Criminal misconduct: an indictment of the law enforces and the courts.

Criminal misconduct - INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos


Editorial
Criminal misconduct
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 23:02:00 12/17/2010


WITH THE Supreme Court having made short shrift of the testimony of Jessica Alfaro in the Vizconde massacre case, the onus has shifted from the convicted and now recently released Hubert Webb et al. to the National Bureau of Investigation’s star witness. As early as Tuesday this week, only hours after the promulgation of the Court’s ruling and at the very moment when TV cameras were recording Webb’s last moments inside prison before his eventual release, the news anchors on the ABS-CBN news channel were already breathlessly speculating on the possible criminal accountability of Alfaro for her tainted testimony.

While to much of the polarized public, the jury on the guilt or innocence of Webb and his co-accused may still be out, there is one element of this sordid, sorry saga that has been made crystal-clear by the Court’s re-examination of the case: the culpability of the NBI in bungling the case. It is a culpability of the shocking, brazen, criminal kind, of which the employment of Alfaro as a dubious witness was only the most disturbing part. In this sprawling enterprise of evidence destroyed or gone missing, witnesses threatened and mishandled, multiple arrests that led nowhere—with suspects invariably crying torture, and fanciful stories planted in the public mind to jam the facts into a clumsy theory—one could see a horrifying picture of a law-enforcement agency practically gone off its ethical rocker, unmoored from any sense of professional, legal or moral constraints in prosecuting the case.

Even as public attention has now turned on Alfaro and questions about the extent of her probable perjury, it must also be asked: Who deployed her and coached her to be the star witness for the state? Who concocted the elaborate story that tried to stitch together various elements of the horrific crime into a plausible whole—plausible enough to have convinced Parañaque Regional Trial Court Judge Amelita Tolentino to convict Webb et al. overwhelmingly on its basis—but which the high court has now trashed as essentially ridiculous and unreliable?

And who destroyed or mislaid crucial evidence, such as the semen samples taken from the body of Carmela Vizconde? The NBI says it sent them as evidence to Tolentino’s sala, a claim the court denies. This exasperating back-and-forth alone deserves the gravest censure, or at least a thorough investigation, from both the Department of Justice, which oversees the NBI, and the Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction over the Parañaque court. Losing evidence is no laughing matter; losing evidence in this case, the most high-profile crime in the country in so many years, is nothing short of heinous.

Running after Alfaro should be secondary to bearing down on the shadowy figures among the police and NBI ranks who, by their incompetence, negligence and/or deliberate conspiracy to manipulate the case, perpetrated a most outrageous injustice—both against Lauro Vizconde whose fate it is now to relive the horrors all over again; and against Webb et al. who had to waste 15 years in jail for a crime they might not have been guilty of.
This is not the first time the NBI and the police have dropped the ball on basic criminal procedures. Too many cases have been dismissed because of legal shortcuts taken, or evidence planted or lost, or victims’ human rights violated. Other than clapping handcuffs on suspects, the country’s law enforcers, it is clear, are woefully, dangerously inadequate in their jobs. But the enormity of the Vizconde massacre threatens to make this moment the most spectacular failure in these organizations’ history so far.
Within six months, the statute of limitations on the Vizconde murders will preclude further criminal proceedings. Instead of launching another investigation that could only raise false hopes and pressure authorities to rely on ever-flimsier evidence, Malacañang and the DOJ should instead see this time as an opportunity to strengthen the rule of law within the NBI and the Philippine National Police.
These agencies’ investigative capabilities and, more crucially, grounding in the legal requirements of criminal prosecution should be overhauled and made a primary basis for their accountability to the public they purport to serve. Leave them be as they are now, without punishment for their criminal misconduct in the Vizconde case, and more bungling is bound to happen—if it isn’t happening now.

Vindicated

Vindicated - INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos

Get Real
Vindicated
By Solita Collas-Monsod
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 00:30:00 12/18/2010

FOUR DAYS ago, the decision of the Supreme Court on the so-called Vizconde Massacre was promulgated, writing finis to a story that began 19 years ago with the rape-murder of Carmela Vizconde and the murder of her mother Estrellita and younger sister Jennifer.

The vote to acquit Hubert Webb and his six co-accused was seven against four, with four other justices not participating for various reasons. But the decision has raised certain issues which should be laid to rest, so that everyone involved, particularly the Vizconde Seven (Hubert Webb and his six co-accused), can maybe get on with the rest of their lives after spending 15 years in jail. Let’s discuss them:

Question 1: Is the decision proof that justice is only for the rich? This is the accusation that Lauro Vizconde, husband and father of the victims, hurled.

The “justice only for the rich” contention is common practically worldwide, buttressed by the fact that prison populations do not reflect “true” cross-sections of society. Studies in the United States (arguably echoed everywhere else) show that bias against the poor with respect to arrest rates, convictions and sentencing. In this country, while the poor constitute 33 percent of the population (2006), they constitute close to 90 percent of the prison population. It has been observed that not only have the rich access to better lawyers, but that arresting officers and judges tend to be more lenient with them.

Using that logic, the Vizconde case can be said to reflect the “justice only for the rich” contention, but only in the sense that had the accused had less access to the services of good lawyers, they would still be rotting in jail today. But Vizconde’s contention is not that Webb et al. had excellent lawyers. He contends that they were acquitted because of “bayaran”—payoffs to justices with decisions for sale.

I don’t know whether Vizconde was describing a situation where seven justices succumbed to monetary blandishments while four stuck to their principles, or if the latter were not principled either, but just did not get their asking price and so no sale, or whether there was a mixture of principled and for-sale justices on both sides, or if even the justices who inhibited themselves were “campaigning” on the sly. Vizconde did not say; he just made the blanket accusation. But one hopes that he will be made to explain (as have the UP lawyers) why he should not be held in contempt for making such a statement.

In any event, his contention does not seem to be supported by the case history: If money could indeed buy a favorable decision in this case, how come the accused had to spend 15 years in jail?

Question 2: Does the decision imply that Webb and his co-accused, though declared “Not Guilty,” were not really “vindicated,” since the SC did not rule on their innocence?

Statements to this effect were attributed to SC spokesman Midas Marquez, and one hopes that these attributions were not accurate, because they smack of intellectual dishonesty. True, the SC did not rule on the innocence of the accused. But it is equally true that any court of law, whether in the Philippines or abroad, can only return one of two verdicts: Guilty, or Not Guilty. No court in the world, or at least in countries with legal systems like ours, can or will pronounce a person Innocent. I’ve been around enough lawyers to have absorbed this by osmosis, but the man on the street may not, and attribute to the “Not Guilty” verdict an additional significance it does not have.

And yes, it is also true that a court can indeed pronounce a defendant “Not Guilty,” even if he actually committed the crime—as when a vital piece of evidence that would have proven his guilt is declared inadmissible, leaving the prosecution with no leg to stand on (I cannot resist adding here that the trial court accepted everything the prosecution had to offer and rejected all the evidence coming from the defense).

So the only way to determine the sense of the Court, above and beyond the cut-and-dried, pro-forma “Acquitted … for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt” is to read the decisions in their entirety.

The reading will show, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the majority of the Court were essentially rebuking the lower courts for taking the uncorroborated testimony of Jessica Alfaro (the justices were not buying either the testimonies of the security guards or the laundress, for reasons discussed in the decision) as gospel, and completely disregarding or belittling official documentary and testimonial evidence that would show that Webb could not have committed the crime because he was halfway around the world at the time.

In their view, “Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi” (Abad). And that Webb’s “travel and immigration documents … not to mention the testimonial and documentary evidence … deserve full credit” (Carpio-Morales). Also that “the various violations of the accused’s rights have resulted in his failure to secure a just trial.”

In short, Alfaro was lying, Webb was telling the truth. Does that sound like the Court majority thinks, in any way, that Hubert Webb could have committed the crime he was accused of?

Lawyer disbarred for nonpayment of debts

A.C. No. 8391

MANUEL C. YUHICO vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, A.C. No. 8391, Nov. 23, 2010

x x x.

In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,[6] had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his debts and his issuance of worthless checks.

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.

 

In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on the issue of double or multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to the Bar.

 

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this time, without interest.

 

We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.

 

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[7]

 

In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay.

 

Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

 

We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,[8] the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks.

In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.

 

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from receipt of this decision with interest.

 

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

 

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

x x x.