The Marketing Mistake Attorneys Make Every Day - Lawyer Marketing

See- The Marketing Mistake Attorneys Make Every Day - Lawyer Marketing





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Mistake #1: Pretending to be bigger than you are

There are real and important reasons why a consumer might choose to work with a solo or small practice versus a larger firm: more personalized service, greater attention to each individual case, etc. In my opinion, being a solo or small firm can be a great selling point and can help create effective brand differentiation, which is central to marketing success.

But a surprising number of websites for solos and small firms employ linguistic gymnastics in an attempt to appear more like larger firms. This can be an especially strong temptation for a solo. I’ve seen many solo websites use the phrase “our attorney” or refer to themselves as “Attorney Smith” over and over, as if the website were written by the staff because the attorney either has nothing to say or doesn’t care to speak directly to prospective clients.

While I’m sure the intent is to convey a sense of gravitas, the website visitor reading this sort of language is likely to be left cold. This approach creates a psychological distance between the reader and the attorney, which is the opposite of the effect we want. Ideally, the website visitor should develop a sense of connection and trust with the attorney. Why? If I, as a legal consumer, feel I understand and can trust you as a person, I will hire you. But if my only experience of you is an oddly de-personalized website, I am likely to look elsewhere for a connection.

The key takeaway is this: Being small can work to a firm’s advantage, particularly if that size translates into personalized and dedicated service. But it’s hard to sell that service with language that has been intentionally stripped of personality.

Subscribe to the LawyerMarketing.com Blog for more legal marketing insights.

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Law Students Need to Hear about ‘Dark Side’ of Being a Lawyer, says Professor - Law Blog - WSJ

See - Law Students Need to Hear about ‘Dark Side’ of Being a Lawyer, says Professor - Law Blog - WSJ





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Studies have shown that lawyers suffer from high rates of depression and suicide. A new paper by a law professor who battled clinical depression says LAW SCHOOLScan do a better job of talking to future lawyers about the issue of mental illness within the legal profession.

In an essay forthcoming in the Journal of Legal Education, Charlotte School of Law associate professor Brian Clarke, argues that LAW SCHOOLS too often avoid dealing with the “the dark side” of being A LAWYER. Having a more candid conversation with students about the challenges of the job can help them meet and overcome them after they graduate, he says.

“Given that today’s depressed law students will, more likely than not, be tomorrow’s depressed lawyers, law schools and the legal professoriate must bring the issue of mental illness out of the closet and into the open,” writes Mr. Clarke. “We must do more to educate our students about mental illness and remove the stigma attached to it.”

Many law schools already provide mental health programs, but Mr. Clarke writes that the people presenting them tend to be unfamiliar to students and either have never experienced serious mental illness themselves or are uncomfortable talking about it. “These shortcomings make it all too easy for students to tune out,” he writes.

Mr. Clarke, who teaches civil procedure, employment discrimination and employment law, speaks from personal experience. He writes about his own struggle with mental illness years ago and says he “would have taken [his] own life” had he not sought medical treatment and counseling at the urging of his wife.

The story of his close call is one familiar to students who’ve taken his class. “Usually about two weeks before the end of the term—when I see the strain of writing papers and the approach of final exams beginning to take a toll—I will put the civil procedure issue of the day on hold and tell my story,” he writes.

After discussing himself, the professor then talks to his students about the life of a lawyer:

I tell them about the challenges of practicing law including taking on the emotional weight of clients’ problems; the inherent competiveness of the adversarial system; the joys of dealing with unreasonable and unprofessional opposing counsel; the fact that someone must lose in litigation; the impact losing may have on a client’s life; the nature of the billable hour; the difficulty of billing 1,900-plus hours a year; the unrealistic expectations many of them may have about being lawyers; the “keeping up with the Joneses” (and corresponding financial stress) that is common in the lifestyles of lawyers; the common narrative that “success” as A LAWYER is dependent on having a “Big Law” job and making partner/member/shareholder and the profound unlikelihood of these happening; the lack of boundaries and the need to be “on the job” 24/7/365 (especially in a big firm); and so on.

Mr. Clarke says he still gets “a bit nervous” raising the topic in class, but he says he’s heartened by the positive feedback.

He writes: “Every single student I have ever talked to about these issues has appreciated—above all else—my openness and honesty, not only about my illness, but about the challenges of being A LAWYER.”

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Regime of Marcoses, cronies, kleptocracy | Inquirer News

See - Regime of Marcoses, cronies, kleptocracy | Inquirer News





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MANILA, Philippines–“We practically own everything in the Philippines—from electricity, telecommunications, airline, banking, beer and tobacco, newspaper publishing, television stations, shipping, oil and mining, hotels and BEACH RESORTS, down to coconut milling, small farms, real estate and insurance,” said Imelda Marcos, talking to the Inquirer in 1998 while she disclosed her plan to file an intervention suit against the cronies of her husband.

Imelda said the Marcos family accumulated its wealth “without dipping into government coffers.”

Former Senate President Jovito Salonga challenged Imelda’s claim, saying that the Marcoses had started raiding the government coffers barely two years into the first term of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1965, with his wife using intelligence funds to finance her foreign trips as first lady and stashing part of the money in SWISS BANKS.

In his book “Presidential Plunder: The Quest for the Marcos Ill-gotten Wealth,” Salonga enumerated the ways by which the Marcoses acquired and safeguarded ill-gotten wealth.

Modus operandi

He said these included the creation of monopolies in certain vital industries and placing them under the control of Marcos cronies or associates, citing the sugar industry under Roberto Benedicto and coconut industry under Eduardo Cojuangco.

Another technique was the outright takeover by Marcos relatives or cronies of large public or private enterprises with nominal amounts as consideration. Case in point: the business and assets of National Shipyard and Engineering Co. and other related government-owned or -controlled entities were taken over in 1972-1973 by Baseco, a private corporation dominated by Marcos and Alfredo “Bejo” Romualdez, a brother of Imelda.

“That’s how [Imelda] and her husband raided government funds,” said Salonga, who served as the first chair of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).

Kleptocracy

The PCGG was created in 1986, three days after the inauguration of Corazon Aquino as President, to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and cronies.

Because of the massive ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcos family and its cronies, the Marcos regime has been called a kleptocracy (from the Greek words for thief and rule).

In hearings in 1986, then US Rep. Stephen Solarz said the Marcos couple looted the Philippine treasury of millions of dollars to buy real estate in the United States. Solarz accused Marcos of running a kleptocracy and enriching himself and his wife at the expense of his country’s citizens.

According to a 2003 ruling of the Supreme Court, assets presumed to be ill-gotten include Marcoses’ wealth in excess of their total legal income of around $304,000 from 1965 to 1986.

Almost 30 years since its creation, the PCGG has recovered P167.5 billion, or about $4 billion, less than half of the $10-billion fortune believed to have been amassed by the late dictator, who stayed in power for 21 years.

The amount recovered is the aggregate cash value, as of February, of all accounts hidden in local and foreign banks, commercial and residential properties, shares in companies here and abroad, artworks and valuable personal effects that had been surrendered to the PCGG or awarded by various courts in the Philippines, Switzerland and the United States.

SMC shares, coco levy

The biggest single recovery (40 percent of the total) was in 2012—P71.6 billion from 24-percent block of San Miguel Corp. (SMC) shares, including dividends and accrued interest, which the government claimed were acquired with coconut levy funds.

The 24 percent was part of the 47-percent block of SMC shares sequestered by the PCGG on the ground that these were illegally acquired by the dummies of Marcos using funds from a tax imposed on coconut farmers from 1973 to the 1980s.

The Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that the 24 percent (originally 27 percent but diluted and reduced because of SMC’s expansion) belonged to the government in trust for the country’s coconut farmers.

But the high court ruled that the remaining 20-percent block claimed by businessman Cojuangco had been legally acquired by the crony whom Marcos had appointed as administrator of the levy funds.

Swiss BANK DEPOSITS

The Swiss BANK DEPOSITS of the Marcoses constituted a fifth of the recovery, or an estimated P35 billion, which includes the P1.3 billion ($29 million) recovered in February from the WestLB Singapore accounts.

The WestLB Singapore accounts were part of the ill-gotten wealth that the late strongman kept in various Swiss BANK ACCOUNTS under dummy foundations. In 1997, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ordered that these deposits be returned to the Philippine government.

In its 2003 ruling, the Philippine Supreme Court forfeited some $683 million in Marcos Swiss deposits in favor of the government. It said Marcos and his wife could not have legally acquired the assets with their legitimate income.

“In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the SWISS BANKS belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks,” the tribunal said.

PLDT, Meralco

A total of P27.3 billion of the recovered assets came from Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corp. (PTIC) shares in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT). The Supreme Court declared in January 2006 that the PTIC shares in PLDT were part of the Marcos ill-gotten wealth as these were registered in the name of Prime Holdings Inc., an alleged dummy firm of Marcos.

The amount from the sale of shares in Manila Electric Co. (Meralco), Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corp., and Marcopper Mining Corp. accounted for P17.7 billion while other recoveries amounted to P15.9 billion. Some P50 billion worth of assets are either tied up in litigation or are up for privatization.

The latest privatization effort by the PCGG included three properties forfeited from the late Jolly Bugarin, who served as a National Bureau of Investigation director.

Real estate

In September, the auction of the properties at North Greenhills, Valle Verde III and Capitol Hills attracted 29 bidders and earned a combined P157.7 million, 38 percent higher than the combined FLOOR PRICE of P114.3 million.

The Mapalad property, a commercial and residential lot on Roxas Boulevard in Parañaque surrendered to the government in 1986 by the late Marcos crony Jose Y. Campos, was sold for P247.11 million in March 2013.

The government has also scored major legal victories over the past 15 months.

In March, the Supreme Court affirmed its previous forfeiture order on some $40 million on Marcos’ secret account in New York for being part of his ill-gotten wealth.

Arelma assets

In the final ruling dated March 12, the Supreme Court’s Special Second Division rejected the appeal of former first lady, now Ilocos Norte Rep. Imelda Marcos, and son Sen. Ferdinand Marcos Jr., to overturn a 2009 forfeiture order on the Arelma S.A. assets with the INVESTMENT FIRM Merrill Lynch.

Arelma is a Panamanian corporation believed to have been one of the dummy firms used by Marcos to hide ill-gotten gains.

With the recent decision, PCGG Chair Andres Bautista said the government was optimistic that it would be able to enforce the decision in the United States and recover the funds, which have been tied up in litigation since 2000. The case is pending in the New York Court of Appeals.

Monet painting

In January, Vilma Bautista, Imelda Marcos’ New York-based personal secretary, was sentenced by the New York State Supreme Court to up to six years in prison after finding her guilty of scheming to sell a $32-million Claude Monet painting and tax fraud.

The 1899 art work, “Le Bassin aux Nymphease,” or “Japanese Footbridge over the Water-Lily Pond at Giverny,” from the French painter’s “Water Lilies” series, was among the ill-gotten assets the government was seeking to reclaim from the Marcoses. The Monet disappeared when the Marcos family fled into exile.

Last year, the Supreme Court ruled with finality that the government owned the shares of Cojuangco in United Coconut Planter’s Bank, which became the depository of the coco levy funds. The high court also ruled that the fund should be used for the benefit of the coconut farmers.

The PCGG recoveries serve as a source of funds for some social justice measures.

Land reform

Based on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) law, funds recovered by the PCGG shall be remitted to the Bureau of the Treasury to serve as additional funding for the implementation of the program.

As of 2013, the PCGG reported that it had provided some P87 billion to CARP, the centerpiece program of the first Aquino administration, since its inception.

The amount was used to finance rural electrification, construction of farm-to-market infrastructure, post-harvest facilities, school buildings and potable water supply systems. It also financed the provision of credit assistance and scholarship grants, and the conduct of extension and training services.

Proceeds from the SMC shares have been allocated for the coconut industry, while P10 billion of the money recovered from the Swiss accounts has been earmarked as the principal fund for Republic Act No. 10368 for the compensation of victims of human rights violations during the Marcos regime.

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February 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Tax Law | LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

See - February 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Tax Law | LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG





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Tax laws

National Internal Revenue Code; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. Taxpayer submits that the requirement to exhaust the 12-day period under Section 112 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code prior to filing the judicial claim with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) is a doctrine of “exhaustion of administrative remedies” and that the non-observance of the same merely results in lack of cause of action which may be waived for failure to timely invoke the same. As the Court opined in San Roque, a petition for review that is filed with the CTA without waiting for the 120-day mandatory period renders the same void. A person committing a void act cannot claim or acquire any right from such void act. Accordingly, taxpayer’s failure to comply with the 120-day mandatory period renders its petition for review with the CTA void. It is a mere scrap of paper from which taxpayer cannot derive or acquire any right notwithstanding the supposed failure on the part of the Commissioner to raise the issue of non-compliance with the 120-day period in the proceedings before the CTA First Division. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Team Sual Corporation (Formerly Mirant Sual Corporation),  G.R. No. 194105. February 5, 2014

National Internal Revenue Code; excise tax; pacta sunt servanda; Section 135.  Under the basic international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, the state has the duty to fulfill its treaty obligations in good faith. This entails harmonization of national legislation with treaty provisions. Section 135 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code embodies the country’s compliance with its undertakings under the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Aviation (Chicago Convention), Article 24 (9) of which has been interpreted to prohibit taxation of aircraft fuel consumed for international transport, and various bilateral air service agreements not to impose excise tax on aviation fuel purchased by international carriers from domestic manufacturers or suppliers. In the previous decision of the Court in this case, the Court interpreted Section 135 (a) as prohibiting domestic manufacturer or producer to pass on to international carriers the excise tax it had paid on petroleum products upon their removal from the place of production. Thus, the Court found that there was no basis to refund the excise taxes paid on petroleum products sold to tax-exempt international carriers as “erroneously or illegally paid” tax. The Court maintains that Section 135 (a) prohibits the passing of the excise tax to international carriers who buys petroleum products from local manufacturers/sellers such as the respondent taxpayer. However, there is a need to reexamine the effect of denying the domestic manufactures/sellers’ claim for refund of the excise taxes they already paid on petroleum products sold to international carriers, and its serious implications on the Government’s commitment to the goals and objectives of the Chicago Convention. With the process of declining sales of aviation jet fuel sales to international carriers on account of major domestic oil companies’ unwillingness to shoulder the burden of excise tax, or of petroleum products being sold to said carriers by local manufacturers or sellers at still high prices, the practice of “tankering” (i.e., carriers filling their aircraft as full as possible whenever they landed outside a jurisdiction that imposes tax on fuel to avoid paying tax) would not be discouraged. This does not augur well for the Philippines’ growing economy and the booming tourism industry. Worse, the Government would be risking retaliatory action under several bilateral agreements with various countries. Evidently, construction of the tax exemption provision in question should give primary consideration to its broad implications on the country’s commitment under international agreements. In view of the foregoing the Court held that respondent, as the statutory taxpayer who is directly liable to pay the excise tax on its petroleum products is entitled to a refund or credit of the excise taxes it paid for petroleum products sold to international carriers, the latter having been granted exemption from the payment of said excise tax under Section 135 (a) of the NIRC. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 188497. February 19, 2014.

National Internal Revenue Code; value-added tax; refund of input value-added tax; prescriptive period for judicial and administrative claims. Section 112([C]) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) clearly provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) has “120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit],” within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120–day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. In this case, the taxpayer filed an administrative claim for refund with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on March 11, 2002 and the petition for review with the CTA on April 1, 2002. As held by the Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., the phrase “within two years… apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund” refers to applications for refund or credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.

Moreover, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, the Court emphasized that the 120–day period that is given to the CIR within which to decide claims for refund/tax credit of unutilized input value-added tax is mandatory and jurisdictional. The Court categorically held that the taxpayer–claimant must wait for the 120–day period to lapse, should there be no decision fully or partially denying the claim, before a petition for review may be filed with the CTA. Otherwise, the petition would be rendered premature and without a cause of action. Consequently, the CTA does not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of a petition for review filed by the taxpayer–claimant should there be no decision by the CIR on the claim for refund/tax credit or the 120–day period had not yet lapsed.  Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Team Sual Corporation (Formerly Mirant Sual Corporation), G.R. No. 194105. February 5, 2014

Local Government Code; taxes vs. fees. Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[e]ach local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.” Consistent with this constitutional mandate, the Local Government Code (LGC) grants the taxing powers to each local government unit. Specifically, Section 142 of the LGC grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces. Section 143 of the LGC provides for the scale of taxes on business that may be imposed by municipalities while Section 147 of the same law provides for the fees and charges that may be imposed by municipalities on business and occupation. The LGC defines the term “charges” as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while the term “fee” means “a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity.” In this case, the Municipality issued Ordinance No. 18, which is entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects,” to regulate the “placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus, and provide for the correction, condemnation or removal of the same when found to be dangerous, defective or otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitant[s].” It was also envisioned to address the foreseen “environmental depredation” to be brought about by these “special projects” to the Municipality. Pursuant to these objectives, the Municipality imposed fees on various structures, which included telecommunications towers. As clearly stated in its whereas clauses, the primary purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate the “placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus” listed therein, which included petitioner’s telecommunications tower. Clearly, the purpose of the assailed Ordinance is to regulate the enumerated activities particularly related to the construction and maintenance of various structures. The fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not impositions on the building or structure itself; rather, they are impositions on the activity subject of government regulation, such as the installation and construction of the structures. Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special projects, which included “cell sites” or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue–raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes. Considering that the fees in Ordinance No. 18 are not in the nature of local taxes, and petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the same, the CTA correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas,  G.R. No. 20442. February 18, 2014

Tax Procedure

Rules of Court; Rule 65 and Rule 45. Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court in assailing the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved part is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. In accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, the Court has treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review oncertiorari, (2) when errors of judgment are averred, and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deemed it proper and justified to relax the rules and treat the petition forcertiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.  The City of Manila, etc. et al. v. Hon. Caridad H. Grecia-Cuerdo etc., et al, G.R. No. 175723. February 4, 2014

Republic Act No. 1125; Court of Tax Appeals; jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. While it is clearly stated that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trail Courts (RTCs) in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under Republic Act No. (RA) 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it. The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.  While there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the strength of said constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.  The City of Manila, etc. et al. v. Hon. Caridad H. Grecia-Cuerdo etc., et al, G.R. No. 175723. February 4, 2014.

 Republic Act No. 1125, as amended; Court of Tax Appeals; jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, created the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Section 7, paragraph (a), sub–paragraph (3) of the law vests the CTA with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over “decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.” The question now is whether the trial court resolved a local tax case in order to fall within the ambit of the CTA’s appellate jurisdiction This question, in turn, depends ultimately on whether the fees imposed under Ordinance No. 18 are in fact taxes. Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas,  G.R. No. 20442. February 18, 2014

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June 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics | LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

See - June 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics | LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG





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Attorney; Disbarment; Effect of withdrawal. A disbarment case was filed by Quiachon against her lawyer Atty. Ramos who represented her in a labor case before NLRC and a special proceeding case before the RTC. During the pendency of the proceedings, complainant withdrew the disbarment case. The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014.

Attorney; Quantum of proof in administrative cases. An administrative complaint for dishonesty was filed against Atty. Molina for having advised his clients to enforce a contract on complainant’s client who was never a party to the agreement. The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith. Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014.

Court personnel; Dishonesty. Ampong was dismissed from the Civil Service Commission for dishonesty, however, remained employed in the RTC. The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014.

Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. Sheriff Macusi was charged with misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for failing to act on a writ of execution. The Supreme Court held that the 30-day period imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30 days, is mandatory. Contrary to such rule, Sheriff Macusi submitted only one return of writ of execution in his Partial Report and did not file any other report to the court. Sheriffs play an important part in the administration of justice because they are tasked to execute the final judgment of courts. Thus, Sheriff Macusi was held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable for simple neglect of duty which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014.

Judge; Time within which certain acts must be done; Exception. An administrative complaint was filed against MCTC Judge Regencia. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants.  In this case, the civil case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only more than 2 years later. While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014.

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April 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics | LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

See -  April 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics | LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG





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Court personnel; simple misconduct. An administrative case was filed against Melchor Tiongson, a Court of Appeals (CA) employee who was assigned to be the head watcher during the 2011 bar examinations. The complaint alleged that she brought a digital camera inside the bar examination rooms, in violation of theInstructions to Head Watchers. The Court held that in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt, and this requirement is satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by an employee. Any transgression or deviation from the established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct. In this case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson committed a misconduct. Tiongson was held liable for simple misconduct only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven with substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office of the Bar Confidant. As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary. Re: Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During the 2011 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014.

Judges; bias and partiality must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held that the truth about Judge Austria’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s  sacred  obligation  under  his  oath  of  office  to  administer  justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant also failed to adduce proof indicating the judge’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.

Judges; decision-making; 90-day requirement. An administrative case was filed against Judge Bustamante when it was found out upon judicial audit that he had a number of cases pending for decision, some of which the reglementary period have already lapsed. The Court held that decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench.  The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases. The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante was held liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction.Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806, April 7, 2014.

Judges; impropriety. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Austria for impropriety for posting her details as judge in Friendster and posting a picture with an indecent attire for the public’s consumption. The Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from becoming  members  of  and  from  taking  part  in  social  networking activities, they do not shed off their status as  judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities.  Judge Austria was guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. However, Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.

Judges; irregular or erroneous order or decision; appropriate remedy. The Court held that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austria’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. Even granting that the judge erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.

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