the penalty for violation of Section 5(b) when the victim is under 12 years old is lower than the penalty when the victim is 12 years old and below 18. “It is a basic rule in statutory construction that what courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of the legislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints, but not those due to oversight, as shown by a review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is clear, and to correct it would be to change the meaning of the law. Thus, a corrective legislation is the proper remedy to address the noted incongruent penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed against a child,” the Court stated.

The Court also fixed the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610, Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, and Sexual Assault in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610 as follows:


Crime

Civil Indemnity
Moral Damages
Exemplary Damages


Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC [Victim is of legal age]

₱20,000.00

₱20,000.00

₱20,000.00


Acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [Victim is a child under 12 years old or is demented]

₱50,000.00

₱50,000.00

₱50,000.00


Sexual Abuse or Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [Victim is a child 12 years old and below 18, or above 18 under special circumstances]

₱75,000.00 (If penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua)

₱75,000.00 (If penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua)

₱75,000.00 (If penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua)


₱50,000.00 (If penalty imposed is within the range of reclusion temporal medium)

₱50,000.00 (If penalty imposed is within the range of reclusion temporal medium)

₱50,000.00 (If penalty imposed is within the range of reclusion temporal medium)


Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC [Victim is of legal age]

₱30,000.00

₱30,000.00

₱30,000.00


Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 [Victim is a child under 12 years old or is demented]

₱50,000.00

₱50,000.00

₱50,000.00


Furthermore, the Court reiterated its previous rulings that (1) Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse wherein a child engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct through coercion or influence and 2) that it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only once considering Section 5, Article III of RA 7610, which explicitly states that a child is deemed “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse” when the child engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money, profit or any other consideration, or under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group as well as Section 3(b), Article I thereof, which clearly provides that the term “child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse.

The Court thus affirmed with modifications the conviction of accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). It found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610, in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months, and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The Court also ordered him to pay the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages. It likewise found him guilty of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) and penalized in Article 266-B of the RPC,in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the victim the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages

The Court also directed that copies of its decision be furnished the Department of Justice, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Court Administrator, and the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for their guidance and information.

Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Justice Marvic Mario Victor M. Leonen, and Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa wrote separate opinions.

Link to the decision: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/2825/

[1] If an aggravating circumstance is present or to set as a public example to deter sexual abuse.

x x x."