Thursday, March 30, 2017

Affidavits of 4 CHR witnesses affirm Lascañas details on DDS | Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism





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EIGHT YEARS before retired SPO3 Arturo Lascañas admitted to participating in killings done by the Davao Death Squad (DDS), supposedly on the orders of then Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte, four other individuals had given sworn statements on the DDS and those who they said were behind it.

Three gave their sworn affidavits on separate dates in early 2009 to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR); CHR lawyer Jacqueline Ann C. de Guia, the current spokesperson of the agency, took their statements. The fourth gave a sworn deposition on July 10, 2009 before Judge William Simon Peralta of the Manila Regional Trial Court for a case filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), which was then seeking entry to a suspected burial site of DDS victims.

Although they were made separately, the statements of all five, including Lascañas, have interlocking details such as the general composition of DDS and the involvement of the police. The affidavits submitted to the CHR and that of Lascañas, along with his second testimony at the Senate, have even more details in common as well as complementary with one another, including the hierarchy within the DDS, the manner in which the killings were carried out, and the amounts given to a team per hit, which usually ranged between P13,000 and P15,000.

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Read the full texts of the affidavits. Go to the link above.

War on drugs statistics





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Here are the facts:

FACT 1. The first time that the PNP used "deaths under investigation" (DUI) was after the government came under attack for the killings in its war on drugs in the 2nd half of 2016. The term DUI was the PNP's way of categorizing deaths in the war on drugs that police officials could not explain because they were outside "legitimate police operations."

FACT 2. The PNP has never used DUIs in the past to classify deaths related to all crimes. It's a puzzle Tiglao does not know this.

FACT 3. BantayKrimen.com, a database maintained by the PNP which documents individual crime incidents, does not even have a DUI category.

FACT 4. The PNP only releases total DUI numbers at any given time, without breaking them down. The DUI total sent by the PNP to media from July 1, 2016 to January 9, 2017 stood at 3,603 – a number that's much smaller than the total number of murdered individuals from July to December 2016 of BantayKrimen, which stood at 9,167.

FACT 5. DUI, based on PNP data available to the public, is obviously a subset of total murders.

FACT 6. There are many more unreported deaths in the war on drugs. We know this from the many hours that our news team has been spending on the streets, pounding the graveyard beat in the last 8 months.

Last week, the PNP apparently clarified that its DUI numbers now cover all crimes.

What the ex-journalist and Arroyo apologist Tiglao should have done was to verify this claim and do his own legwork or, if he can't, research his way through Google. But Tiglao is out to get Rappler. And that's the only explanation for his series of fake news about us. – Rappler.com

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Becoming Duterte: The Making of a Philippine Strongman | INQUIRER.net





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Becoming Duterte: The Making of a Philippine Strongman
© 2016 New York Times News Service / 05:14 PM March 22, 2017

DAVAO CITY, Philippines — President Rodrigo Duterte relishes the image of killer-savior. He boasts of killing criminals with his own hand. On occasion, he calls for mass murder.

Speaking of the drug addicts he says are destroying the Philippines, he said, “I would be happy to slaughter them.”

Duterte and his friends have long cultivated legends of his sadistic exploits, like throwing a drug lord from a helicopter and forcing a tourist who violated a smoking ban to eat his cigarette butt at gunpoint.

It is a thuggish image that Duterte embraces.

Whether Duterte has done what he says — the killings he claims to have carried out are impossible to verify — he has realized his gory vision in national policy. First as a mayor, now as president of the Philippines, he has encouraged the police and vigilantes to kill thousands of people with impunity.

While his draconian justice and coarse manner have earned him widespread condemnation outside the Philippines, an in-depth look at his rise to power and interviews with many people close to him reveal a man of multiple contradictions.

He has alienated many with outrageous comments and irrational behavior, yet remains wildly popular. He is an anti-drug crusader, yet has struggled with drug abuse himself. And he grew up a child of privilege, the son of a provincial governor, yet was subjected to regular beatings.

His mother whipped him so often for his misbehavior that she wore out her horsewhip, according to his brother, Emmanuel Duterte. At parochial school, he was caned by Jesuit priests and, the president says, molested by one. By his teenage years, he was known as a street brawler.

“Violence in the house, violence in the school and violence in the neighborhood,” Emmanuel Duterte said. “That is why he is always angry. Because if you have pain when you are young, you are angry all the time.”

Years later, a psychological assessment of Rodrigo Duterte, prepared in 1998 for the annulment of his marriage, concluded that he had “narcissistic personality disorder” and a “pervasive tendency to demean, humiliate others and violate their rights.”

Nonetheless, his ailing ex-wife campaigned for his presidential bid last year.

That act of devotion only begins to unravel the paradox that is Duterte. Behind his brutish caricature, according to interviews with dozens of Duterte’s friends, family members, allies and critics, is a man who can be charming and engaging. He has many loyal friends and a soft spot for sick children.

As mayor of Davao City, he was known to help people in need by digging into his pocket and handing them a wad of cash. To many, his vulgar jokes only burnish his bona fides as a man of the people. When he appears in public, he is swarmed by adoring fans.

Still, the bodies have been piling up. Since Duterte took office last June and declared a “war” on drugs, the police and unknown assassins have killed more than 3,600 people, the police say, mostly in the slums of Philippine cities. Some put the toll at more than 7,000.

“I might go down in the history as the butcher,” he acknowledged unapologetically in January.

In less than nine months, he has already surpassed the death toll of President Ferdinand Marcos, whose forces killed about 3,300 political opponents and activists during his harsh 20-year rule.

Yet his gangland approach to combating crime and drugs has largely endeared him to Filipinos who have suffered high rates of violent crime and who see him as a refreshing change from the sophisticated but out-of-touch elite who have ruled this country for most of the last three decades.

The dissonance between the image of the gentle, caring grandfather and the brutal strongman spilling blood on the streets is just one of many in a common-man president who was born to the elite and has lived a life surrounded by violence.

Young, Armed and Angry

Duterte grew up in war-torn Davao City, in the southern Philippines, the oldest son of the governor of Davao province.

As a teenager, he hung out with the toughest kids, got into fights and learned the rude expressions he uses today. By 15, he was carrying a gun, his brother said.

As a freshman at the Ateneo de Davao high school, he was fondled by a U.S. priest, an experience he revealed only in 2015. He identified the priest as the Rev. Mark Falvey, who later moved to California and died in 1975. The Jesuit order agreed in 2007 to pay $16 million to nine people Falvey molested as children at a Hollywood church.

Against another priest, Duterte retaliated for a punishment he had received by filling a squirt gun with ink and spraying the priest’s white cassock, his siblings said. For that, he was expelled. He often skipped classes and likes to tell audiences that it took him seven years to finish high school.

His misbehavior was often overlooked because of his status, family members say. “He was known as the governor’s son,” said his older sister, Eleanor Duterte.

A daredevil, he took flying lessons at 16. On his first solo flight, he buzzed the family home and hit a treetop with the wheel of his Piper Cub, Emmanuel Duterte said. Later, a car accident put him in a coma for two days, his sister Jocellyn Duterte said.

The first time he killed a man, he says, was in a drunken beach brawl at age 17. “Maybe I stabbed somebody to death,” he told an interviewer two years ago.

His reputation as a womanizer is well-founded, but it was often women who sought him out. “Being the governor’s son,” Jocellyn Duterte said, “the women were always available.”

His father told him that since he was always in trouble, he could save legal fees by becoming a lawyer, his brother recalled, so Rodrigo went to law school. In his final year, he shot and wounded a fellow student whom he accused of bullying him.

Duterte graduated anyway and became a prosecutor.

“One thing about my brother is he is hardheaded,” Emmanuel Duterte said. “The more you tell him not to do it, the more he will do it. He needs to tone down on his anger. He needs anger management.”

In the 1980s, his mother led frequent marches against Marcos’ dictatorial rule. After Marcos’ ouster, President Corazon Aquino offered her the post of Davao’s vice mayor. She asked that Rodrigo be appointed instead, friends and family said.

Two years later, in 1988, he ran for mayor and won, starting a lifelong streak in which he has never lost an election.

When he took office, much of Davao was a war zone. The iron rule of the Marcos era had ended, and Communist rebels held a large part of the city. Armed groups operated with impunity, and assassinations of police officers were common.

Making the city safe was Duterte’s biggest challenge, and one he accepted personally.

Jesus G. Dureza, a high school friend who is now a Cabinet-level adviser, recalls seeing him late one night in the taxi he often drove to patrol the city. Duterte said he was hunting for a man who had been robbing cabdrivers. Dureza noticed that his pistol was cocked.

“He had a death wish,” Dureza said.

The Davao Death Squad

Shortly after he became mayor, crime suspects started turning up dead on Davao’s streets.

Duterte and his supporters have long denied the existence of a death squad in Davao City. But in September, Edgar Matobato, 57, came forward and told a Senate committee that he worked as an assassin on the squad for 24 years, killing about 50 people.

In an interview with The New York Times, he said the death squad was founded in 1988 at a lunch he attended at the old Menseng Hotel with Duterte, several police officers and six other recruits. They were told their job was to hunt down criminals.

A police officer passed around a covered basket, and each recruit took out a weapon. Matobato considered it good fortune that he drew a .45.

“The only one who could command the Davao Death Squad was Mayor Duterte,” he told The Times. “If there was an order to kill, it had to be with his clearance. Without his orders, we kill no one.”

Mr. Duterte took part in at least one killing, Matobato said. In 2007, a chance encounter on the road with a man named Vicente Amisola led to a shootout.

After Amisola ran out of ammunition, Matobato said, Duterte arrived, grabbed an Uzi and emptied two magazines at the defenseless Amisola.

When they checked Amisola’s body, the squad discovered that he worked for the National Bureau of Investigation.

Arnold Rosales, the bureau’s acting regional director in Davao, said that Matobato’s account of Amisola’s killing matched the findings of the bureau’s investigation except for one detail: the allegation of Duterte’s involvement.

Investigators concluded that the death was a result of miscommunication, and no charges were filed, Rosales said. The investigative report is missing, he said.

In February, a former police officer, Arthur Lascañas, 56, came forward and confessed to having led the death squad. He said that he received orders to kill directly from Duterte and that he had killed 200 people.

“All the killings that we committed in Davao City, whether they were buried or thrown in the sea, were paid for by Mayor Duterte,” he said.

Of the more than 1,400 people the Davao Death Squad is believed to have killed, at least one was not a crime suspect. Jun Pala, a journalist and outspoken critic of Duterte’s, was gunned down near his home in 2003. Lascañas said the mayor had ordered the killing, and Lascañas helped carry it out.

Duterte has never directly addressed the accusations made by Matobato or Lascañas, and he declined to be interviewed for this article. After Matobato’s testimony, Duterte accused the senator who led the committee of taking payoffs from drug lords. She was arrested and jailed last month.

Duterte’s personal death toll is harder to substantiate. If he stabbed someone on the beach, there is no record of it. In boasting that he hunted down suspects by night, he offered no specifics.

His claim to have killed “about three people” probably refers to a 1988 hostage raid in which he says he fired an M-16 at three kidnappers. But he recently acknowledged, “I may have hit them all or none at all.”

‘A Simple Man’

Becoming president has been an adjustment for Duterte, who is 71. For months, he still thought of himself as mayor and often called himself that.

He prefers to go home to Davao City rather than stay in the sprawling presidential palace complex in Manila. In a land that is notoriously corrupt and where government officials often live like kings, he has lived for decades in the same modest two-story house where he only recently installed air-conditioning.

Pomilda Daniel, a neighbor, calls him “a simple man.” She said that Duterte once admired her large new television and asked if he could have it if it ever broke so that he could fix it and use it.

Yet when he discovered during a visit to the House of Hope, a child cancer treatment center in Davao, that the children had no televisions, he returned the same day with nine TV sets and had them installed, said Mae Dolendo, a pediatric oncologist who heads the center.

“He is very, very compassionate,” she said. “We have had presidents who conducted themselves like we would expect presidents to conduct themselves, but they haven’t solved the country’s problems. He’s not perfect. He curses. But he gets things done.”

Duterte has no official first lady and boasted during his campaign that he had two wives and two girlfriends. Later, he said he should give Pfizer an award for creating Viagra.

In 1973, he eloped with Elizabeth Zimmerman, a former flight attendant, after courting her for a month. The marriage lasted until 2000, when it was annulled.

The psychological assessment of Duterte prepared for the annulment, a copy of which was obtained by The Times, was based on an examination of Elizabeth Duterte and is not a diagnosis.

In addition to the finding of narcissism, it described Duterte as a “control freak” and womanizer who began having affairs soon after he was married and flaunted his infidelity by bringing girlfriends to public functions.

While still married, Duterte met Cielito Avanceña, a teenage contestant in a beauty pageant who goes by the nickname Honeylet. She is 25 years his junior. He has described her as his second wife, although they never married.

Elizabeth Duterte and Avanceña declined to be interviewed.

Duterte’s Other Drug Problem

Perhaps some of the president’s mercurial behavior stems from the constant pain he suffers and his use of narcotics to treat it. Duterte has made a political career of fighting drugs, but acknowledged in December that he had been abusing the opioid fentanyl, the powerful and addictive drug that killed the musician Prince last April.

Duterte began using fentanyl to treat back pain and migraines from a spinal injury, apparently a result of a motorcycle accident a few years ago.

His doctor prescribed a quarter of a fentanyl skin patch, the president said, but he began using an entire patch at a time. When his doctor discovered that, he ordered him to quit.

“He said: ‘Stop it. The first thing that you would lose is your cognitive ability,’” the president recounted. “’You are, you know, abusing the drug.’”

Duterte has not said publicly when he started using fentanyl or whether he has stopped. In December, he denied being addicted.

His communications director, Martin Andanar, said that Duterte had stopped using fentanyl “way before he was elected president” last May. But a person with knowledge of his condition told The Times in September that Duterte was using the drug then.

Duterte’s energy and jet-black hair belie his age, but his afflictions have taken their toll. During public appearances, he often presses his fingers against a nerve on the side of his face to reduce the pain. He has skipped several public events because of illness.

In his speeches, he sometimes suggests he will not live to serve out his six-year term. He has not explained why.

Decades ago, Duterte learned that he had two rare conditions, Barrett’s esophagus and Buerger’s disease, which prompted him to quit drinking and smoking. As mayor, he enforced a strict public smoking ban, and he is now considering a similar measure nationwide.

He dislikes being questioned about his health. After a reporter asked for his medical report, he publicly rebuked the journalist, demanding, “How is your wife’s vagina?”

Loose Talk

Duterte’s outrageous remarks have left many with the impression that he is unhinged.

He says God speaks to him and made him president of this heavily Roman Catholic country. He has compared himself to Hitler. He used a term that translates as “son of a whore” to describe both Pope Francis and President Barack Obama.

Antonio Trillanes, a senator, recalled that when they met in 2015 to discuss a political alliance, Duterte only wanted to talk about people he had killed and “how the brains were splattered all over the place, gangland style.”

He seems never to have questioned the proposition that shooting people on the street is the best remedy for crime and addiction.

“I have my own political philosophy,” he said recently. “Do not destroy my country, because I will kill you.”

He scoffs at complaints about lack of due process for people killed by his police force and has threatened to kill human rights activists.

On numerous occasions, his aides have had to walk back his comments. Press secretary Ernesto Abella cautioned journalists that they should use their “creative imagination” to understand him and not be “too literal.”

That Duterte’s violent boasts should not always be taken literally matters little to his zealous supporters and is of little consolation to the families of the thousands killed by his policies.

“He is a child of privilege, but he became a champion of the little guy,” said Ken Angeles, Duterte’s college roommate and lifelong friend. “He’s a very passionate guy.”

Trillanes, now a leading critic of Duterte, has another name for him: “mass murderer.”


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Deconstructing the most common Dutertian arguments





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1.) It’s ok to kill drug users because they murder and rape: One problem with this argument is that unless you could prove that ALL drug users kill and rape, you’re saying that it’s ok to kill any member of a group because of the crime of some of its members. That’s like saying it’s ok to kill any Muslim because almost all terrorist attacks are committed by Muslims. Another mind altering substance, alcohol, is also responsible for a lot of crimes including murder, rape and a lot of car related deaths. In a lot of countries, alcohol related deaths actually outnumber drug related deaths but I don’t see anyone carrying banners saying “death to all lasengos”. What we do is we prosecute individuals for the specific crimes that they committed while under the influence of alcohol.

You’ll find plenty of documentation proving that users of hard drugs like shabu or meth can be rehabilitated (Robert Downey Jr would be an example) and not all of them commit rape and murder. We don’t prosecute people for the crimes members of their group have committed or crimes that we think they are LIKELY to commit. If a certain person was killed by a drug addict then that particular addict should be charged with murder. Other addicts should be given punishment that's proportional to the crimes that they have committed. 

Furthermore are we saying that it’s ok to kill users of Hard drugs like shabu, or are we going to extend this to users of other drugs like cocaine, LSD, marijuana and ectasy. (even dealers of ecstasy have been targeted recently) Because if you’d look at the numbers, you’d be hardpressed to find a strong correlation between the use of recreational drugs and violence. Some of the brightest minds in history experimented with drugs. Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Richard Feynman did LSD, Thomas Edison and Sigmund Freud did Cocaine and if I may quote Bob Marley, a strong proponent of the herb, “peace, love and hug all trees mawn” –Obviously a peace loving bloke, although I may be paraphrasing him on that

2.) Extrajudicial killings are justified because our crime rate has reached national crisis levels. This, ladies and gentlemen, is a classic example of fear mongering. Not so dissimilar from how bush justified his war on Iraq or how Hitler justified the actions of his Nazi party. You make the populace think that there’s a grave and imminent threat and you can justify extraordinary measures to counter that supposed threat.- Duterte’s chief legal adviser even said that the drug problem is now enough grounds to declare martial law. I’d like to think that we’re smart enough not to fall for that. I hope we are. The murder rate in the US is higher than in the Philippines. Rape cases are higher in the UK. In terms of drug use, we’re not even in the top 10 list. We are being led to believe that we have an extraordinary situation but data will show that we’re nothing special.

3.) Why do you grieve for the criminals who are getting killed by the police and vigilantes? Why not grieve for their victims instead? Does it really have to be mutually exclusive? Can’t you denounce both? In the first place, you CAN'T even really say that victims of extrajudicial killings are criminals yet. They're only suspects and therefore innocent until their guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal court. Innocent until proven guilty, not the other way around. Even if you were successful in arguing that murderers and rapists deserve death, it doesn't justify the killing of suspects unless you could prove that they are indeed guilty of murder and rape. Also, violent crime perpetuated by individuals happens in every country. It's a sad fact but it's a given. Violent crime that is openly perpetuated/encouraged by the government against its own people is a lot worse and it happens in states like North Korea and certain African countries that civilization has left behind. 

4.) Unless youre a drug addict, you have nothing to fear. You can tell that to Roman Manaois, Roana Tiamson, Julius Rabina, Jefferson Bunuan and the thousands of SUSPECTS who got reduced to a statistic without getting to the chance to prove their innocence. As recent events have shown, “Top gear justice” aka trial by the mob is quite unreliable. Just because a lot of people think that a person is guilty doesn't mean that he is actually guilty.If we treat due process as something that can be skipped, anyone can be a drug addict or a pusher and anyone can be killed. The purpose of due process is to determine guilt through an objective evidence-based process, more or less. It can never be perfect but it will still be more reliable than a subjective process based on finger pointing and chismis mongering.

5.) The US has no right to criticize the Philippines because they kill blacks. This argument was not made by a teenage girl but by Mr Duterte himself after he was asked by an American journalist a question regarding extrajudicial killings. It’s like that argument with your girlfriend or bf where you try to dig up every bad thing that you’ve done to each other in the past. It is true that there are plenty of cases of white officers killing unarmed black suspects. If Obama endorsed these killings like Duterte does, then we can say that these acts are state sponsored and we should condemn Obama. But Obama hasn’t praised any of these killings, has never endorsed them and has even condemned some of them. The most that you can claim is that there are a few bad seeds in the American police force (they exist in every country) and that they should be tried. A lot of these killer cops have been tried and convicted.

6) Human rights only protect drug coddlers not their victims:- Contrary to popular Dutertian belief, human rights were not invented by yellowtards or by drug coddlers. These rights predated yellowtards actually. The Universal declaration of human rights were agreed upon and ratified by most of the world’s democratic countries including the Philippines back in 1948 so each individual person can have a chance to stand against even the might of the state. A lot of the rights that you enjoy now are inspired by this declaration. It’s not the job of human rights organizations to investigate every crime that happens in a country. That is the government’s job. Now when governments trample on the rights of individuals, such as the right to due process, that’s when they step in. When duterte said that the UN had no right to criticize the country’s policy on extrajudicial killigs,he was a bit ill informed. Extrajudicial killings are crimes against humanity according to rules that we are a signatory to. Violators can be tried in 
the international criminal court.

7.) More people have died during the Arroyo and Aquino administrations: Aquino was in office for 6 years, Arroyo for 9. That's 15yrs combined or 180months. Duterte has been in office for a little over 2 months. Even if you could argue that more people died in the previous 2 administrations' 180months than duterte's 2 months, it's kind of a self-defeating argument, isn't it? 2400 have already died. More than 1000 are from police operations. You won't find that death rate from state actors in any administration post martial law. If we were to take his campaign promise seriously, he's still 97600 short of his goal.

8.) Drug addicts/pushers are not human and therefore not deserving of human rights: This is a very dangerous line of thought and shows how far this administration will go to mentally condition the populace into accepting things that most people would find morally objectionable. History is full of terrible examples of what happens when you dehumanize an entire group of people. Japanese interment camps during world war 2, the jews under the nazi etc. But again it boils down to due process. Even if you were right that drug users and pushers are not human and are in fact 3 headed demons, unless there's due process, you wouldn't know if the people you're killing are indeed 3 headed demons or just victims of false chismis... or perhaps victims of cops trying to meet their quota.

9.) Hundreds of thousands of addicts have surrendered and only 3000 have been killed. This drug war is working: You can completely eradicate poverty in the Philippines by killing all the poor people ...that is until small businesses start collapsing from lack of low-cost labor. If you kill all straight men, you will undoubtedly end all rape and you’ll have yourself a glorious feminazi utopia ...until the entire human race goes extinct because it can't reproduce anymore. You can achieve seemingly impossible things if you kill enough people. but extreme measures usually come with extreme side effects in the long run. 

I think it's safe to say that at least in this period of time, this drug war is working. Whether it's a long term, sustainable solution is another question. But at the cost what? at the cost of our relationship with our allies? our image in the world stage, the dignity of our legal institutions, our economy, the moral fabric of the Filipino people... the lives of innocents which we are now quick to dismiss as collateral damage? The drug problem isn't the Philippines' only problem. It's also far from its biggest problem. We're being conditioned to believe that a lot of more important things can be sacrificed in the name of this drug war.

10.) Extrajudicial killings are justified because Due process in the Philippines is lengthy. Our legal process is indeed lengthy and therefore it should be improved not circumvented. Imagine if all the resources that go towards hunting down and killing drug suspects were aimed towards fixing the judicial system instead. We can look at our neighbors for ideas. For example in Japan, judges are given incentives for finishing cases early. Whether it’s a good thing or a bad thing, they have some of the most quickly resolved cases in the world. If you argue that the judiciary is not necessary, you're moving the conviction process further down the chain ...or up the chain or anywhere else other than where it should be. If it came down to your sentencing and your life depended on it, would you rather be sentenced by a judge, a vigilante or a police officer?

Don't get me wrong. I'm sure there are a lot of police officers who are honest and morally upright. But as someone who’s had regular encounters with kotong cops, I can personally attest that not all of them are angelic, incorruptible enforcers of justice. A lot of them can't even handle our traffic situation without extorting a few hundred pesos from motorists for nonexistent violations. What makes anyone think that they are equipped with the right faculties to become judge and executioner

11.) You have no proof that duterte is associated with any of these extrajudicial killings: This is probably the most frustrating point to argue against because our dear president flip flops on so many things that he says. He once admitted that he was the Davao death squad only to deny it later. He says he’ll pull us out of the UN only to say later “joke only”. Doesn't it bother anybody that he gets to spew verbal diarrhea locally and internationally and it's on us to interpret if he's serious or not? Here are a number of things he said that he hasn’t taken back yet: 

1.) “I don’t care about human rights”
2.) “If you know any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself as getting their parents to do it would be too painful”
3.) “Drug addicts are not human beings”
4.) “Where will this lead us? Where do I get the billions (of pesos)? My budget is only this much… that’s why in the meantime you have them killed,”
5.)“When I become president, I’ll order the police and the military to find these people and kill them.”
6.) “The funeral parlors will be packed… I’ll supply the dead bodies,”

These are direct quotes from him some even have actual video footage. He also promised hefty rewards for vigilantism. (50k reward for every drug peddler killed if i'm not mistaken -Maybe that was also a joke but it seems like there are some who didn't get the joke and took it seriously). If not admission of guilt, at the very least you can say that it is incitement to violence, no? But leaning a lot more towards guilt, I'd say. These statements alone should be worthy of condemnation. Not only do they show that our administration is morally abhorrent, it shows that the administration is inciting the population to do morally abhorrent acts. Coupled with the fact that the number of extrajudicial killings of drug suspects in his 2-month term is unprecedented, i'd say there's at least a positive correlation.

Modern History generally doesn't favor tyrants who kill their own people, even if they claim that it's for a better cause. Even if Marcos did a few good things for the country, it will not matter because of the thousands that he tortured and killed. He will never be remembered as a hero, a good president or even just a good man. I doubt if Duterte will reach his goal of 100,000 dead drug suspects before his term is over. But if he does, history will remember him as a tyrant who killed his own people en masse. ...and we will be remembered as a generation of people who didn't just let it happen but actually celebrated it. In our quest to rid our society of its monsters, we are becoming the monsters. What a time to be a Filipino.

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When a President Says, ‘I’ll Kill You’ - Video - NYTimes.com

See - When a President Says, ‘I’ll Kill You’ - Video - NYTimes.com





Recommended. Please watch. Go to link above.

Tuesday, March 28, 2017

Chief Justice Sereno to lawyers: Fight impunity amid threats, fear | Headlines, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com

See - Sereno to lawyers: Fight impunity amid threats, fear | Headlines, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com







"x x x.

Sereno to lawyers: Fight impunity amid threats, fear
By Evelyn Macairan (The Philippine Star) | Updated March 26, 2017 



 0
Speaking before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) 16th National Convention of Lawyers at the Marriott Hotel, Sereno reminded the lawyers present to bear in mind their role and not allow impunity to succeed. SC PIO


MANILA, Philippines - Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno on Friday night called on the country’s lawyers to do their share in combating impunity amid “living in violent times,” as proven by 86 law practitioners who had been killed since 1999, which has caused some to fear handling certain cases.

Speaking before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) 16th National Convention of Lawyers at the Marriott Hotel, Sereno reminded the lawyers present to bear in mind their role and not allow impunity to succeed.

The conference had the theme “Global and Regional Integration of Legal Services: Challenging the Philippine Status Quo.”

In a statement, Sereno pointed out that these are “increasingly violent times that we find ourselves in,” citing that there have been lawyers and judges who have been threatened and attacked, particularly public interest lawyers.

From 1999 to 2014, 83 practicing lawyers, excluding prosecutors and judges, were violently killed, while from 2015 to the present, three have been assassinated.

As a result, according to Sereno, individual members of the Bar and even one chapter have taken the step of publicly articulating their fears and even desisting from handling specific cases.

‘National conversion’

Calling for a “continuing national conversion” among Filipino lawyers, the Chief Justice admonished her audience to “swim against whatever tide meets them” and to “bring hope.”

“When judges and lawyers hesitate to do the right thing for fear of being derogated for the company they keep or when they respond to vilification, threats and actual violence with surrender and capitulation, the rule of law is shoved out and impunity steps in,” Sereno said.

“The reality of the violent times we find ourselves in should make us – we, in the judiciary, and you, in the practicing Bar – all too aware of our role in combating impunity and promoting the rule of law and the law of hope.”

In the same speech, Sereno reminded lawyers on how they could do this: by taking their oath seriously; by signing up to help; by going against the grain and not taking the path of least resistance; and by continuing the conversation and discussion on ways where their profession could bring hope to the people.

“The Lawyer’s Oath is no ordinary canonical incantation nor is it a routinary legal requirement. The Oath, far from being a sterile form of words, gives us the roadmap to action as lawyers and defines us, as a profession. In a very real sense, it is a definition of who we are and to what we have been called,” Sereno said.

She added that the Lawyer’s Oath carries the values of fidelity, commitment, integrity, courage; fidelity to the Philippine flag, the Constitution, the country’s laws and duly constituted authorities; commitment to the law and the values it seeks to uphold; integrity to practice law in an ethical manner, encompassing also self-restraint in not performing acts proscribed and the active witness of carrying out affirmatively the acts required; and the courage to be able to carry out all these faithfully and well.

Lawyers could also help bring suit to protect rights, when appropriate, according to Sereno.

In line with the theme, she said challenging the status quo “may mean that lawyers must occasionally confront traditions that may have taken root through inertia and, if necessary, create new traditions.”

“Do something noble, something good, something righteous, something different,” Sereno said.

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Disbarment vs. Impeachment - SC junks disbarment case vs Ombudsman Morales | Inquirer News





"x x x.

"The Supreme Court has dismissed outright the disbarment case filed against Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

During Tuesday’s en banc, SC decided to dismiss the disbarment complaint for lack of merit.

The high court noted that in the cases of Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 56384 March 22, 1984), Cuenco v. Fernan (A.M. No. 3135 Feb. 17, 1988), Re: Raul M. Gonzales (A.M. No. 88-4 5433, April 15, 1988), Jarque v. Desierto (A.C. No. 4509, Dec. 5, 1995), and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica et al. (A.C. No. 4683, Aug. 6, 1997), they repeatedly stated that a member of the Bar who holds office that may only be removed by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during his or her incumbency.

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Sunday, March 19, 2017

JURIST - Self-Defense Against Terrorists: How Long and How Far?




"x x x.

Self-Defense Against Terrorists: How Long and How Far?
Saturday 11 March 2017 at 7:43 PM ETedited by Yuxin Jiang

JURIST Guest Columnist Laurie Blank, Emory Law School, discusses the recent airstrikes against al Qaeda targets in Yemen, and how self-defense raises questions in US response against al Qaeda...


Last week's sustained campaign of airstrikes against al Qaeda targets in Yemen brought the conflict with al Qaeda to the forefront of our attention, after a few years of heavy media concentration on the US and coalition fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. It thus served as a reminder that the US campaign against al Qaeda and affiliates — often termed "associated forces" — is now in its sixteenth year and does not appear to be ending anytime soon.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US responded in self-defense against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and since then has used force against al Qaeda and several affiliated groups from Pakistan to Yemen to Syria to Somalia and beyond. The passage of time alone raises a critically important question: how long does self-defense last? And as the US has shifted its stated objective from preventing future attacks to "ensuring the lasting defeat of al Qaeda and violent extremist affiliates," a second essential question is how far can a state go — both in the geographic sense and in the sense of the legitimate aims of using force — when acting in self defense?

These questions are essential for effective legal analysis of US actions against al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Most discussions of self-defense under international law focus on the right to use force at the initiation of action in self-defense — based on the existence of an armed attack or imminent armed attack and the necessity and proportionality of the force used to deter or repel the attack. At some point, however, sixteen years and thousands of miles from the initial trigger for self-defense authority, it is clear that we must transition from whether there is a right to act in self-defense to what is the extent of the right to act in self-defense.

As I analyze in greater depth here, examining the extent of self-defense raises three categories of questions. First, what are the legitimate aims of self-defense against terrorist groups and how do such aims affect our understanding and application of necessity and proportionality? Second, if the campaign against a terrorist group is an armed conflict, how does that change our assessment of self-defense or the legitimate parameters of action against that group? And third, how does a state's initial success against a terrorist group affect the application of necessity and proportionality in the self-defense analysis?

Traditionally, the international law of self-defense recognizes the right of states to use force to deter or repel an attack — and the force used must be necessary to achieve that purpose and proportionate, in degree or amount of force, to that goal. The foundational self-defense criteria of necessity and proportionality thus require that any assessment of self-defense must start with the victim state's aim or objective in using force in response to an armed attack or imminent armed attack.

In the counterterrorism arena, however, using the traditional notion of "deterring" or "repelling" an attack as the legitimate aim of self-defense is significantly more complicated. Terrorist attacks tend to be singular events causing mass civilian casualties rather than military operations to gain territory or achieve other conventional strategic objectives, such that the very idea of halting or repelling an attack does not translate well into the counterterrorism scenario, where targets are unknown and the terrorists may be gone long before the attack itself takes place. Most states therefore justify the use of force in self-defense against terrorist groups as action taken to prevent future attacks. Although preventing future attacks makes sense, it can have very different operational meanings: it could be limited to action to stop specific terrorists in the last window of opportunity before an attack or it could include action to destroy the terrorist cell or group entirely.

This lack of clarity hampers the legal analysis. One could argue that only preventing an immediate future attack is a legitimate aim of self-defense. Or one could argue that broader action to defeat the terrorist group is a question of proportionality and how elastic the degree of force allowed can be for achieving the traditional objective of deterring or repelling an attack. Finally, one might contend that the destruction of the terrorist group's capability is a legitimate objective of self-defense itself. The extent of self-defense — how much force the state can use and for how long — varies significantly depending on which of these interpretations one applies.

Second, the US has consistently framed its campaign against al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups as an armed conflict. At the most basic level, the armed conflict paradigm raises the question of whether victory in war supplants self-defense against an attack or imminent armed attack as the analytical structure for assessing the lawfulness of state action. That is, the key issue is whether the characterization as armed conflict removes the necessity and proportionality criteria from consideration and leaves the extent of self-defense — how much force against which groups and for how long — to be determined solely by the idea of victory in war.

The challenge, of course, is that no one seems to know what winning looks like against a terrorist group. Without tools for identifying when a conflict ends or, in effect, victory is achieved, it is difficult to delineate metrics for when a state has exceeded the parameters for the use of force against a terrorist group. Indeed, allowing a state to characterize operations against an armed conflict can potentially give that state carte blanche to set perpetually expanding aims in self-defense, a highly problematic scenario. Given the uncertainties, it would be wise to consider if and how necessity and proportionality can continue to play a role in assessing the reasonableness of the use and extent of the use of force, thus helping to maintain the balance between sovereignty, territorial integrity and order in the international system, and the state's inherent right of self-defense.

Finally, several questions arise from the shifting nature of a terrorist group and military operations against it as the state enjoys initial success in its forceful responses to the terrorist group's attacks or series of attacks. As a state takes forceful action, the terrorist group's ability to launch attacks will likely diminish, at least temporarily. As the threat of future attacks lessens, an assessment of the classic criteria of necessity and proportionality correspondingly changes — the necessity for action has lessened and the amount of force needed to attain the objective is lower — suggesting that the scope of self-defense is thus narrower. Operationally, however, this approach is counterintuitive. If initial success means a state has less room for maneuver, then the terrorist group has more space to reconstitute and launch attacks, thus re-triggering the state's right to act in self-defense. The result is a circular argument and legal framework divorced from the operational reality of how states respond to threats.

Ultimately, therefore, it is essential to examine how initial success and the responsive acts or maneuvers of a terrorist group affect how we consider the extent of self-defense against terrorist groups. Three features of contemporary counterterrorism are of particular interest here: terrorist groups finding safe haven in another state; terrorist groups splintering or reconstituting as one or more new or related groups; and attacks or propaganda inspiring the creation of new groups or vows of allegiance from other existing groups. The first expands the geographic range of self-defense and the latter two expand or potentially expand the spectrum of groups against whom the state proposes to use force in self-defense. In other words, initial success and its resulting effects have significant consequences for the reach of self-defense--both whom the state can use force against and where it can do so.

The discourse over the past sixteen years has focused on whether and when a state can use force in self-defense against a non-state group, the classic questions surrounding the initiation of the right of self-defense. It is now essential to develop sophisticated tools for understanding and assessing the extent of self-defense to avoid significant gaps in the ability of international law to guide and regulate the long-term use of force against terrorist groups.

Laurie Blank is a Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the International Humanitarian Law Clinic at Emory University School of Law..

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JURIST - President Trump's Revised Travel Ban: The Underlying Problem of Religious Discrimination Remains





"x x x.

In effort to stave off legal challenges to his initial Executive Order (EO) banning travel by nationals of seven predominantly Muslim-majority countries, President Donald J. Trump issued a revised EO that addresses several shortcomings. Yet, the new EO, issued on March 6, 2017, remains fundamentally flawed because it perpetuates the central constitutional infirmity: discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.

Trump issued the original EO, entitled "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States," on January 27, 2017. (The revised EO bears the same title). The original order caused widespread chaos and unwarranted hardship for noncitizens traveling to the United States, including refugees and legal permanent residents. The EO sparked legal challenges by individuals and by several states, nearly all of which resulted in judicial rulings invalidating key portions of the order. Most notably, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington blocked enforcement nationwide of the EO's provisions temporarily suspending entry of noncitizens from the seven identified countries and temporarily suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the Trump administration's motion for an emergency stay of the district court's order pending appeal.

The Trump administration's decision to issue a revised EO represents a concession of the first order's legal indefensibility. The revised EO addresses several flaws, including excluding application of the travel ban to lawful permanent residents. It also does not apply to foreign nationals with valid visas or refugees whose travel to the U.S. has previously been scheduled with the State Department. Those provisions, coupled with the 10-day delay in implementation, are designed to avoid a repeat of the mass chaos that accompanied the first EO.

But the immigration ban continues to target six nations that are more than 90 percent Muslim: Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Syria and Yemen The EO's sole changes in this regard are to make the ban on Syrian nationals temporary and to exclude Iraqi nationals, purportedly based on increased cooperation from Iraq, but more likely based on political and diplomatic pressure from Iraq and internally from within the Trump administration. Additionally, the revised EO maintains the temporary suspension of refugee admissions and the 50,000 cap on refugees for 2017 once the program resumes (thus cutting the current total in half).

The order also poses new concerns, including by requiring relevant federal agencies to collect and publish information about convictions of terrorism-related offenses, government charges of terrorism, and gender-based violence against women committed by foreign nationals, while containing no corresponding publication requirement for U.S. citizens. This provision discriminates based on national origin and is likely to inflame bias against noncitizens by deliberately misrepresenting to the public that they alone—and not U.S. citizens—are responsible for terrorist activity. Indeed, the Trump administration could seek to use this information to lay the groundwork for further bans or restrictions on immigration.

The Constitution's Establishment Clause prohibits discrimination by the government based on religion, including giving preference to one religious denomination over another. Like the original order, the revised order continues to discriminate both in its purpose and effect by maintaining the ban on countries that are overwhelming Muslim. The ban need not include all Muslim-majority countries; as long as religious discrimination is a motivating factor, it may run afoul of the Establishment Clause.

The Trump administration, to be sure, will defend the revised EO by claiming that religion is not the motivating factor and that the ban on immigration from the six countries is based on national security considerations. Further, the administration will likely point to the revised EO's elimination of any preference for religious minorities.

But context is crucial, and nothing in the new order is sufficient to overcome the evidence of discriminatory purpose surrounding the original order. That evidence includes multiple statements by Trump indicating his wish to restrict immigration of Muslims to the United States as well as a statement by Trump's close advisor, former New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani, that Trump was looking for a way to make a Muslim ban legal.

Further, despite the more restrained rollout that accompanied the new EO, the discriminatory intentions of Trump and several key advisors continue are still evident. For example, White House adviser Stephen Miller noted that any changes to the first executive order would be "mostly minor, technical differences," and that "[f]undamentally, you are still going to have the same, basic policy outcomes for the country."

Additionally, evidence continues to show that the Trump administration's purported security concerns are merely a misguided attempt to use territory as a proxy for religion. A Department of Homeland Security report recently found "country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity" and that "few of the impacted countries [under the executive order] have terrorist groups that threaten the West."

Previously, Judge Leonie Brinkema of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held in Aziz v. Trump [PDF] that the travel ban in the original EO was adopted for the constitutionally impermissible purpose of discriminating against Muslims. Applying the Supreme Court's decision in McCreary County v. ACLU—where the court looked at the history of events surrounding the visible display of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky courthouses—Judge Brinkema concluded that the EO was the outgrowth of Trump's previously promised Muslim ban.

The revised EO is best understood as another step by the Trump administration in its efforts to achieve this goal. It seeks to clean up some glaring instances of executive overreach to defeat legal challenges, while keeping the underlying policy of discriminating against Muslims intact.

The first EO may have made an easier target, given the disorder it unleashed and its inclusion of legal permanent residents. But none of the Trump administration's tinkering to the revised EO repairs its fatal flaw.


Jonathan Hafetz is Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law. He has served as counsel for amici curiae in legal challenges to President Trump's travel ban executive orders.

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JURIST - Arizona’s Death Penalty Procedures & Professional Ethics





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Jjust recently, it has come to light that the State of Arizona has put forward a new death penalty plan given the lack of availability of anesthetics and sedatives previously used in the death chamber, namely, Pentobarbital and Sodium Pentothal. The plan being put forward is a provision that puts the onus on a death row inmates’ lawyer to provide the drugs so the State can follow through with the planned death penalty. To say that this plan throws some ethical issues in the face of those lawyers would be a great understatement.

One of the main duties of any lawyer is to act in the clients’ best interests and in accordance with their instructions. Here we have a situation where Arizona is attempting to put a duty on a lawyer to act in the state’s best interests and per their instructions rather than the clients. This flies in the face of the duties of a lawyer to their client. This is before we even take into account the fact that it is against Federal law in the US to import these drugs. It should be noted that a lawyer is bound to not assist or take part in criminal conduct with their client but here, Arizona expects a lawyer to commit a criminal act for the State so that they can execute their client? One could say that the plan is rather nonsensical when compared with a lawyers professional responsibilities. Not to mention the fact that committing a criminal act can be seen to indicate that the lawyer is not fit to practice and can amount to professional misconduct.

In addition to working in their clients best interests, it is also a professional conduct rule that lawyers must work with diligence in representing their client and with dedication and commitment to the interests of the client. I don’t think anyone could argue that assisting the state to execute your client, assuming that it is against their wishes of course, is hardly working in an effort to seek the best results for their client with the dedication and commitment that a lawyer is bound to put into their work.

We could also turn our mind to the matter of professional ethics which stipulates that a lawyer must act independently and impartially in providing legal services but the plan being put forward is essentially asking the lawyer to be a slave to the aims of government and hammer their client to the stake, so to speak. Further, when acting with this independence the lawyer is given the right to refer to considerations such as moral, social and political factors in addition to matters of law. So in the few US jurisdictions that allow voluntary euthanasia, a doctor cannot administer end-of-life drugs to a terminally ill person because this goes against a doctors ethics, otherwise when voluntary euthanasia legislation is discussed in jurisdictions that are debating whether to implement this kind of legislation all we ever hear is “How can this fit with the ethics of being a doctor?”. Never mind that though, it is perfectly fine for a lawyer to buy end-of-life drugs for someone who is not choosing to die, when there is a likelihood that they do the work that they do with death row inmates because they are not in favour of the death penalty for their clients.

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"When the United States ratifies a treaty, it not only makes the US a party to that treaty; it also becomes US domestic law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which says treaties "shall be the supreme law of the land." Courts have a duty to restrain federal executive action that conflicts with a ratified treaty. Customary international law develops from the general and consistent practice of states. It is part of federal common law and must be enforced in US courts, whether or not its provisions are contained in a ratified treaty."





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Evaluate New Travel Ban in Light of International Law
Thursday 16 March 2017 at 1:05 PM ETedited by Joseph Macklin

JURIST Contributing Editor Marjorie Cohn, Professor Emerita at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, discusses the constitutional violations resulting from the executive order banning nationals from six Muslim-majority countries...


\After a federal district court [PDF] judge and a unanimous three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled [PDF] that Donald Trump's Executive Order (EO) instituting a travel ban was likely illegal, the president suspended it and issued a new EO on March 6, 2017.

On March 15, a federal judge granted a temporary restraining order in Hawaii v. Trump et al., halting the operation of the new EO nationwide. US District Judge Derrick K. Watson found that plaintiffs met their burden of establishing a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim, that irreparable injury is likely if the requested relief is not issued, and that the balance of the equities and public interest counsel in favor of granting the requested relief.

When the case is heard on the merits, the legality of the new EO, which categorically suspends immigration from six Muslim majority countries to the United States, should be assessed in light of US treaty and customary international law, according to an amicus brief filed in the case.

Eighty-one international law scholars, including this writer, and a dozen non-governmental organizations with expertise in civil rights law, immigration law or international human rights law (amici) argue in their amicus brief that the new EO threatens discrimination that would run afoul of two treaties. They are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [PDF] (CCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [PDF] (CERD).

When the United States ratifies a treaty, it not only makes the US a party to that treaty; it also becomes US domestic law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which says treaties "shall be the supreme law of the land." Courts have a duty to restrain federal executive action that conflicts with a ratified treaty.

Customary international law develops from the general and consistent practice of states. It is part of federal common law and must be enforced in US courts, whether or not its provisions are contained in a ratified treaty.

Under the Constitution's Take Care Clause, the President must "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." This means Trump has a constitutional duty to comply with our legal obligations under both treaty and customary international law.

"[T]he Immigration and Nationality Act and other statutes must be read in harmony with these international legal obligations pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and long established principles of statutory construction requiring acts of Congress to be interpreted in a manner consistent with international law, whenever such a construction is reasonably possible," amici argue. "In this case, the international law obligations . . . reinforce interpretations of those statutes forbidding discrimination of the type threatened by Sections 2 and 11 of the EO."

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The United States ratified the CCPR in 1992. Article 2 prohibits "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference" based on religion or national origin, which has "the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing," according to the United Nation Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body charged with monitoring implementation of the CCPR.

Article 2 prohibits discrimination against the family as well as individuals. "The family is the natural and fundamental group of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State," Article 23 says. The HRC has opined that states have an obligation to adopt appropriate measures "to ensure the unity or reunification of families, particularly when their members are separated for political, economic and similar reasons."

Many immigrants and refugees flee their countries of origin and come to the United States to reunify with their families. The CCPR protects them against discrimination based on religion or national origin.

Amici state in their brief, "Restrictions on travel and entry caused by the EO that impose disparate and unreasonable burdens on the exercise of this right violate CCPR article 2." According to the HRC, although the CCPR does not generally "recognize a right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party . . . , in certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise."

Thus the non-discrimination mandates and protection of family life in the CCPR "should be considered by courts in interpreting government measures affecting family unification," the brief says.

Article 26 prohibits religious and national origin discrimination and guarantees equal protection in any government measure. These provisions are not limited to individuals within the territory of the state party and subject to its jurisdiction. So immigrants need not be physically present in the United States to enjoy the protection of Article 26.

Moreover, the non-discrimination requirements enshrined in the CCPR also constitute customary international law. In 1948, the United States approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [PDF] (UDHR), which is part of customary international law. The UDHR forbids discrimination based on religion or national origin, guarantees equal protection of the law, and protects family life against arbitrary interference.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

The United States ratified CERD in 1994. That treaty also prohibits discrimination based on religion or national origin. "Racial discrimination" includes any distinctions and restrictions based on national origin. Article 1 specifies that states can only adopt "nationality, citizenship or naturalization" policies that "do not discriminate against any particular nationality."

Like the CCPR, CERD does not limit its non-discrimination provisions to citizens or resident noncitizens. "While CERD does not speak specifically to restrictions on entry of nonresident aliens," the brief says, "the general language of CERD expresses a clear intention to eliminate discrimination based on race or national origin from all areas of government activity."

In Article 4, CERD provides that states parties "[s]hall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination." This includes discrimination based on national origin. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the body of independent experts that monitor the implementation of CERD, interprets Article 4 as requiring states to forbid speech that stigmatizes or stereotypes noncitizens, immigrants, refugees and those seeking asylum.

International Law Should be Considered in Evaluating the EO

"Those international law principles require courts to reject any attempt by the President to define classes based on national origin or religion, and then to impose on those classes disparate treatment, except to the extent necessary to achieve a legitimate government purpose," amici wrote.

Their brief continues, "The EO...makes an explicit distinction based on national origin that, unless necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate government aim, would violate US obligations under international law."

In effect, the EO makes a distinction based on religion. All six of the listed countries have majority Muslim populations. As the brief says, "the EO does not suspend immigration from any state with a non-Muslim majority."

Amici also argue that international law is relevant to Section 11 of the EO, which requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to "collect and make publicly available" information relating to convictions of terrorism-related crimes, government charges of terrorism, and "gender-based violence against women" by foreign nationals. But the EO does not require publication of this information on US citizens.

"By mandating that the Secretary publish pejorative information about noncitizens without comparable information about US citizens," amici wrote, "Section 11 makes a suspect distinction based on national origin." Section 11 "may bear on the intent to discriminate, because the decision to publish derogatory information about noncitizens alone is stigmatizing, and appears to be motivated by a desire to characterize noncitizens as more prone to terrorism or gender-based violence than US citizens." Moreover, "a measure designed to stigmatize noncitizens cannot be proportionate and thus violates article 26 of the CCPR and articles 2 and 4 of the CERD."

Thus, amici "request that the Court consider US obligations under international law, which forms part of US law, in evaluating the legality of the EO."

Marjorie Cohn is professor emerita at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, former president of the National Lawyers Guild, and deputy secretary general of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. Her most recent book is "Drones and Targeted Killing: Legal, Moral, and Geopolitical Issues." Visit her website at http://marjoriecohn.com/ and follow her on Twitter @MarjorieCohn.

Suggested citation:Marjorie Cohn, Evaluate New Travel Ban in Light of International Law, JURIST - Forum, Mar. 16, 2017, http://jurist.org/forum/2017/03/marjorie-cohn-international-law.php.


This article was prepared for publication by Joe Macklin, JURIST's Managing Editor. Please direct any questions or comments to her at commentary@jurist.org

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"So don’t deposit a check and wire money or send money back in any way. Banks must make funds from deposited checks available within days, but uncovering a fake check can take them weeks. If a check you deposit bounces – even after it seemed to clear – you’re responsible for repaying the bank. Money orders and cashier’s checks can be counterfeited, too."





"x x x.

Don't bank on that check
March 17, 2017
by  Lisa Lake
Consumer Education Specialist, FTC


Scammers know how to design phony checks to make them look legitimate. In fact, the Council of Better Business Bureaus just released a list of the most “risky” scams, based on how likely people are to be targeted, how likely to lose money, and how much money they lost. Fake checks were number two.

Fake checks drive many types of scams – like those involving phony prize wins, fake jobs, mystery shoppers, online classified ad sales, and others. In a fake check scam, someone asks you to deposit a check – sometimes for several thousand dollars – and, when the funds seem to be available, wire the money to a third party. The scammers always have a good story to explain the overpayment – they’re stuck out of the country, they need you to cover taxes or fees, you’ll need to buy supplies, or something else. But when the bank discovers you’ve deposited a bad check, the scammer already has the money, and you’re stuck paying the money back to the bank.

So don’t deposit a check and wire money or send money back in any way. Banks must make funds from deposited checks available within days, but uncovering a fake check can take them weeks. If a check you deposit bounces – even after it seemed to clear – you’re responsible for repaying the bank. Money orders and cashier’s checks can be counterfeited, too.

Want to avoid the latest rip-offs? Sign up for free scam alerts from the FTC at ftc.gov/scams.

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