Pauper litigant

"X x x.

Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." Thus runs paragraph 21. Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution. Implementing this constitutional precept is Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which in part provides that [a]ny court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise.

There should not be any misapprehension as to the concept of the term "pauper litigant". Under the Constitution and the rule just cited, a "pauper litigant" is not what the nomenclature literally means — that the petitioner must be so destitute as to have no means at all of even supporting himself. In Acar vs.

 Rosal (March 18, 1967), 19 SCRA 625, which is an expositor Of the constitutional precept, our language is this — "As applied to statutes or provisions on the right to sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader meaning. It has thus been recognized that: 'An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be a pauper; the fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to his statement that he has not sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs' (14 Am. Jur. 31). It suffices that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), tho not a public charge. And the difference between 'paupers' and 'indigent' persons is that the latter are 'persons who have no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-supporting when able to work and in employment' (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913, 'Indigent', citing People vs. Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830). It is therefore in the sense of being indigent that 'pauper' is taken when referring to suits in forma pauperis. Black's Law Dictionary in fact defines pauper, thus: 'A person so poor that he must be supported at public expense; also a suitor who, on account of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend without being chargeable with costs' (p. 1284, emphasis supplied)."3

Not that the foregoing view stands alone. This concept of pauper litigant has been incorporated in recent (1969) legislations. In Republic Act 6033, "An Act Requiring Courts to Give Preference to Criminal Cases Where the Party or Parties Involved are Indigents", and Republic Act 6034, "An Act Providing Transportation and Other Allowances for Indigent Litigants" both approved on August 16, 1969.' Congress has defined the term "indigent" to refer to a person "who has no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for the subsistence of his family." Of particular interest is a third statute, Republic Act 6035, also approved on August 16, 1969, entitled "An Act Requiring Stenographers to Give Free Transcript of Notes to Indigent and Low Income Litigants and Providing a Penalty for the Violation Thereof". This refers to the transcript of stenographic notes of "a hearing before an investigating fiscal or trial judge or hearing commissioner of any quasi-judicial body or administrative tribunal." For, indeed, the term "indigent litigant" for the purpose of this statute (R.A. 6035) was given a more expansive meaning to include "anyone who has no visible means of support or whose income does not exceed P300 per month or whose income even in excess of P300 per month is insufficient for the subsistence of his family."

Of course, the present case came up before the decision in Acar vs. Rosal and the approval of the statutes just mentioned. Nonetheless, we believe that in the resolution of the issue involved we should not lose sight of the liberal views expressed in said decision and laws. For, these views are but expressions of the constitutional policy that prescribes denial of free access to the courts by reason of poverty. Which policy should be liberally applied, the better to approximate the constitutional intent.

There is in the record the affidavit of petitioner stating that he has neither property nor income. And yet, the municipal judge misconceived the impact of this affidavit by relying merely on a certificate of the municipal treasurer stating that a man by the name of Juan Enaje appears to own property. Such certificate was mistakenly given importance by the municipal judge. His Honor should have taken stock of petitioner's vehement assertion that he is not the Juan Enaje mentioned in those tax declarations; and that, in truth and in fact, he (petitioner) had no source of income at all.

Even on the assumption that petitioner owns property, he may still be an indigent,4 considering his sworn statement that he had no income. Under the standard set forth in Acar vs. Rosal as well as the recent legislations heretofore adverted to, it is the income of a litigant that is the determinative factor. For, really, property may have no income. It may even be a financial burden.

For the reasons given, we hold that the judges below committed a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to allow petitioner to prosecute his action in the inferior court as pauper litigant.

Xxx."

G.R. No. L-22109, January 30, 1970

JUAN ENAJE, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

VICTORIO RAMOS, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Gubat, SORSOGON, and FELIPE F. DUGAN, respondents-appellees.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/jan1970/gr_22109_1970.html

When the Information does not charge an offense, it must be quashed.

" The Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 must be quashed as the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

In adjudging that each of the Information in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 charges more than one offense, the CA rationalized that the acts constitutive of the crime of premature campaigning are covered by two separate paragraphs in Section 79, i.e., (1) and (5). It explained that these are two separate modes and constitute two (2) separate crimes. The CA noted that the use of the word "and" does not connote continuity, but rather, separation, theorizing that:

If the purpose of the information was to charge [respondents] of only one offense and their visitation of houses and holding of meetings were only in furtherance of their act of campaigning and soliciting votes, the informations should have used the words "by", "thru" or any other word of equivalent meaning instead of the word "and".42

Foremost, the Court disagrees with the aforementioned disquisition. Under prevailing laws and jurisprudence, premature campaigning is no longer punishable. It is for this reason that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 must be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.43

In Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069, the respondents were charged with two (2) counts of violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code or premature campaigning. Except with respect to the date of commission, the Informations identically recite the crime of premature campaigning to have been committed as follows: "engage[d] in a partisan political activity by campaigning and soliciting votes for the Totoy del Mundo Movement, within Barangay Talipapa of Quezon City and by visiting the houses of voters and thereafter holding a meeting for the purpose of soliciting votes for their favor."44

Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code punishes election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period as defined under Section 79(b) of the same Code, viz.:

Sec. 79. Definitions. – As used in this Code:

x x x x

b. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include: 

1. Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

2. Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;

3. Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;

4. Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or

5. Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

x x x x Emphasis supplied.

From the foregoing, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.45

In relation to the second element, Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties." Notwithstanding such definition, a person is considered as a "candidate" only at the start of the campaign period for which the certificate of candidacy is filed. The provision further qualifies that unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start such of the campaign period.46 In this sense therefore, there can be no scenario in which premature campaign may be committed, as there can be no "candidate" prior to the campaign period.

The Court in Penera v. COMELEC, et al.,47 explained that legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. This is because the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots.48 Furthermore, the Court expounded-

It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is especially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

In layman's language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. x x x

x x x The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.49 (Emphasis supplied)

As stated in Penera, a review of legislative deliberations in the passage of the Omnibus Election Code and R.A. No. 9369, does not lend guidance with respect to the rationale behind the definition and enumeration of prohibited acts; thus, the Court cannot speculate and is left to apply the law as stated. Otherwise stated, the limitation with respect to how a candidate may be held liable for the offense of premature campaigning, irrespective of the motivation is a policy determination which the Court cannot overturn without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers.50

In accordance with the foregoing, the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-169068 and Q-11-169069 insofar as the facts alleged therein refer to the offense of premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election, which under the state of present law is "impossible" to commit, must be quashed. Consequently, there is no longer any reason for the Court to make a determination if these Informations each charge more than one offense. "

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212738. March 09, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ATTY. ANNA LIZA R. JUAN­-BARRAMEDA, MISCHAELLA SAVARI, AND MARLON SAVARI, PETITIONERS, VS. RUFINO RAMOY AND DENNIS PADILLA, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/mar2022/gr_212738_2022.html

Motion to quash; interlocutory order

"Parameters of the Court's review of interlocutory orders.

An order denying a Motion to Quash is interlocutory in nature and is not appealable. In general, the same cannot even be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari in view of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law. "The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash."38 However, when special or exceptional reasons obtain, immediate resort to filing of a petition for certiorari may be allowed.39
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the same as an appeal. In an appeal, the appellate court reviews errors of judgment. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not an appeal but a special civil action, where the reviewing court has jurisdiction only over errors of jurisdiction.40
In this regard, it is important to underscore the limitation in the mode of review of interlocutory orders as it dictates the context within which the Court resolves the instant petition for review on certiorari. Rule 45 limits the Court to review questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. Hence, without disregarding the rule that an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of an appeal, the Court examines the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence of or absence of grave abuse of discretion when it issued the interlocutory order.41
In view of the attendant circumstances, particularly the novel aspects of this case, which will be illustrated further on in this decision, it would be more favorable for this Court to entertain this appeal. It also bears to note that this case has been pending for a long time. The subject Orders of the RTC were issued in 2012; the assailed rulings of the CA were promulgated in 2013 and 2014; and the instant petition for review was filed in 2015. Given the considerable lapse of time that this case has been pending, it would serve no useful purpose for the Court to dismiss the instant case on technicality alone. Speedy disposition presents a special and important consideration in this case. "

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212738. March 09, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ATTY. ANNA LIZA R. JUAN­-BARRAMEDA, MISCHAELLA SAVARI, AND MARLON SAVARI, PETITIONERS, VS. RUFINO RAMOY AND DENNIS PADILLA, RESPONDENTS.


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/mar2022/gr_212738_2022.html

Modification of judgment and double jeopardy in criminal cases

"The petition lacks merit.

While we are called upon to resolve the sole issue of whether the CA correctly denied the issuance of the writ of certiorari, we cannot ignore the procedural issues which the trial and appellate courts failed to appreciate.

In filing her motion for reconsideration before the RTC and her petition for certiorari before the CA, petitioner sought the modification of the court’s judgment of conviction against Geren, because of the allegedly mistaken application of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender." The eventual relief prayed for is the increase in the penalty imposed on Geren. Is this action of petitioner procedurally tenable?

Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. – A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

Simply stated, in judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.13

Records show that after the promulgation of the judgment convicting Geren of bigamy, it was petitioner (as private complainant) who moved for the reconsideration14 of the RTC decision. This was timely opposed by Geren, invoking his right against double jeopardy.15 Although the trial court correctly denied the motion for lack of merit, we would like to add that the same should have been likewise denied pursuant to the above-quoted provision of the Rules.

As explained in People v. Viernes,16 the rule on the modification of judgments of conviction had undergone significant changes before and after the 1964 and 1985 amendments to the Rules. Prior to the 1964 Rules of Court, we held in various cases17 that the prosecution (or private complainant) cannot move to increase the penalty imposed in a promulgated judgment, for to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. The 1964 amendment, however, allowed the prosecutor to move for the modification or the setting aside of the judgment before it became final or an appeal was perfected. In 1985, the Rules was amended to include the phrase "upon motion of the accused," effectively resurrecting our earlier ruling prohibiting the prosecution from seeking a modification of a judgment of conviction. Significantly, the present Rules retained the phrase "upon motion of the accused." Obviously, the requisite consent of the accused is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.18

Equally important is this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Court of Appeals19 on the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari assailing a judgment of conviction. In that case, the trial court convicted the accused of homicide. The accused thereafter appealed his conviction to the CA which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the prosecution, then filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion. The OSG prayed that the appellate court’s judgment be modified by convicting the accused of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance. In effect, the OSG wanted a higher penalty to be imposed. The Court declared that the petition constituted a violation of the accused’s right against double jeopardy; hence, dismissible. Certainly, we are not inclined to rule differently.

Indeed, a petition for certiorari may be resorted to on jurisdictional grounds. In People v. Veneracion,20 we entertained the petition for certiorari initiated by the prosecution to resolve the issue of whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in imposing a lower penalty. In that case, the trial judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refused to impose the penalty of death because of his strong personal aversion to the death penalty law, and imposed instead reclusion perpetua. In resolving the case in favor of the prosecution, the Court concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion, and remanded the case to the trial court for the imposition of the proper penalty. By so doing, we allowed a modification of the judgment not on motion of the accused but through a petition initiated by the prosecution. But it was an exceptional case. Here and now, we reiterate the rule that review is allowed only in apparently void judgments where there is a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The aggrieved parties, in such cases, must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.21

Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and cause of its alleged misappreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntarrrender. Consequently, the trial court’s action cannot come within the ambit of the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the trial court’s action becomes an improper object of, and therefore non-reviewable by, certiorari.23:

G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009

ROSARIO T. DE VERA, Petitioner,

vs.

GEREN A. DE VERA, Respondent

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_172832_2009.html

Voluntary surrender

"For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary.24 The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.25 Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.26

Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. Cagas27 and in People v. Taraya,28 the Court added a fourth requisite before "voluntary surrender" may be appreciated in favor of the accused – that there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. Since the warrant of arrest had been issued, petitioner insists that arrest was imminent and the "surrender" could not be considered "voluntary."

In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, the accused ran to the upper portion of the cemetery where a police officer caught up with him. Thereupon, he voluntarily gave himself up. The Court held that if the accused did then and there surrender, it was because he was left with no choice. Thus, the "surrender" was not spontaneous.

In Taraya, when the accused learned that the police authorities were looking for him (because of a warrant for his arrest), he immediately went to the police station where he confessed that he killed the victim. Notwithstanding such surrender and confession to the police, the Court refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstance in his favor.

Lastly, in People v. Barcino, Jr.,29 the accused surrendered to the authorities after more than one year from the incident in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court refused to mitigate the accused’s liability because there was no acknowledgment of the commission of the crime or the intention to save the government the trouble and expense in his search and capture; and there was a pending warrant for his arrest.

Certainly, we cannot apply the same conclusion to the instant case. Cagas is not applicable because the accused therein did not surrender but was caught by the police. In Taraya, the warrant of arrest had, in fact, been issued and was forwarded to the proper authorities for implementation. In Barcino, it was a year after the commission of the crime when the accused went to the police station, not for purposes of acknowledging his culpability, nor to save the government the expense and trouble of looking for and catching him, but actually to deny his culpability.

In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest.30

The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the surrender. As distinguished from the earlier cases, upon learning that the court had finally determined the presence of probable cause and even before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest, Geren already gave himself up, acknowledging his culpability. This was bolstered by his eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment. Thus, the trial court was correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender."

We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco,31 the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up.:

G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009

ROSARIO T. DE VERA, Petitioner,

vs.

GEREN A. DE VERA, Respondent

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_172832_2009.html

Rule 65 petitions for certiorari and errors of jurisdiction in criminal cases

 "Decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case (regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved) may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which, in essence, is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[48] Being an appellate process, such remedy is confined to a review of any error in judgment.[49] However, unlike other modes of appeal, the scope of review is narrower because this Court only entertains pure questions of law,[50] and generally does not re-evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial stage of the whole proceedings.[51] Furthermore, the scope of review under Rule 45 for CA decisions, resolutions or final orders in granting or denying petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 is even narrower. Just like in labor cases, this Court will examine the CA's decision, resolution or final order from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the lower tribunal's part and not whether the same tribunal decided correctly on the merits.[52]

In this case, the CA nullified the RTC's February 13, 2013 Order dismissing the case against the petitioner on the ground of grave abuse of discretion and reinstated Criminal Case No. 10-1829. As a consequence of such reinstatement, this Court is now confronted with the issue on whether the petitioner's constitutional right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA.

To resolve such issue, this Court reiterates the general rule that the Prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case because an acquittal is immediately final and executory and the Prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.[53] However, there are instances where an acquittal may still be challenged without resulting to double jeopardy, such as:

(1) When the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process;[54] or

(2)      When the trial was a sham.[55]

In these instances, the dismissal or judgment of acquittal is considered void and assailing the same does not result in jeopardy.[56]

As to the proper procedure, a judgment of acquittal (or order of dismissal amounting to acquittal) may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[57] The reasons being are that: (1) the Prosecution is barred from appealing a judgment of acquittal lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated;[58] (2) double jeopardy does not attach when the judgment or order of acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion;[59] and (3) that certiorari is a supervisory writ whose function is to keep inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies within the bounds of their jurisdiction.[60] Verily, certiorari is a comprehensive[61] and extraordinary writ wielded by superior courts in criminal cases to prevent inferior courts from committing grave abuse of discretion.[62]

More importantly, grave abuse of discretion should be alleged and proved to exist in order for such petition to prosper.[63] The petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction whenever grave abuse of discretion is alleged in the petition for certiorari.[64] Such manner of exercising jurisdiction must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[65] In other words, mere abuse of discretion is not enough - it must be grave.[66] Thus, as applied in this case, while certiorari may be used to nullify a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal, the petitioner seeking for the issuance of such an extraordinary writ must demonstrate clearly that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point that such act is so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[67]

At this point, it now becomes imperative for this Court to re-assess whether the CA: (1) correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part; and (2) properly reinstated Criminal Case No. 10-1829 without violating the constitutional prohibition on placing an accused twice  in jeopardy."

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 216824, November 10, 2020 ]

GINA VILLA GOMEZ, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/670

25

Review of Comelec and COA decisions by Supreme Court

 "At the outset, the Court notes that the petition was filed out of time. Petitioners confused Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court when they erroneously claimed that their petition was timely filed within 60 days from notice of judgment.33 Rule 64 provides:

SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

SEC. 3. Time to file petition. The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (Underscoring supplied)

As gleaned from above, Rule 65 applies to petitions questioning the judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the COA only insofar as Rule 64 does not specifically provide the rules. Consequently, since Rule 64 explicitly provides the 30-day period for the filing of the petition, the same shall apply - not the 60-day period provided in Rule 65.

To recall, the COA Decision was promulgated on December 27, 2017 and petitioners received a copy of the Decision on February 23, 2018. Thus, the 30 day-period began to run from February 23, 2018. However, following Section 3, Rule 64 the period was interrupted when petitioners filed an MR on February 28, 2018. Petitioners received a copy of the Resolution denying their MR on November 12, 2018. Consequently, they had 25 days from November 12, or until December 7, 2018 to file their petition before the Court. However, petitioners only filed their petition on January 11, 2019 or 35 days after the last day of filing.

From the foregoing, there is no dispute that petitioners belatedly filed their petition before the Court. Nevertheless, the petition appears to be partly meritorious. Time and again, the Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial justice.34 Moreover, the present petition provides an appropriate avenue for the Court to settle the conflicting jurisprudence on the liability for the refund of disallowed allowances. Thus, the Court opts for a liberal application of the procedural rules considering that the substantial merits of the case warrant its review by the Court.

The Constitution vests the broadest latitude in the COA in discharging its role as the guardian of public funds and properties.35 In recognition of such constitutional empowerment, the Court has generally sustained the COA's decisions or resolutions in deference to its expertise in the implementation of the laws it has been entrusted to enforce.36 Thus, the Constitution and the Rules of Court provide the remedy of a petition for certiorari in order to restrict the scope of inquiry to errors of jurisdiction or to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COA.37 For this purpose, grave abuse of discretion means that there is, on the part of the COA, an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the assailed decision or resolution rendered is not based on law and the evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.38

In this case, petitioners failed to show that the COA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the subject NDs. Nevertheless, there is merit to their contention that they should not be held liable to refund the dis allowed amounts."

EN BANC

G.R. No. 244128, September 08, 2020 

MARIO M. MADERA, BEVERLY C. MANANGUITE, CARISSA D. GALING, AND JOSEFINA O. PELO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) AND COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_244128_2020.html

Admissibility vs. Probative value

 "In any event, even granting that petitioner has the requisite authority to question the subject RTC Decision, this Court, after a careful review of the arguments of the parties, finds no error in the questioned Decision of the RTC.

In the instant case, the Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC that the disputed acts of the MTC in denying admissibility to the subject ink cartridges as part of the prosecution's evidence, its appreciation of the entirety of evidence presented by both parties to the case, and its subsequent finding that the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged, are assailable as errors of judgment and are not reviewable by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

The Court finds no error in the ruling of the RTC that petitioner was not able to establish its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.22

Thus, this Court has explained that:

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross x x x.23

As found by the RTC, there was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of the MTC. If at all, the mistake committed by the MTC is only an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction, which would have amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.

This Court sustains the RTC ruling that even if the subject ink cartridges are admitted as evidence, it does not necessarily follow that they are given probative weight. The admissibility of an evidence is different from its probative value. Thus, this Court held in Mancol, Jr. v. Development Bank of the Philippines24 that:

x x x [a]dmissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.

The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. The admissibility of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests by which its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered with other evidence admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to the truth. The weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case.1âшphi1 "Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue." "Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence."25

Petitioner chose to simply focus on the MTC's act of denying admissibility to the subject ink cartridges. Petitioner lost sight of the fact that respondents were acquitted not because the ink cartridges were excluded as evidence but because the MTC, after considering the entirety of evidence presented by the prosecution, found that the latter failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged.

Stated differently, even if the seized ink cartridges were admitted in evidence, the Court agrees with the OSG that the probative value of these pieces of evidence must still meet the various tests by which their reliability is to be determined. Their tendency to convince and persuade must be considered separately because admissibility of evidence is different from its probative value. As contended by the OSG, "[e]ven granting arguendo that the MTC indeed committed an error in ruling that there was illegal search and seizure in this case, the prosecution still has to prove that the seized cartridges were indeed the property of petitioner."26 However, the prosecution failed in this respect. This Court agrees with the OSG that since the employee of petitioner who allegedly discovered the theft of the subject cartridges, and who was supposedly the one who put identifying marks thereon was not presented in court, nobody could verify if the cartridges seized from respondents were the ones missing from the stockroom. Parenthetically, what is very damaging to the cause of the prosecution is its failure to present the alleged video recording which supposedly shows respondents in the act of putting ink cartridges inside a bag."

G.R. No. 236686, February 05, 2020 

YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, V. SANDRA REYES AND JOCELYN REYES, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_236686_2020.html

Appeal re: civil aspect of criminal case

 "At the outset, the Court notes that petitioner lacked authority in filing a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC to seek the annulment of the decision of the MTC which acquitted herein respondents from the crime of attempted theft.

It is settled that in criminal cases, the State is the offended party and the private complainant's interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom.12 Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).13 The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.14 However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.15

The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant.16 The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.17 In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General.18 The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case.19

Thus, this Court's ruling in the earlier case of People v. Santiago20 is instructive, to wit:

It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.21

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.

In its petition for certiorari filed with the RTC, petitioner seeks the annulment of the MTC decision acquitting herein respondents. In so doing, petitioner raises issues on the admissibility of evidence which it submitted to prove the guilt of the accused. These issues necessarily require a review of the criminal aspect of the case and, as such, is prohibited. As discussed above, only the State, and not herein petitioner, who is the private offended party, may question the criminal aspect of the case."

G.R. No. 236686, February 05, 2020 

YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, V. SANDRA REYES AND JOCELYN REYES, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_236686_2020.html

Legal Ethics: negligence, lawyer-client relationship

 "Their conversations did not appear like casual exchanges between friends about a theoretical legal issue. On the contrary, the series of exchanges between the parties show that respondent voluntarily acquiesced to representing complainant in his prospective annulment case, or at the very least, render her legal assistance in his suit. She asked complainant to submit to his documents related to the case and repeatedly assured him that she would be filing the annulment complaint even after complainant expressed hesitation due to the lack of action on respondent's part.

A lawyer client relationship is established when a lawyer voluntarily entertains a consultation; regardless of the close relationship between the parties or the absence of a written contract or non-payment of legal fees.29 Once a lawyer agrees to take up the client's cause, the lawyer must serve the client with diligence and competence. A lawyer who is negligent in attending to a client's cause may be grounds for administrative sanction.30

In Burbe v. Magulta:31

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare - and had actually prepared - at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied.32

While respondent may later refuse to represent complainant, as in this case when she ws requested by complainant's mother-in-law to refrain from interfering in complainant's domestic issues, it was still incumbent upon respondent to inform complainant that she would no longer be able to represent him. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.ℒαwρhi৷

When complainant asked respondent for an update on his case on February 26, 2014,33 respondent did not inform him that she would no longer be connected with the case due to conflict of interest, even though she was approached by complainant's mother-in-law sometime before November 2013.34 It was only when she filed her Answer35 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that complainant learned of the reason why respondent would not be representing him.

This Court has stated that "[t]he fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence."36 Respondent's duty as a lawyer compels her to act not only with diligence, but with candor as well. She should have been upfront with complainant once she decided that she would no longer interfere in complainant's troubles. In Gone v. Ga:37

Respondent's sentiments against complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to renege on his obligation as a lawyer. The moment he agreed to handle the case, he was bound to give it his utmost attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires that he exerts his best efforts and all his learning and ability in defense of his client's cause. Those who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the community's respect for the legal profession.38

The Investigating Commissioner was correct in finding that respondent did not profit from complainant, since Mr. Domenden confirmed his receipt of P35,000.00 for the psychological evaluation fee.39 This circumstance, however, will not excuse respondent from administrative liability for violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as her oath to render "all good fidelity"40 to her client. As in a similar case,41 she must be made liable for her inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Lourdes Philina B. Dumlao is hereby REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Dumlao's record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED. "

A.C. No. 11959, April 28, 2021 

EUSEBIO D. SISON, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. LOURDES PHILINA B. DUMLAO, RESPONDENT.

Link: 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/apr2021/ac_11959_2021.html

Ejectment case; sole issue is physical or material possession.

 "Well-settled is the rule that the sole issue for resolution in ejectment case relates to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of the claim of ownership by any of the parties.26 Even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, as in the case at bench, the courts may pass upon such issue but only to determine the issue of possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter.27 In any case, the adjudication of ownership, being merely provisional, does not bar or prejudice an action between the parties involving title to the subject property.28

In Co v. Military,29 the Court ruled:

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.30 (Italics supplied.)

Moreover, the Court emphasized in the case of Mangaser v. Ugay31 that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession only if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership, thus:

Before the Court continues any further, it must be determined first whether the issue of ownership is material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance — to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.32 (Italics supplied.)

Another case wherein both parties raised the issue of ownership as their basis of their respective right to possess the property in question is Sps. Dela Cruz v. Sps. Capco,33 wherein the Court reiterated the rule that where both parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property, thus:

"The only issue in an ejectment case is the physical possession of real property possession de facto and not possession de jure." But "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property." Here, both parties anchor their right to possess based on ownership, i.e., the spouses Dela Cruz by their own ownership while the spouses Capco by the ownership of Rufino as one of the heirs of the alleged true owner of the property. Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctly passed upon the issue of ownership in this case to determine the issue of possession. However, it must be emphasized that "[t]he adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.”34

Based on the aforementioned jurisprudence, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that an ejectment case is not the proper proceeding where contrasting claims of ownership by both parties exist. At the risk of repetition, the only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real property—prior physical possession and not title.35

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.36

Records reveal that petitioner was able to satisfactorily prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of all the elements of forcible entry. While it may be true that respondents occupied the property before 2012, it was without the knowledge of petitioner and respondents voluntarily left the premises after the latter learned of petitioner's ownership. More importantly, petitioner was already in prior peaceful occupation of the subject property when respondents forcibly entered it by using a bolt cutter, evicted the tenants therein, changed the padlocks, and placed a rent signage in front of the property. These were the acts of respondents that prompted petitioner to file a forcible entry case.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that their entitlement to possession over the subject property is based on their ownership rights as evidenced by an Affidavit of Acceptance for the Foreclosure of the Mortgage of Real Property dated March 15, 2005 executed by Pablo. The Court stresses that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is.37 Contrary to the conclusions of the RTC, the Court deems it inappropriate for the ejectment court to dwell on the issue of ownership considering that respondents' claim of ownership could not establish prior possession at the time when the subject property was forcibly taken from petitioner.

Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror, not even by the owners.38 Assuming arguendo that herein respondents are the real owners of the subject property, they had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject petitioner's tenants from the subject property. Their employment of illegal means to eject petitioner by force in entering the subject property by destroying the locks using bolt curt replacing the locks, and prohibiting the tenants to enter therein made them liable for forcible entry since prior possession was established by petitioner.

All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion as affirmed by the RTC that petitioner is better entitled to the material possession of the subject property and that she cannot be forcibly evicted therefrom without proper recourse to the courts."

G.R. No. 229076, September 16, 2020 

MA. LUZ TEVES ESPERAL, PETITIONER, VS. MA. LUZ TROMPETA-ESPERAL AND LORENZ ANNEL BIAOCO, RESPONDENTS.

Link: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_229076_2020.html

Question of Fact vs. Question of Law; Rule 45, petition for review on certiorari

 "At the outset, the Court reiterates that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, its jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. The Court explained the difference between a question of fact and a question of law in this wise:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.24

Here, petitioner argues that the CA erred in holding that the instant ejectment suit is not proper due to the contrasting claims of ownership by both parties. In other words, petitioner is raising the issue of whether the court can resolve an ejectment suit even if both parties claim ownership of the subject property. Clearly, the issue raised is a question of law.

Still, the Court will have to pass upon the factual findings in the case considering the conflicting or contradictory25 decisions of the CA and RTC; thus, the Court is constrained to make its own factual findings in order to resolve the issue presented before it."

G.R. No. 229076, September 16, 2020 

MA. LUZ TEVES ESPERAL, PETITIONER, VS. MA. LUZ TROMPETA-ESPERAL AND LORENZ ANNEL BIAOCO, RESPONDENTS.

Link: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_229076_2020.html

Seafarer's death benefit

"SC: Only Legal Spouse, Children May Receive Seafarer Death Benefits

July 2, 2024

The Supreme Court has ruled that benefits arising from a seafarer’s death under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) contract should be awarded only to the surviving legitimate spouse, despite being long estranged from the seafarer, alongside the seafarer’s legitimate and illegitimate children.

Thus held the Supreme Court’s Third Division in a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa ordering the release of death benefits due the heirs of deceased seafarer Pedrito G. Macalinao (Pedrito).

Pedrito married Cerena in 1981. They had one child, Cindy. However, the spouses separated in fact after four years.

In 1990, with his marriage to Cerena still subsisting, Pedrito married Elenita. They had two children, Kenneth and Kristel.

Cerena herself contracted a second marriage in 1992, with Rene Paredes.

Elenita and Pedrito, a seafarer, lived together until his death in 2015 onboard the vessel of Excel Marine Co. Ltd./Fair Shipping Corporation (Excel Marine). His death benefits amounted to PHP 4,506,309.52, the only property he left upon his death.

In 2016, Cerena and Cindy filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the settlement of Pedrito’s estate, which included as a secondary issue the declaration of nullity of Pedrito and Elenita’s marriage.

The RTC ruled that the death benefits formed part of Pedrito’s estate and that under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, series of 2010 (POEA MC), they shall be divided among the beneficiaries in accordance with the rules on succession. The RTC held that Elenita, despite being the nominated beneficiary, is not entitled to Pedrito’s death benefits since their marriage is bigamous and void.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

The Supreme Court, however, held that the death benefits do not form part of Pedrito’s estate. Under Article 781 of the Civil Code, what forms part of the estate is property existing at the time of death.

However, in the case of the death benefits from the employment contract between Excel Marine and Pedrito, these benefits only arose upon Pedrito’s death and did not exist at the time of his death.

As to the division of the proceeds from the death benefits, Section 20.B.(3) of the POEA MC states that benefits for the seafarer’s death are payable to the seafarer’s beneficiaries consistent with the rules of succession under the Civil Code.

Such benefits are payable to the legal heirs not as inheritance but as proceeds from a death benefit.

The beneficiaries, however, must be determined in accordance with the rules of compulsory and intestate succession.

The Court held that Elenita is disqualified as a beneficiary since she is not Pedrito’s legal spouse, and their marriage was clearly bigamous and void from the beginning. Elenita’s supposed lack of knowledge of Pedrito’s subsisting marriage to Cerena is not a defense.

That Cerena herself entered into a bigamous marriage with another does not validate Pedrito and Elenita’s bigamous marriage. This, along with the fact that Cerena has been separated from Pedrito for 30 years, likewise does not disqualify Cerena, Pedrito’s legal wife, as one of his beneficiaries.

The Court acknowledged that, unlike the Social Security Act, Government Service Insurance System Law, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the POEA MC does not apply the test of dependency in determining the qualified beneficiary. However, this perceived gap in the law is for Congress to address, not the Court.

As to the distribution of the benefits among the legal heirs, the Court clarified that when the concurring primary compulsory heirs are the surviving spouse, one legitimate child, and illegitimate children, Article 892 of the Civil Code shall apply, subject to Article 895 of the same law, as amended by Article 176 of the Family Code.

Under Article 892, if only one legitimate child survives, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate. On the other hand, Article 895, as amended by the Family Code, provides that if illegitimate children survive with legitimate children, the shares for each of the former shall consist of one-half of the share of each legitimate child, provided that the share of the surviving spouse must first be fully satisfied.

The Court further clarified that the correct approach would be to determine and satisfy first the share of each legitimate child/ren, then the share of the surviving spouse in relation to the  number of legitimate children. Finally, the share of the illegitimate child/ren will be taken from the remaining free portion of the hereditary estate.

Thus, in the present case, the Court ordered that the proceeds from Pedrito’s death benefits be distributed as follows: one-fourth to Cerena; one-half to Cindy; one-eighth to Kenneth; and one-eighth to Kristel. (Courtesy of the Supreme Court Public Information Office)

FULL TEXT of G.R. No. 250613 (Macalinao v. Macalinao), April 3, 2024 at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/250613-elenita-v-macalinao-kenneth-v-macalinao-and-kristel-v-macalinao-vs-cerina-a-k-a-cerena-n-macalinao-and-cindy-n-macalinao/

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/250613-concurring-and-dissenting-opinion-justice-maria-filomena-d-singh/."

Supreme Court 

Insufficient prosecution evidence

 

G.R. No. 130189 June 25, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DOMINGO R. MULETA, accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/jun1999/gr_130189_1999.html

 

"Sufficiency of Evidence for the Prosecution

Having ruled the alleged confession as unconstitutional and inadmissible, we now determine whether the other pieces of evidence — all circumstantial in nature — would be sufficient to overturn yet another constitutional right: to be presumed innocent unless otherwise proven.

The rule is that ". . . in the absence of direct-proof, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable

doubt. 41

Here, the solicitor general, as well as the trial court, posits that the conviction of the appellant was sufficiently warranted by the aggregate of the following circumstantial evidence:

1. The appellant was familiar with the place where the crime was perpetrated.

2. The appellant left work around 9:30 on the evening of April 29, 1993 and did not return home until the morning of April 30, 1993.

3. The appellant, during the victim's wake, became hysterical and allegedly uttered: "Patawarin mo ako Charo, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti pang mamatay na," after which drank "chlorox."

We do not agree. At the outset, we stress that a careful review of the records of this case reveals that these pieces of circumstantial evidence were controverted by the defense and, even more important, they were not sufficiently established. 42

Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination, 43 the appellant consistently denied that he worked in the place where the victim's body was found. Also, the prosecution failed to prove that he was at work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 and that he went home on April 30, 1993. 44 All it could present was the testimony of NBI Agent Ely Tolentino, who merely testified on what appellant's co-workers related to him: that appellant left work earlier. 45 This is clearly hearsay. The affidavits of these co-workers do not help the prosecution's case, since they themselves were not presented during the trial. An affidavit is hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and subjected to cross-examination. 46 Besides, the appellant's wife, Emelinda Muleta, stated categorically that her husband was with her at home on April 29 and 30, 1993. 47 The appellant himself steadfastly affirmed this during his cross-examination. 48

The appellant's rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his testimony, due to his perceived failure to take care of his niece. 49 This was corroborated by the testimony of Danilo Delgado. 50 Moreover, the defense claims that the words he said during the wake were ambiguous. "Patawarin mo ako Charito" could have meant that the appellant was blaming himself for being unable to protect the victim. "Ikaw kasi lumaban pa" could have connoted frustration with what he imagined could have saved the life of his niece. "Nakakahiya ako, mabuting mamatay na" also shows the appellant's for blaming himself inutile, indicating his desire to take his own worthless life. If these words merit anything, it is this: it places the appellant under suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 51

Most importantly, even if we were to assume that all the foregoing were proven, they are still not enough to establish an unbroken chain leading inexorably to the guilt of the appellant. That the appellant could have been familiar with the place where the body was found did not legally prove anything. That he left work at 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 did not necessarily mean he was at the scene of the crime. So many other possible conclusions could be made regarding this circumstance. As for his statements during the wake, they are ambiguous.

We have said that "[i]n the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the state's evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal." 52 Thus, in People v. Bato, 53 the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented there — those showing that the accused brothers invited the victim (and his son) for a drink, suddenly tied his hands and took him away; after which his body was recovered from the river the next day — were ruled to be inadequate to sustain a conviction based on guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 54

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented acquires significance only when taken together with the appellant's confession.

The pattern of the tapestry, 55 which the prosecution would want us to see, is bound by only a single thread — the confession of the appellant. Due to constitutional infirmity, that one strand has been cut, and thus the pattern disintegrates. The tapestry becomes an unreadable puzzle."

Invalid Waiver of Rights

 G.R. No. 130189 June 25, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DOMINGO R. MULETA, accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/jun1999/gr_130189_1999.html

 

"No Valid Waiver

The illegality of the alleged confession is further demonstrated by the fact that appellant exercised no satisfactory waiver of his rights. As stated in our earlier discussions, since he was not assisted by a lawyer when the waiver was made, there was no valid waiver to speak of. 36

Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the appellant was assisted by counsel when he waived his lights, the waiver itself was lamentably insufficient. After Atty. Daquiz was allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this question: "Gusto mo bang talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon?" 37 To this appellant replied: "Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin ko." 38

To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly required. Such waiver failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the implications of his waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a language that clearly manifested his desire to do so. 39 The part of the sworn statement in which the accused "waived" his rights referred to them as "mga karapatan na ibinigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon" and "iyon" — words that were utterly vague and insufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirements. 40 As presented, the prosecution would have us refer to the first part of the sworn statement for guidance, as if it were a footnote saying "Please see first part." Such stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of rights cherished and enshrined in our basic law.

Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised only one question: whether appellant would like to waive his rights. This was odd, because she had been called to assist appellant in making his confession, not his waiver. Atty. Daquiz made no effort to determine whether the accused was treated well, or the understood his rights. Such perfunctory, even cavalier, attempt falls short of constitutional requirements."

Rights of suspects

" Validity of Extrajudicial Confession

The appellant claims that "it is not true that [he] had executed an extra-judicial confession" 14. As correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, however, the appellant actually admits to the execution of the said confession, albeit without the assistance of counsel. But unlike the solicitor general, we are not ready to declare that such "ambivalence only indicates the unreliability of [appellant's] claim." 15 Indeed, confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.

To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the following rights of persons under custodial investigation: to remain silent, to have independent and competent counsel preferably of their own choice, to be provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted by such counsel during the investigation, to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights, and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court. In People v. Santos, 16 we held:

A confession is not admissible unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III thereof, provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely — without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.

A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order because no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. 17 Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the exclusionary rule. 18 (citations omitted)

Flagrantly violated in the present case were the appellant's right to be informed of his rights under custodial investigation, his right to counsel, as well as his right to have said counsel present during the waiver of his rights under custodial investigation."

G.R. No. 130189 June 25, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DOMINGO R. MULETA, accused-appellant.

 https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/jun1999/gr_130189_1999.html

Extrajudicial Confession

 "An extra-judicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights is inadmissible in evidence. During custodial investigation, suspects have the rights, among others, (1) to remain silent, (2) to have an independent and competent counsel, (3) to be provided with such counsel, if unable to secure one, (4) to be assisted by one in case of waiver, which should be in writing, of the foregoing; and (5) to be informed of all such rights and of the fact that anything he says can and will be used against him. Where the remaining pieces of evidence are insufficient to determine guilt with moral certainty, the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. A conviction must rest on the strength of the admissible evidence of the prosecution, not on the weakness or insufficiency of the defense."

G.R. No. 130189 June 25, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DOMINGO R. MULETA, accused-appellant.

 https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/jun1999/gr_130189_1999.html

 

Corruption in the Judiciary

 #Corruption in the #Judiciary cannot be solved by perfunctory administrative/disciplinary #investigations alone. #AdministrativeCases are Reactive, not Proactive. The Judiciary should have its own Internal Rules to encourage #whistleblowers and to grant them #immunity as they reveal corruption-related information and documents that only #insiders know. Further, it is time for the Judiciary to establish its own Internal #Intelligence and #CounterIntelligence Divisions in the #JudiciaryIntegrityBoard and/or the #OfficeoftheCourtAdministrator. The said judicial offices must be #regionalized, too. The Office of Judicial Marshalls take care only of the security of judicial officers and personnel exposed to death threats. They're not into corruption-linked Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence missions in the Judiciary. Three serious issues weaken the Judiciary and the #RuleofLaw, whether here in the Philippines or abroad: (1) #Delay in the #AdministrationofJustice.  

(2) #Graft and #Corruption. 

(3) Lack of #Independence. The rest of the problems facing the Judiciary are secondary, like Computerization, Construction of New Halls of Justice, Compensation, Retirement, Continuing Judicial Education, Recruitment, and other Routine Administrative Issues.

Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr. 

Loan interests and penalties

 "Ruling

The Petition has no merit. By virtue of their contract of loan, MCC agreed to lend money to respondents, who, in turn, bound themselves to return the principal obligation plus pay monetary interest, which is the compensation for the use or forbearance of money.28 Under the principle of autonomy of contracts, parties to an agreement are allowed to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.29

Here, MCC and respondents agreed on 23.36% per annum as monetary interest for the PHP 467,600.00 loan under the first promissory note, PN No. 7155. The stipulated interests were computed for the five-year duration of the loan as they formed part of the PHP 16,895.77 monthly amortization to be paid by respondents. PN No. 7155 also provided for the payment of "an interest of 1/10th of 1% for every day" the loan obligation remains unpaid, plus "penalty of 1.5% per month" and "collection fee of P100.00 added, all of which, if left unpaid, shall be compounded monthly on due date to become part of the total outstanding obligation."30

In this case, however, the RTC found that MCC imposed an additional 3% monthly interest, referred to as the EIR. During trial, MCC admitted that it was their company policy to charge 3% per month EIR for every delay. The EIR is on top of the stipulated 23.36% per annum monetary interest and the penalties of 1/10 of 1% per day and 1.5% per month penalty, all of which were compounded monthly as part of the outstanding balance.

Clearly, the Court cannot sustain the imposition of the compounded 3% monthly EIR. The evidence shows that the EIR was not indicated in PN No. 7155. MCC unilaterally imposed the EIR by simply inserting it in the disclosure statement. This is not valid and does not bind the respondents as it violates the mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code, which states that the validity or compliance to the contract cannot be left to the will of one of the parties.31

The Court likewise rejects MCC's argument that the 3% monthly EIR may not be invalidated because the reduction of interest rates only apply to loans with open-ended terms, citing De la Paz v. L & J Development Company, Inc.32 Further, MCC cannot validly insist that respondents may not question the interest rates after agreeing to and benefiting from the proceeds of the loan.1aшphi1

In Megalopolis Properties, Inc. v. D 'Nhew Lending Corporation,33 the Court ruled that although there is no numerical limit on conscionability, the rate of 3% per month or 36% per annum is three times more than the 12% legal interest rate, and therefore, excessive and unconscionable. The rate of 36% per annum is also far greater than those previously upheld by the Court.34 Moreover, contrary to MCC's argument, we stressed in Megalopolis that the ruling in De la Paz did not in any way shield loan agreements with definite terms from scrutiny on conscionability. In De la Paz, the Court disallowed the creditor's claim for payment of monetary interests because of the absence of a written stipulation on interests as required under Article 195635 of the Civil Code. The fact that an interest of 6% per month was imposed on an open-ended loan wherein the period is unspecified only served to aggravate the outrageous amount being charged. At any rate, jurisprudence is settled that the willingness of the debtor in assuming an unconscionable rate of interest is inconsequential to its validity.36

When MCC and the respondents executed PN No. 7155 in September 2009, the legal interest rate was fixed at 12% per annum.37 This rate was considered the reasonable compensation for forbearance of money. As held in Spouses Abella v. Spouses Abella,38 while the contracting parties may depart from the legal interest rate, any deviation therefrom must be reasonable and fair. If the stipulated interest for a loan is more than twice the prevailing legal rate of interest, it is for the creditor to prove that this rate is justified under the prevailing market conditions.39 No justification was offered by MCC in this case.

In Chua v. Timan,40 the Court declared that stipulated interest rates ranging from 3% per month and higher are excessive, unconscionable, and void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law.41 Although Central Bank of the Philippines Circular No. 905-82 has effectively removed the interest ceilings prescribed under the Usury Law, still, lenders may not impose interest rates that would enslave the borrowers or hemorrhage their assets.42 Following these standards, the 3% per month or 36% per annum EIR cannot pass as reasonable. It is unacceptable particularly in this case where the EIR was charged on top of the stipulated 23.36% per annum monetary interest and the penalties of 1/10 of 1% per day and 1.5% per month, compounded monthly. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, MCC's scheme exponentially bloated the principal loan amount of PHP 467,600.00. It misled respondents into continuously paying on the belief that their balance was increasing because of several delayed payments.43

Likewise, the Court denies MCC's prayer to maintain the stipulated interest and charges in PN No. 7155 and hereby affirms the RTC and the CA's judgment equitably reducing the stipulated interest rate to the applicable 12% per annum legal interest. Even if we disregard the 3% per month or 36% per annum EIR, the Court sees that the stipulated interest rate of 23.36% per annum and the additional interest of 1/10 of 1% per day and 1.5% per month penalty, all compounded monthly, or roughly 42% per annum, is still excessive. Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable interest are contrary to morals, if not against the law. Under Article 140944 of the Civil Code, these contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the right to set up their illegality as a defense be waived. The unconscionable interest rate is therefore, nullified and is deemed not written in the contract of loan. For these reasons, and given the span of years counted from 2009 that are covered by the computation of interests, the reduction of the stipulated interest rates and penalties to the applicable 12% per annum legal interest is more equitable. This prevents the outstanding balance from increasing to an amount which disproportionately exceeds the PHP 467,600.00 principal debt.45 The Court is empowered to equitably reduce the penalties charged especially in respondents' case because of their substantial payments.46

Note however that only the EIR and stipulated interest rates and penalties are declared void for being unconscionable. The very nature of the parties' contract of loan entitles MCC to recover not only the principal amount, but also the payment of monetary interest from the respondents, as compensation for the use of the borrowed amount.47 Based on Article 142048 of the Civil Code, respondents' obligation to pay the principal and the interest subsists as this can be separated from the void interests rates and charges.

Now, in order to determine whether the RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that the entire principal obligation of PHP 467,600.00 under the first promissory note, PN 7155, has been fully paid by respondents, we apply the legal rate of 12% per annum, as monetary interest reckoned from the date of the contract, September 2009.49 We also deduct respondents' payments made until January 2014 amounting to a total of PHP 757,778.54,50 computed as follows:

X x x. 

As can be seen from the foregoing, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that respondents had fully paid the entire obligation. The Court finds that the obligation was fully paid as early as August 2012 and there was even an overpayment of PHP 11,532.47 for that month. Since respondents continued the payments until January 2014, they have a total overpayment of PHP 203,532.47 for PN No. 7155.

Relative to this, the Court sustains the RTC and the CA's declaration that the second promissory note, PN No. 8351, is void for lack of consideration as it was only executed by respondents to cover the supposed "unpaid balance" in PN No. 7155. In this regard, we need to modify the RTC and the CA's judgment in order to reflect the correct amount of overpayment to be refunded to respondents. The total amount to be refunded to respondents must cover not only the payments made in PN No. 8351 in the amount of PHP 417,859.58,51 as awarded by the RTC and the CA, but also the overpayment in PN No. 7155 amounting to PHP 203,532.47, as shown in the computation above, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of respondents' Complaint until finality, following Nacar v. Gallery Frames.52 All monetary awards will earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.53

Finally, the Court affirms the CA's ruling that the foreclosure proceedings are void. Generally, the nullity of the unconscionable interests and charges does not affect the terms of the real estate mortgage. The creditor's right to foreclose the mortgage remains, and such right can be exercised upon the failure of the debtors to pay the debt due.54 In this case however, the principal loan obligation was extinguished by the full payment of the respondents. This act automatically terminates the real estate mortgage. Being a mere accessory contract, the mortgage cannot exist independently of the principal obligation.55 Considering that the mortgage ceased to exist, the new title, TCT No. 010-201900129856 of the Registry of Deeds for Parañaque City, issued in the name of MCC as a result of the foreclosure, is void. The title registered in the name of respondent Ramon, TCT No. 72248,57 was properly reinstated by the RTC and the CA.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 6, 2021 and the Resolution dated December 22, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 115157 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Manila Credit Corporation is further ordered to refund to respondents Ramon S. Viroomal and Anita S. Viroomal the overpayment in the amount of PHP 203,532.47 for PN No. 7155, in addition to the amount of PHP 417,859.58 for PN No. 8351, with legal interest of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of respondents' Complaint until finality. Legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is likewise imposed on all the monetary awards, from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED."

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/jan2023/gr_258526_2023.html

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 258526, January 11, 2023 ]

MANILA CREDIT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON S. VIROOMAL AND ANITA S. VIROOMAL, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY ATTY. JERRY R. TOLEDO AND SHERIFF ALEJANDRO P. ABREMATEA, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

LOPEZ, M., J.:

Exorbitant and unconscionable interests

"A contract that is freely executed has the force of law between the parties. This time-honored principle of autonomy in contracts is, however, not absolute. It is balanced by the governing rule in Article 1306 of the Civil Code which declares that parties may not stipulate on matters which are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.1 Guided by this premise, the parties' principal loan of PHP 467,600.00, payable for five years at PHP 16,895.77 per month, inclusive of interests, which, later on condemned the debtors to pay the sum of PHP 1,175,638.12, yet still leaving more unpaid balance, cannot be upheld. The interests and penalties charged by the creditor are patently exorbitant and unconscionable; hence void.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 6, 2021 Decision3 and the December 22, 2021 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 115157, which affirmed the trial court's judgment declaring the interest rates imposed on respondents' loan void for being unconscionable and contrary to morals.5"

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 258526, January 11, 2023 ]

MANILA CREDIT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON S. VIROOMAL AND ANITA S. VIROOMAL, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY ATTY. JERRY R. TOLEDO AND SHERIFF ALEJANDRO P. ABREMATEA, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/jan2023/gr_258526_2023.html