POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO ORDER CLOSURE OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

The authority of local governments to shut down non-compliant business establishments is not an implied residual power; it is an express statutory and constitutional delegation anchored on local autonomy and police power.

1. Constitutional Basis

Local governments may exercise powers “as may be provided by law” (Art. X, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution). Congress implemented this mandate through the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

2. Statutory Bases under the Local Government Code (RA 7160)

A. General Welfare Clause (Sec. 16, LGC)

LGUs may enact and enforce measures necessary to promote health, safety, and general welfare. This includes regulatory measures over businesses operating within their jurisdiction.

B. Licensing and Regulatory Power (Secs. 444, 455, 465, LGC)

Mayor’s Licensing Authority: City and municipal mayors have the power to issue and revoke business permits, and to “suspend or revoke” the same for violations of laws, ordinances, and conditions.

This authority carries the implied ancillary power to close down establishments operating illegally or without required permits.

C. Local Taxation and Enforcement (Secs. 129–171, LGC)

LGUs may impose local business taxes, issue assessments, and enforce compliance. Non-payment authorizes administrative sanctions, including closure.

D. Power to Enforce Building and Safety Regulations (Sec. 477, LGC; National Building Code)

If a business occupies a building without an occupancy permit or in violation of safety regulations, the mayor may order closure to prevent danger to life and property.

E. Special Laws

For construction firms:

Republic Act No. 4566 (Contractors’ License Law) requires a valid PCAB license.

Operating without a PCAB license is unlawful and subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. LGUs may shut down such establishments as part of their police power.

LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES ON LGU POWER TO CLOSE BUSINESSES

1. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457 (March 20, 1987)

While this case concerned confiscation of property, the Court expounded on the limits of police power. It held that regulatory actions—such as shutting down unsafe or illegal businesses—are valid only if grounded on lawful authority, reasonable means, and due process. It remains a foundational doctrine on the scope and limits of police power exercised by LGUs.

Digest:

Facts: The petitioner’s carabaos were confiscated under an executive order penalizing transport of carabaos across provinces.

Ruling: The Court invalidated the order as an unreasonable exercise of police power.

Doctrine: Regulatory closure or restriction of business must satisfy substantive due process and must pursue a legitimate public purpose.

2. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846 (January 20, 2009)

This case directly addressed LGU authority over business operations. The Court upheld the power of LGUs to regulate or restrict business activities to protect public morals, health, and safety—even if such actions negatively affect business profits.

Digest:

Facts: Ordinance prohibited “short-time” motel operations.

Ruling: The Court struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional for being unduly intrusive, but reaffirmed the broad regulatory authority of LGUs under the General Welfare Clause.

Doctrine: LGUs may regulate or close businesses but must do so through measures that are reasonable, not arbitrary, and respectful of substantive due process.

3. Malabon Coliseum Corp. v. Malabon, G.R. No. 220705 (April 10, 2019)

This is the leading case on closure of businesses for lack of permits. The Court upheld the mayor’s authority to issue closure orders when a business fails to secure local permits, even if the business challenges the validity of the underlying ordinance.

Digest:

Facts: The city ordered the closure of a coliseum for operating without a mayor’s permit.

Ruling: Closure was valid. The LGU did not need to wait for criminal prosecution or judicial action before closing a non-compliant business.

Doctrine: A mayor may immediately close establishments operating without permits. Closure is administrative and preventive, not penal, and may be imposed before or independently of judicial proceedings.

APPELLATE AND REVIEW REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO AFFECTED BUSINESSES

1. Administrative Remedies

Before escalating to the courts, the business may file:

Motion for Reconsideration with the mayor or city legal office.

Appeal to the Sangguniang Panlungsod if the closure stems from an ordinance-related administrative action (Sec. 188, LGC regarding assessment disputes; analogous principles apply to administrative actions).

2. Judicial Remedies

A business may immediately resort to court, particularly if closure results in grave abuse of discretion.

A. Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

Ground: The mayor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Relief: Nullification of the closure order; possible injunction.

B. Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction

To prevent immediate closure or allow reopening while the case is pending.

C. Petition for Prohibition (Rule 65)

If the LGU threatens unlawful closure.

D. Action for Damages under Art. 32, Civil Code

If the closure violated constitutional rights (due process, equal protection).

3. Quasi-Judicial Remedies

If tax liability is involved:

Protest of assessment under Sec. 195, LGC.

Appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (for real property tax issues).

For local business taxes, decisions of LGUs may be elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals through Rule 65 or appeal mechanisms recognized in jurisprudence (e.g., City Treasurer of Makati v. CTA, G.R. No. 140284).

4. Remedies Regarding PCAB Licensing

5. 

If closure is tied to absence of a PCAB license:

The business may file an appeal with the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines (CIAP) under RA 4566.

CIAP decisions may be elevated to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43.

VERIFIED LEGAL SOURCES AND CITATIONS

1. 1987 Constitution, Article X

2. Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), Sections 16, 129–171, 444, 455, 465, 477

3. National Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096), Sections on occupancy permits

4. Contractors’ License Law (RA 4566) and PCAB regulations

5. Ynot v. IAC, G.R. 74457, March 20, 1987

6. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. 122846, January 20, 2009

7. Malabon Coliseum Corp. v. Malabon, G.R. 220705, April 10, 2019

8. City Treasurer of Makati v. CTA, G.R. 140284, June 15, 2005

All citations above have been verified against Supreme Court reports and statutory texts.

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Assisted by ChatGPT, December 13, 2025.

Execution of Judgment

In Philippine judicial procedure, the only portion of a judgment that may be executed is the dispositive portion (the fallo). Neither the body, nor the reasoning, nor any obiter dictum can be enforced by a writ. Both the sheriff tasked with execution and the losing party against whom execution is directed are legally bound only by the literal, operative text of the dispositive portion.

This principle is settled in doctrine:

1. Execution must conform strictly to the dispositive portion.

A writ of execution “must conform not only to the judgment’s tenor but to its literal terms,” and cannot vary, enlarge, or diminish the judgment. (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100594)

2. The body of the decision cannot control the fallo.

If there is any inconsistency between the body and the dispositive portion, the latter prevails because it constitutes the final, definitive adjudication. (Heirs of Malate v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 170338)

3. Sheriffs have no authority to interpret or expand the judgment.

A sheriff’s role is ministerial: to execute the judgment as written, not as understood or implied. Any act beyond what the fallo commands is void. (Castillo v. Namuco, G.R. No. 182729)

Thus, until the exact dispositive portion of the Supreme Court’s PhilHealth ruling is released, the following remain impossible:

drafting a proper writ of execution;

determining the precise obligations commanded by the Court;

identifying whether restitution is immediate or requires actions by specific agencies;

enforcing any recovery against officials or contractors.

Media summaries, even official press releases, have no legal force. Only the verbally exact fallo is enforceable.

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Assisted by ChatGPT, December 5, 2025.

Estate tax amnesty

The “estate tax amnesty law” referred to in the news is essentially the amnesty regime created by Republic Act 11213 (the 2019 Tax Amnesty Act), as subsequently amended — most significantly by Republic Act 11956 (2023). 

Below is a summary of its main features — its coverage, mechanics and benefits — as currently in force under those laws.

I. Original Law: RA 11213 (2019) — Estate Tax Amnesty

Coverage (Section 4, RA 11213): The amnesty applied to estates of decedents who died on or before December 31, 2017, whose estate taxes remained unpaid or had accrued as of that date, with or without prior assessment. 

Tax rate / Amount (Section 5): Eligible estates pay a flat “estate amnesty tax” of six percent (6%) of the decedent’s total net estate at the time of death. If there was a prior estate tax return filed, the rate applies to the net undeclared estate. 

If allowable deductions then exceed the gross estate (i.e., resulting in a negative net estate), the minimum amnesty tax is ₱5,000. 

Filing and payment (Section 6): The executor, administrator, legal heirs, transferees or beneficiaries had to file a sworn “Estate Tax Amnesty Return” (ETAR) with the relevant revenue district office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) within two years from the effectivity of the tax amnesty’s implementing rules and regulations; payment was due at time of filing. For nonresident decedents, there was a specified RDO for filing. 

Finality / Immunity (Section 8): Once conditions were satisfied and the amnesty tax paid, the estate would enjoy immunity from any further estate tax liabilities (including late tax, interest, surcharges, or additions) for the relevant taxable years, as well as immunity against civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings under the 1997 Tax Code arising from failure to pay such taxes. 

Exceptions (Section 9): The amnesty did not apply to estates where tax liabilities had already become final and executory, or estates involving cases pending in court — for example, those under the jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), or involving unlawful wealth, money-laundering, tax-evasion crimes, or malversation of public funds. 

Thus, RA 11213 offered a one-time opportunity for heirs of older estates to regularize their tax obligations with reduced tax and broad immunity, in exchange for payment at a favorable flat rate.

II. Amendments & Extensions: RA 11956 (2023) + Earlier Amendment RA 11569 (2021)

Because many potential beneficiaries failed to avail themselves within the original window, the amnesty period was extended twice:

Under Republic Act 11569, the availment period was extended from the original 2021 deadline to June 14, 2023. 

Subsequently, RA 11956 further amended RA 11213 (as already amended) to extend the availment period until June 14, 2025. 

Key changes under RA 11956:

Expanded coverage: The cut-off date for decedents was moved from December 31, 2017 to May 31, 2022 (i.e., estates of those who died on or before that date may now avail of amnesty, provided their estate taxes remain unpaid or accrued). 

Filing/payment mechanics: Filings may be made either manually or electronically, via any authorized agent bank (AAB), any Revenue District Office (RDO) through its Revenue Collection Officer (RCO), or through authorized tax software providers. 

Installment payment option: Payment may be made in installments within a two-year period from the statutory due date — without civil penalty or interest — in order to encourage more estates to avail. 

Immunities extended to updated cutoff: Estates that fully comply (i.e., file, pay, etc.) get immunity from all estate taxes (including increments/ additions) for the period ending May 31, 2022 and prior years, plus immunity from related civil, criminal and administrative cases and penalties under the Tax Code. 

Implementing rules and regulations were issued by the BIR to operationalize the provisions (filing channels, documentary requirements, payment, etc.). 

As a result, under current law (post-2023), heirs or beneficiaries of estates of decedents who died up to May 31, 2022 may — before June 14, 2025 — file and pay a flat 6% on the net estate (or minimum ₱5,000, whichever is higher), enjoy installment payment, and obtain immunity from further estate tax liability and related penalties. 

III. Significance and Purpose

The estate tax amnesty law was enacted as part of a broader revenue-administration reform: it sought to clear a backlog of outstanding estate tax liabilities, unlock idle or un-title-transferred properties, simplify and accelerate registration/ title transfer, and give families a chance to regularize their inherited assets at a much lower cost. 

By widening the coverage (up to May 2022) and extending the availment period, the amendments recognize that many potential heirs still had unresolved estates — particularly those who lost relatives during the pandemic years — and provide them a “last chance” to avail of the amnesty. 

IV. Relation to the Proposed Bill (per the News)

The news you cited refers to a new proposed bill (approved by a House committee) to extend the estate tax amnesty further — reportedly through 2028, and to cover estates of decedents who died on or before December 31, 2024. 

If enacted, this would again expand the temporal coverage (so that more recent decedents are covered) and lengthen the availment period, effectively continuing the amnesty regime and offering the same benefits (reduced tax rate or fixed minimum, immunity from liabilities, installment payments) to a broader class of estates.

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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, December 9, 2025.

International Law: United States Air Strikes on Alleged Drug-Smuggling Boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific

Legality under International Law of United States Air Strikes on Alleged Drug-Smuggling Boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific

Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr. 

I. INTRODUCTION

This memorandum examines the legality, under established norms of international law, of recent United States military air strikes against alleged drug-smuggling vessels operating in the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Pacific.

The operations, which have reportedly resulted in at least sixty-six deaths in the last two months, were publicly justified by the Trump administration as actions in a “formal armed conflict” against transnational narcotics cartels.

Former International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, however, has characterized these operations as crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), asserting that they constitute a planned, systematic attack on civilians during peacetime.

This memorandum evaluates the issue under international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), and the law on crimes against humanity, in light of relevant jurisprudence from international tribunals.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the U.S. air strikes constitute lawful acts of self-defense or fall within an armed conflict as defined under the Geneva Conventions;

2. Whether such actions violate international norms protecting civilians during peacetime; and

3. Whether they may amount to crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute, thereby engaging individual criminal responsibility.

III. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND SOURCES OF LAW

A. Principle of Distinction

Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977) codifies the principle of distinction, requiring parties to an armed conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians. Attacks may be directed only against combatants and military objectives.

Drug traffickers, however, are civilians engaged in criminal conduct, not lawful combatants, unless they form an organized armed group capable of sustained military operations (Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY, 1995).

B. Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life

Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) declares that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”

The UN Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 36 (2018), affirmed that extrajudicial killings in counter-narcotics operations are incompatible with this fundamental right.

C. Crimes Against Humanity

Under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, murder committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, constitutes a crime against humanity.

This standard applies irrespective of whether the state in question is formally at war.

The ICC has consistently held that crimes against humanity may occur in peacetime, provided that the acts are part of a policy or organized attack directed against civilians (Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., ICTY, 2001).

D. Absence of an “Armed Conflict”

Under Common Article 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949), an international or non-international armed conflict exists only where there is protracted armed violence between governmental forces and organized armed groups under responsible command.

Narcotics traffickers, operating without political objectives or military structure, do not meet this threshold. Consequently, the laws of war are inapplicable, and international human rights law governs the use of lethal force.

E. Prohibition of Extraterritorial Use of Force

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (1945) prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

Even if the strikes occur on the high seas, they implicate the sovereignty and jurisdiction of other states whose nationals or vessels are affected.

The claim of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter is invalid, as drug trafficking, however grave, does not constitute an “armed attack” by a state or organized armed group.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The U.S. Campaign as a Law Enforcement Matter

Drug trafficking is an international criminal problem governed by domestic and treaty-based law enforcement frameworks (e.g., the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988), not by the law of armed conflict.

By classifying drug traffickers as enemy combatants, the United States effectively militarizes law enforcement in peacetime—a position rejected by the international community since the Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ, 1986) decision, which held that support for armed attacks under the guise of “self-defense” against criminal actors violates the UN Charter.

B. Systematic Attack Against Civilians

If the air strikes are part of a planned and continuous campaign of extrajudicial killings, they meet the widespread or systematic attack element under Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.

The intent to target civilian boat crews, absent evidence of their direct participation in hostilities, fulfills the mental element (mens rea) required for crimes against humanity.

C. Individual and Command Responsibility

Under Articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute, individuals—including heads of state and military commanders—bear personal criminal responsibility for ordering or failing to prevent crimes against humanity.

The doctrine of command responsibility, developed in Prosecutor v. Galić (ICTY, 2003), imposes liability where superiors knew or should have known of unlawful attacks against civilians and did not act to prevent or punish them.

V. RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE

1. Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY, Decision on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1 (1995)

The Tribunal defined an “armed conflict” as existing only where there is protracted armed violence between organized armed groups. This standard excludes sporadic or law-enforcement-type operations.

2. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., ICTY, Judgment, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (2001)

The Tribunal held that crimes against humanity may occur in peacetime and that systematic attacks against civilians pursuant to a state policy suffice for conviction.

3. Prosecutor v. Galić, ICTY, Judgment, IT-98-29 (2003)

The accused was convicted for targeting civilians during the siege of Sarajevo, affirming that deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against civilians, even under claims of “security necessity,” are unlawful under customary international law.

VI. CONCLUSION

The deliberate killing of alleged drug traffickers through aerial bombardment does not fall within the scope of lawful military operations under the laws of armed conflict.

No armed conflict exists between the United States and narcotics traffickers as defined by international humanitarian law. The campaign therefore constitutes an unlawful, systematic attack against civilians during peacetime, potentially amounting to crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

The operations also violate the right to life protected by the ICCPR and the UN Charter’s prohibition on the arbitrary use of force.

Although the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute, the norms it contains—particularly those on crimes against humanity—reflect customary international law binding on all states.

VII. REFERENCES

Below is an appendix of verified official links to the primary international-law sources I cited, arranged for easy reference and insertion into your blog bibliography.

Treaty and Instrument Sources

1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) — English version in PDF from the official website of International Criminal Court:

https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf 

Also via UN Treaty Collection: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?chapter=18&lang=en&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&src=UNTSONLINE 

2. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977) and the Geneva Conventions themselves — text accessible from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) database.

(I did not supply a direct link in the memorandum, but these are available from the ICRC website.)

3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) — accessible via the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

4. Charter of the United Nations (1945) — official UN text available at https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter

Judicial Decisions / Case Law Sources

5. Prosecutor v. Tadić (IT‑94‑1) (ICTY) — Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 Oct 1995):

https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm 

Also the full “Opinion and Judgment” (7 May 1997) in PDF: https://www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/icty/1997/en/40193 

6. (You may wish also to cite) Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002) — judgment available via ICTY case-law database (searchable). A reliable summary appears at Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/ij/icty/2.htm 

7. Prosecutor v. Galić (IT-98-29, 5 Dec 2003) — full judgment available via ICTY archives (searchable via ICTY/IRMCT legacy site).

Additional Institutional Guidance

8. ICC “How the Court works” (explaining crimes against humanity, jurisdiction etc.) — https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works 

9. ICRC case-study on Tadić: “International Humanitarian Law and the Tadić Case” (Greenwood, EJIL) — PDF available: https://www.ejil.org/pdfs/7/2/1365.pdf 

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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, November 7, 2025.

2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability

2025 Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability (CJCA) — A.M. No. 25-04-04-SC as approved by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. 

PART I — Preamble and Scope

> PREAMBLE

The turn of the 21st century has seen the fascinating emergence of the so-called “integrity movement” in the judiciary—not only in the Philippines but internationally. The benchmark of good judges is no longer simply adjudicative competence but also ethical excellence. The judiciary must not only be independent and impartial but must perceive itself and be perceived by the public to adhere to the highest standards of conduct. The rule of law demands nothing less.

This Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability (“Code”) is promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc under A.M. No. 25-04-04-SC and shall apply to all incumbent Justices and Judges of the Philippine Judiciary, except as otherwise provided herein. The Code is intended to supplement existing constitutional, statutory and other judicial rules governing conduct, and to foster a culture of integrity, accountability, transparency, professionalism and public confidence in the judiciary.

The Canons and Rules that follow represent minimum standards of conduct. Judges are encouraged and expected to adopt higher standards consistent with evolving jurisprudence and international best practices.

SCOPE AND EFFECTIVITY

1. This Code shall take effect on the [15th] calendar day after its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, and its posting on the SC website.

2. The Code is applicable to all Justices of the Supreme Court, Justices of the Court of Appeals, Judges of the Sandiganbayan, Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Shari’a Appellate Courts and Shari’a District/Metropolitan/Provincial/Municipal Courts.

3. Where specific statutes, rules or other orders of the Court prescribe higher or additional standards of conduct, such standards shall govern. In the event of conflict between this Code and other rules, the higher standard shall prevail.

4. This Code shall be enforced through existing judicial disciplinary processes, subject to any additional mechanisms the Court may adopt for monitoring compliance, reporting of breaches, remedial action and sanctions.

PART II — Canons and Rules

> CANON 1: INDEPENDENCE

A Judge shall uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both adjudicative and administrative functions, and shall resist influences, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, that tend to undermine such independence.

Rule 1.1. A Judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships or interests to influence judicial conduct or judgment.

Rule 1.2. A Judge shall neither initiate nor participate in inappropriate communications about a pending or impending matter with the parties, counsel or any other person, except as permitted by law.

Rule 1.3. A Judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity, impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

CANON 2: INTEGRITY

A Judge shall act at all times with dignity, integrity and propriety, and shall avoid behaviour that undermines the dignity of judicial office or the public’s confidence therein.

Rule 2.1. A Judge shall conduct the performance of judicial duties in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of judicial office.

Rule 2.2. A Judge shall avoid financial, business, or other interests or relationships that conflict with obligations of judicial office. A Judge shall make timely disclosure of any actual or potential conflict of interest.

Rule 2.3. A Judge shall not accept gifts, hospitality, favours, or other benefits that may cast doubt on the Judge’s independence, integrity or impartiality.

CANON 3: IMPARTIALITY AND FAIRNESS

A Judge shall perform judicial duties impartially, ensuring both the reality and the appearance of fairness.

Rule 3.1. A Judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding an opportunity to be heard, and shall act without bias or prejudice.

Rule 3.2. A Judge shall avoid both actual and perceived conflicts of interest and shall disqualify or recuse himself or herself when required by law or whenever the Judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Rule 3.3. A Judge shall ensure that the record clearly shows the basis for any ruling, order or judgment so that the appearance of arbitrariness is avoided.

CANON 4: DILIGENCE AND COMPETENCE

A Judge shall perform the duties of judicial office competently, diligently and with reasonable promptness.

Rule 4.1. A Judge shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that court proceedings are expedited and disposed of in a timely manner consistent with the rights of litigants and the demands of justice.

Rule 4.2. A Judge shall maintain professional competence in the law and shall keep abreast of developments in statutes, rules, jurisprudence and procedural practice.

Rule 4.3. A Judge shall not delegate his or her judicial responsibilities except when authorized by law or rule and must supervise any delegated functions.

CANON 5: PROPRIETY, BEHAVIOUR AND APPEARANCE

A Judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary, both in and out of court.

Rule 5.1. A Judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of his or her activities.

Rule 5.2. A Judge shall conduct himself or herself in public life with due regard for the special position of judicial office, recognising that public attention is focused upon the Judge’s conduct.

Rule 5.3. A Judge shall refrain from political activity inappropriate to judicial office and shall observe applicable restrictions on public statements, endorsements, or partisan activity.

CANON 6: ACCOUNTABILITY

A Judge shall remain accountable for the integrity of the judiciary, the performance of the judicial function and the public trust placed in the judicial office.

Rule 6.1. A Judge shall participate in and support efforts for the improvement of the administration of justice.

Rule 6.2. A Judge shall comply with applicable reporting, disclosure and monitoring requirements, including but not limited to:

­- (a) fiduciary and financial interests;

­- (b) gifts and hospitality;

­- (c) non-judicial activities;

­- (d) continuing education and competence.

Rule 6.3. A Judge shall cooperate with proceedings relating to judicial discipline, audit or oversight and shall not hinder or seek to evade legitimate accountability mechanisms.

CANON 7: SERVICE AND LEADERSHIP

A Judge shall serve the public, the legal profession and the judiciary without favour or prejudice and shall exercise leadership in the improvement of the administration of justice.

Rule 7.1. A Judge may engage in extrajudicial activities for educational, religious, charitable or civic purposes, provided that such activities do not detract from the dignity of judicial office, interfere with proper performance of judicial duties or appear to exploit the judge’s position.

Rule 7.2. A Judge shall refrain from participation in activities that could reasonably be perceived to exploit the prestige of the judicial office for personal benefit.

Rule 7.3. A Judge shall mentor and assist in training of judges, court personnel and the bar, and promote public understanding of the judicial system.

PART III — Special Institutional and Transitional Provisions

> SECTION 8 — Use of Technology, Social Media and Public Communications

8.1 A Judge shall ensure that his or her use of electronic communications, social media, blogging or other online presence is consistent with the dignity of judicial office, does not cast doubt on judicial independence or impartiality, and does not give rise to unwarranted public comment on pending or impending cases.

8.2 A Judge shall observe security, confidentiality and proper record-keeping when using court-managed or personal electronic devices, and avoid inadvertent disclosures of privileged or sealed information.

8.3 A Judge involved in public presentations or media interviews shall make clear that the opinions expressed are personal and do not reflect the institution of the judiciary, unless otherwise authorised.

SECTION 9 — Financial Disclosure and Gifts

9.1 A Judge shall submit periodic and truthful disclosure of financial interests, liabilities and other assets as required by the Court’s rules. The disclosures shall become part of the official registry of the judiciary.

9.2 A Judge shall refuse or return any gift that creates a sense of obligation, appearance of impropriety or that is given because of the judicial office. Exception may be made for nominal gifts of ordinary social hospitality of de minimis value, so long as public confidence is not undermined.

9.3 A Judge shall not serve in adjudication, administration or supervision in any matter in which the Judge or a family member holds a significant financial interest, and shall remove himself or herself if disqualification is required.

SECTION 10 — Post-Judicial Service Restrictions

10.1 After leaving judicial office, a former Judge shall not appear, practice or consult in any case in any court over which he or she presided or for which he or she took significant part in the decision-making, for a period prescribed by the Court (not less than 2 years) or as specified in other rules.

10.2 A former Judge shall not hold partisan political office or engage in partisan political campaigns for a period of at least one (1) year after separation from the bench, unless specifically authorized by the Court.

SECTION 11 — Implementation and Enforcement Mechanisms

11.1 The Court shall establish or designate a Judicial Integrity Office or other mechanism to monitor, receive and investigate complaints regarding breaches of this Code, and to recommend disciplinary, remedial or educational action.

11.2 Violations of this Code may subject a Judge to disciplinary proceedings, reprimand, suspension, removal, or any other penalty provided by law.

11.3 Each Judge shall certify annually in writing that he or she has read, understood and will comply with this Code. Non-compliance shall be reported in the judiciary’s official annual report.

PART IV — Entry into Effect; Supersession

> EFFECTIVITY

This Code shall be deemed effective on the date specified in the “Scope and Effectivity” clause above. All prior codes of judicial conduct promulgated by the Court (including A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, the “New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary” of 2004) are hereby superseded to the extent inconsistent with this Code. Transitional arrangements, if any, shall be prescribed by the Court.

APPROVED

Promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc on November 13, 2025 pursuant to A.M. No. 25-04-04-SC.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo

Acting En Banc Clerk

____ Day of _____ 2025.

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Assisted by ChatGPT, November 14, 2025.

Legal and historical foundations for the national territorial sovereignty of the Philippines

A concise treatment of the legal and historical foundations for the national territorial sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines. 

Short Thesis 

The Philippines’ territorial title rests on: (a) Spain’s colonial maps and administration (as evidence of original title and effective control); (b) Spain’s legal transfer of sovereignty to the United States by the Treaty of Paris (10 December 1898) and the supplemental 1900 Washington Convention (7 Nov. 1900) describing outlying islands; (c) international boundary delimitation with third States by treaty (notably the U.S.–U.K. Convention of 2 January 1930 delimiting the Philippines–North Borneo line); (d) progressive codification of the national territory in Philippine constitutions (1935 → 1973 → 1987), culminating in the 1987 constitutional text that embraces the archipelagic doctrine and expressly makes “the waters around, between, and connecting the islands… part of the internal waters of the Philippines”; and (e) modern international law on maritime zones (UNCLOS) and recent arbitral pronouncements (notably the 2016 PCA Award in The Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China) which define maritime entitlements and constrain historic-title claims. These elements operate together: historic titles and maps provided the factual/prehistoric basis, treaties effected legal transfers and boundary fixes, constitutions memorialized the State’s claim, and international law/decisions govern maritime entitlements and settle (or attempt to settle) disputes with other States. 

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1. The 1935 Constitution (Commonwealth) — legal text and practical effect

• The 1935 Constitution defined “THE NATIONAL TERRITORY” by reference to the territories ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris (10 Dec. 1898) and by reference to supplemental treaties (the Washington convention 7 Nov. 1900 and later agreements). The 1935 Constitution thus anchored Philippine territorial limits expressly to earlier international instruments that effected Spanish cession to the United States. 

Legal consequence: The 1935 text reflected a constitutional recognition that the State’s territorial base derived from those cessions and conventions; the constitution simply incorporated international treaty definitions into the domestic constitutional framework.

2. The 1973 Constitution

• Article I of the 1973 Constitution defines the national territory as “the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all the other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title” and enumerates territorial sea, airspace, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves and submarine areas. 

Legal consequence: The 1973 Charter broadened the constitutional description to include explicitly maritime and subsoil domains and recognized both historic and legal title as bases for possession — thereby implicitly accepting concepts later crystallized in UNCLOS and in the archipelagic-state doctrine.

3. The 1987 Constitution (current)

• Article I (National territory): the text contains the clearest and now-settled constitutional formulation: (i) the national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago with all islands and waters embraced therein and other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction; (ii) it enumerates terrestrial, fluvial, aerial domains, territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, and other submarine areas; and (iii) importantly, it states that “the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.” This provision embodies the archipelagic doctrine (as later codified in UNCLOS) in the Constitution itself. 

Legal consequence: The Constitution supplies a strong domestic basis for archipelagic claims and for asserting jurisdiction over maritime spaces within archipelagic baselines. It is the current constitutional foundation for any diplomatic, legislative or judicial action involving territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction.

4. Treaty of Paris (10 December 1898) — Spain → United States

• Article III and related articles of the Treaty of Paris ceded the Philippine Archipelago to the United States; the Treaty (and later exchanges and protocols) served as the international instrument effecting transfer of Spanish sovereignty. The treaty came into force upon exchange of ratifications (April 1899). 

Legal consequence: The Treaty of Paris is the pivotal international instrument by which sovereignty over the archipelago (as then understood) was transferred to the United States — and, as a matter of constitutional history, the 1935 Constitution referenced that treaty as the basis of the national territory.

5. Treaty (Convention) of Washington — 7 November 1900 (cession of outlying islands)

• The 7 November 1900 convention (sometimes called the “Treaty of Washington (1900)” or Convention of 1900) clarified and ceded to the United States islands lying outside the lines described in Article III of the 1898 treaty (for example, islands such as Cagayan, Sulu, Sibutu, etc.). The 1900 instrument was expressly cited in the 1935 Constitution’s territorial article. 

Legal consequence: This instrument closed potential gaps left by the 1898 treaty and is part of the cluster of treaties forming the legal base of the Philippine territorial claim.

6. 1930 Convention between the United States and Great Britain (boundary w/ North Borneo)

• The Convention of 2 January 1930 between the United States and Great Britain definitively delimited the boundary between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo (then British territory). The treaty, and subsequent exchanges of notes, fixed the outer limit between the two jurisdictions for specific purposes. 

Legal consequence: Treaties between administering Powers fixed inter-State boundaries which later affect successor rights and claims (for example, issues involving North Borneo/Sabah). Such treaties remain legally relevant unless modified or abrogated by subsequent agreement.

7. Other relevant treaties, international instruments and historical maps

• UNCLOS (1982): codifies modern maritime zones (territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf) and recognizes archipelagic States and archipelagic baselines (Part IV). Philippine constitutional language on internal waters echoes UNCLOS archipelagic concepts. 

• Murillo-Velarde map (1734) and other historic maps: used as historical evidence of geographic knowledge and historic connections to maritime features (e.g., the Murillo Velarde map was relied upon in Philippine submissions in the South China Sea arbitration to demonstrate historic charting). 

8. Domestic and international judicial, quasi-judicial and arbitral decisions and awards

• PCA Award — The Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China (Award, 12 July 2016): the Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII to UNCLOS ruled on the legal status of maritime features and on the inexistence (under UNCLOS) of China’s claimed historic rights within the “nine-dash line”; it clarified that historic rights inconsistent with UNCLOS do not prevail. The Award is a major, binding pronouncement in that arbitration (binding between the parties to that arbitration), and it strongly affects continental shelf/EEZ/territorial sea entitlements. China has publicly rejected the Award; enforcement remains political/diplomatic. 

• Domestic courts in the Philippines have repeatedly treated territorial sovereignty and foreign-relations questions as primarily political questions (for diplomatic resolution), though the Supreme Court has considered domestic legal implications arising from treaties and legislation. (Searchable primary cases on discrete sovereign title (e.g., Sabah claims) are largely treated in executive/diplomatic contexts; there is comparatively limited domestic case law adjudicating international territorial title as a pure judicial question.) 

9. Historical studies and research

• Scholarly histories and archival maps (Velarde 1734 and other charts) have been used to demonstrate continuity of naming and usage of maritime features and to establish historical links; modern historians and legal scholars use both cartographic evidence and contemporaneous administrative records when reconstructing title. The Murillo-Velarde map is frequently cited in both scholarly work and the Philippines’ legal submissions in maritime disputes. 

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Synthesis — how these pieces fit in legal practice

1. Title chain: Spain’s colonial title → Treaty of Paris (1898) ± Treaty of Washington (1900) → U.S. sovereignty (1898–1946) → Philippine independence (commonwealth and republic constitutions) → Philippines as successor State with constitutionalized territorial claims. The 1930 U.S.–U.K. convention fixed parts of the external boundary vis-à-vis North Borneo. 

2. Constitutional entrenchment: The 1987 Constitution codifies the archipelagic doctrine and internal-waters claim; domestic law therefore supports executive steps (baseline declarations; maritime zone claims) and provides a constitutional warrant for asserting jurisdiction. 

3. UNCLOS and arbitral practice: UNCLOS provides the legal framework for maritime entitlements; the 2016 PCA Award demonstrates how UNCLOS adjudication treats "historic-rights" claims of China  incompatible with UNCLOS. Thus the Philippines’ constitutional assertions must be pursued consistent with UNCLOS rules when maritime entitlements are at issue. 

4. Maps and historical evidence: Cartography (e.g., Murillo-Velarde) is admissible as historical evidence but never alone dispositive; treaties and effective administration (showing State acts of authority) have decisive legal weight in international law. 

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Limits / caveats

• Where interstate sovereignty claims are contested (e.g., Sabah/North Borneo, certain shoals/reefs), the legal outcome depends upon the legal instrument(s) at issue (treaties, succession doctrines, effective control, estoppel) and political/diplomatic practice; judicial resolution is possible but often precluded by the political-question character of external sovereignty.

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Primary sources and links (verified)

1. 1935 Philippine Constitution (text) — Article I (National Territory). Lawphil. 

https://lawphil.net/consti/cons1935.html

2. 1973 Constitution (text) — Article I (National Territory). Lawphil / official texts. 

https://lawphil.net/consti/cons1973.html

3. 1987 Constitution (text) — Article I (National Territory). Official/constitute project / ChanRobles. 

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Philippines_1987

https://chanrobles.com/article1.htm

4. Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain (Treaty of Paris, 10 Dec. 1898) — text (Yale Avalon / U.S. historical documents). 

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp

5. Convention / Treaty between the United States and Spain (7 Nov. 1900) — Cession of outlying islands (text and U.S. archival presentation). 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1900/ch105

6. Convention between the United States and Great Britain (2 Jan. 1930) — boundary between Philippine Archipelago and North Borneo (text/explanatory notes). U.S. Department of State, FRUS. 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1930v03/ch16

7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) — full text and Part IV (archipelagic States). 

https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part4.htm

8. The South China Sea Arbitration (PCA Award), The Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China (Award, 12 July 2016) — PCA (registry) PDF and RIAA / UN collection. 

https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf

9. Murillo Velarde (Velarde) map (1734) — background and institutional collection pages (Library of Congress, Philippine Cultural Center). 

https://murillovelardemap.com/

https://www.loc.gov/

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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 12, 2025.

SALN (Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth)

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I. Constitutional and statutory foundations

1. Constitutional mandate.
   The SALN requirement is constitutional. Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) expressly requires that “[a] public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” For certain high offices (President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, members of Congress, justices of the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, etc.), the Constitution also requires disclosure to the public “in the manner provided by law.”

2. Statutory duty and public right to know (RA No. 6713).
   The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) operationalizes the constitutional duty. Section 8 of RA 6713 requires public officials and employees to file SALNs and declares that “the public has the right to know” such information; Section 5(e) of the same law imposes on public officials the duty to make documents accessible to the public. The SALN is thus both a filing obligation of the officer and a statutorily recognized subject of public scrutiny.

3. Data-privacy law as an operational constraint.
   Any rules on access must also be consistent with the Data Privacy Act (RA No. 10173) and its IRR: the State balances the public’s right to information with the individual’s right to personal data protection. This means access regimes must observe legitimate-purpose, proportionality, data minimization, and adequate safeguards when SALNs are published or disclosed electronically.

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II. Custodianship and practical repository rules

• The SALN regime contemplates repository agencies: the original SALN is filed with the filer’s employing agency; certain high officers’ SALNs are deposited with particular custodians (e.g., the Office of the Ombudsman for certain officials, Office of the President for cabinet officials, Civil Service Commission for rank-and-file personnel). The Commission on Audit, Judiciary, and other custodians have their own procedures for access. Agency rules and Ombudsman circulars thus materially affect public accessibility in practice. (See CSC SALN FAQs and repository lists.)

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III. Key jurisprudence — what the courts have held

1. Public access is a recognized right but not absolute — the Supreme Court’s posture.
   In the leading high-court disposition that addressed the Ombudsman’s 2020 circular, the Supreme Court dismissed a petition challenging the circular but unequivocally stated that the public’s right of access to official records (including SALNs) is subject to regulation by the custodian to protect other legitimate interests and to ensure orderly custody and inspection. The Court therefore recognized both the constitutional/statutory right to information and the custodian’s power to regulate access. (G.R. No. 254516, Notice of Resolution, Feb. 2, 2021 — Biraogo / challenge to Memorandum Circular No. 1, series of 2020).

2. Custodianship may lawfully impose safeguards — but those safeguards must be reasonable.
   The Supreme Court and administrative pronouncements (and earlier administrative rules adopted by the judiciary itself for judges’ SALNs) accept that custodians may set reasonable conditions to prevent damage to records, to protect other persons’ rights, or to avoid interference with official functions — but the custodian is not free to nullify the public purpose of the SALN by erecting disproportionate barriers (e.g., blanket secrecy or near-impossible prerequisites). The 2021 rulings and administrative guidelines show a balancing approach: public right of access v. legitimate regulatory concerns.

3. Misdeclaration and sanctions: evidence and intent matter.
   Cases construing RA 6713 and disciplinary statutes show that not every omission or error in a SALN automatically produces administrative or criminal liability. Courts have required proof of wrongful intent or substantial evidence of misdeclaration/ill-gotten wealth, and have at times reversed or moderated penal administrative sanctions where mistakes could be explained or corrected. (See cases such as Navarro v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 210128, Aug. 17, 2016) and other Ombudsman/Supreme Court decisions on SALN omissions and sanctions). The jurisprudence therefore treats SALN defects as serious but not mechanically punitive absent proof of bad faith or manifest disproportionality between assets and lawful income.

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IV. The normative spirit: transparency, accountability, and the public trust

1. Public office is a public trust. The SALN is an instrument to operationalize the constitutional promise that public officers are accountable and must lead modest lives. Disclosure serves the prevention and detection of corruption, enables informed public discourse, and supports institutions (Ombudsman, COA, media, civil society) in verifying whether an official’s wealth is explainable by lawful means.

2. Transparency as prophylaxis and civic check. The SALN promotes (a) deterrence of illicit enrichment, (b) evidence for investigations (administrative, criminal, impeachment), and (c) public confidence in government. For these goals to be realized, the SALN must be accessible, intelligible, and usable by legitimate requesters (investigators, journalists, researchers, citizens). Overly burdensome procedures that effectively deny access convert a transparency tool into a private record — undermining its constitutional purpose.

3. But transparency is not absolute — legitimate privacy and safety concerns exist. The State must also protect the safety of officials, the privacy of third parties (spouses, children), and sensitive personal data that may be unrelated to public duties. Hence the need for proportionate rules that enable scrutiny while guarding against misuse, identity theft, or threats to personal security — a balance that data-privacy law helps to institutionalize.

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V. Legal and practical conclusions — what “reopening” should mean in law-respecting practice

1. Reversal of the 2020 circular is legally permissible and constitutionally salient provided the new memorandum restores meaningful public access consistent with RA 6713 and the Constitution. The Ombudsman, as repository for many high-ranking officers, may issue implementing guidelines; these must not reimpose barriers that nullify the public’s statutory right to inspect SALNs. (The Supreme Court permits custodian regulation but insists on reasonableness.)

2. Any new Ombudsman memorandum should expressly do four things:

   • (a) Restore practical access — permit inspection and copying (or certified copies) during reasonable hours and under reasonable procedure, without an a priori notarized consent requirement that delegates to the declarant a veto over public inspection;
   • (b) Set narrow, legitimate restrictions — carve-outs for bona fide safety concerns, or for personal data of third parties not related to public duty; require redaction only where strictly necessary and for narrowly defined categories;
   • (c) Adopt electronic access with safeguards — publish SALNs in a searchable electronic repository (or provide certified electronic copies on request) subject to Data Privacy Act safeguards: purpose limitation, access logs, minimization, and NPC guidance; and
   • (d) Provide administrative remedies and timelines — put in place quick procedures for requests, a transparent fee schedule (if any), and a right to administrative appeal for denials with written reasons.

3. Ensure compatibility with the Data Privacy Act and Supreme Court guidance. The memorandum must square the public’s right to know with data-privacy principles and with the Court’s holding that custodians may regulate access but not destroy it. Reasonable, clearly-written rules will withstand judicial review; facially arbitrary or absolute secrecy will not.

4. Guard against “weaponization” while preserving investigatory use. The SALN can be abused — for political harassment, fishing expeditions, or doxxing of private family details. Guidelines should therefore permit bona fide investigative uses (media investigations, Ombudsman/COA fact-finding, court orders) while discouraging non-legitimate invasions of privacy. Clear standards for “legitimate investigative purpose” and penalties for misuse will protect both transparency and individual rights.

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VI. Recommended legal drafting points for Ombudsman Remulla’s memorandum (short form)

1. Begin with constitutional and statutory citations (Art. XI, §17; RA 6713, §8; duties under §5(e)).
2. State policy objective: restore meaningful public access consistent with the Data Privacy Act.
3. Provide concrete procedures: request forms, timeline for response, ability to obtain certified copies, reasonable fees, electronic access/portal, redaction rules narrowly tailored.
4. Prohibit blanket prior notarized consent requirement; allow consent where declarant affirmatively requests redaction of narrowly defined personal data unrelated to public duty.
5. Provide an oversight/appeal mechanism and require publication of denials with reasoned explanation.

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VII. Selected primary authorities (for citation and verification)

• 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 17 (Requirement to file SALN).
• Republic Act No. 6713 — Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Sections on SALN and public access).
• Data Privacy Act, RA No. 10173 (privacy constraints and NPC).
• Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 1, series of 2020 (amended guidelines that restricted access). — text and Ombudsman press release.
• Supreme Court — G.R. No. 254516 (Notice of Resolution, Feb. 2, 2021) — upholding that access may be regulated but not eliminated; dismissal of the challenge to the 2020 circular for lack of justiciability while articulating the balancing principles.

(Other useful case authorities on SALN misdeclaration and sanctions: Navarro v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 210128, Aug. 17, 2016) and the decisions summarized in G.R. No. 225774 and related Ombudsman rulings.)

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VIII. Final observation (legal-policy judgment)

The SALN is an instrument of constitutional governance — a prophylactic and evidentiary tool to vindicate the public trust. Any normative legal regime must preserve meaningful public access while building in proportionate privacy and security safeguards. Ombudsman Remulla’s announced reversal is legally supportable and, if implemented carefully, will restore the constitutional balance between transparency and privacy. The success of any revised memorandum will depend on its concrete operational provisions: whether it restores practical inspection/copying, removes veto-like barriers (e.g., notarized blanket consent), provides speedy and inexpensive access, and adopts electronic publication with privacy safeguards. If those elements are present, the memorandum will realign practice with the constitutional spirit of accountability and the public’s right to information.

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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 10, 2025.

COMELEC’S POWER TO INVESTIGATE & PROSECUTE ELECTION OFFENSES

Under Philippine law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is authorized not only to administer and enforce election laws, but also to conduct preliminary investigations of alleged criminal violations of those laws, and to prosecute such cases — a function which is statutory, constitutional, and affirmed by Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The constitutional basis is Article IX-C, Section 2, paragraph (6) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that COMELEC shall have power to “investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.” Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 128054, Oct. 1997) confirms that this constitutional grant is real and substantive.

Statutorily, Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) explicitly states that the Commission “shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same.” It also allows COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of government. Under the implementing COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 34, Section-2), provincial/city prosecutors (and their assistants), as well as state prosecutors, are given continuing authority to act as deputies of COMELEC in conducting such preliminary investigations and prosecutions — but that authority is derivative: it depends on COMELEC’s delegation and is subject to withdrawal.

Supreme Court decisions have consistently upheld that COMELEC’s Law Department is empowered to perform preliminary investigations of election offenses, and to initiate prosecutions. For example, in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, the Court discussed Section 265 and held that COMELEC is the public prosecutor with exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code — with the deputized assistance of prosecutors where authorized. Also, in G.R. No. 170447 (2009), the Court reiterated that the Chief State Prosecutor and city/provincial prosecutors act only within the scope of authority delegated by COMELEC under Rule 34.

Importantly, an amendment by Republic Act No. 9369 (which amended Section 265) changed the wording to make power to conduct preliminary investigations concurrent among COMELEC and other prosecuting arms, rather than purely exclusive. Under that law, other prosecuting arms (including the DOJ via its prosecutors) may investigate and prosecute election offenses concurrently. Thus, while COMELEC continues to have constitutional and statutory authority, the DOJ is not entirely excluded; but the DOJ’s participation depends on the legal framework and whether the power is properly exercised.

CONCLUSION

COMELEC’s Law Department is empowered by law to conduct preliminary investigations of criminal violations of election laws and to prosecute them. The Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have an exclusive power in this realm; its role is either (a) by deputation / delegation under COMELEC, or (b) under concurrent authority after legal amendments (e.g. RA 9369) when conditions are met.

Hence, in any given case, COMELEC has the primary mandate; the DOJ may act, but only in accordance with law (delegation, concurrence, or residual jurisdiction under circumstances defined in statute).

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/kilosbayan-inc-v-commission-on-elections?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_199082_2012.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jun2009/gr_170447_2009.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_199082_2012.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Assisted by ChatGPT AI, October 5, 2025.

Rescission of the Deeds of Conditional Sale.

Spouses Noel John M. Kaw & Josephine Caseres-Kaw v. Heirs of Marilyn Nodalo et al., G.R. No. 263047, November 27, 2024 

Facts / Antecedents

1. The Spouses Kaw are registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot F, TCT No. T-158628) located in Cagmanaba, Oas, Albay, with an area of 3,040 sqm. 

2. In February 2014, the Kaw spouses, through dentist colleagues (including Ivy Orolfo), introduced the subject property to prospective buyers (respondents, including heirs of Marilyn Nodalo and others). They agreed to sell a 2,000 sqm undivided portion, for ₱1,200,000. The buyers proposed to pay in two 1,000 sqm tranches at ₱600,000 each, with ₱300,000 downpayment and six months for the balance. 

3. Two separate “Deeds of Conditional Sale” were executed (one on March 10, 2014; another on March 29, 2014) between Kaw spouses and the various respondents. Under those deeds:

The vendees made partial payments (down payments) toward the total consideration. 

The balance was to be paid within six months; failure to do so would permit rescission. 

Upon full payment, the vendors (Kaws) would execute and deliver the deed of absolute sale. 

Meanwhile, respondents would have beneficial possession and enjoyment. 

The deeds also contained a clause that respondents were prohibited from assigning, conveying, or hypothecating their rights under the agreement to third parties without prior written consent of the vendors. 

4. After the execution of the contracts, the Kaw spouses were surprised to find that respondents had erected cottages, fences, did improvements, and operated a beach-resort business (renting cottages to third parties) on the subject property. The Kaws contended these acts breached the terms of the deeds (including the prohibition on assignment/letting, the nature of improvements, etc.). 

5. Respondents, in turn, asserted they tendered payment of the balance under the conditional sale, but the Kaw spouses refused to accept. In fact, some respondents filed consignation cases in municipal trial court against Kaws (Civil Cases 1712-P, 1714-P) insisting on their right to tender and compel acceptance. 

6. On September 29, 2015, Spouses Kaw filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ligao City, a Complaint for Rescission (with prayer for preliminary injunction) against respondents. 

7. The RTC dismissed the rescission complaint for lack of merit; it found that respondents did not materially breach the contracts, and instead granted respondents’ counterclaim, ordering the Kaws to accept payment, execute the absolute deeds, pay taxes, surrender documents, and pay moral damages. 

8. The Court of Appeals affirmed (with modification deleting the award of moral damages). 

9. Kaws then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising primarily that (a) respondents committed fundamental breaches warranting rescission, and (b) respondents engaged in forum shopping in filing multiple actions (rescission vs consignation) in different courts. 

Issues

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Kaws’ Complaint for Rescission of the Deeds of Conditional Sale.

2. Whether respondents are guilty of forum shopping, thereby subjecting their counterclaims (or other actions) to dismissal or penalty.

Ruling (Disposition)

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed with modification the CA decision. 

Modifications included:

Ordering dismissal of the consignation cases (Civil Cases 1712-P and 1714-P) and associated appeals, on the ground of forum shopping. 

Directing respondents (Heirs of Marilyn Nodalo, Zenaida Chiquillo, and Atty. Rudyard Anthony M. Trinidad) to show cause within ten (10) days why they should not be cited for contempt for engaging in forum shopping. 

Referring the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for possible administrative action against their counsel for deliberate forum shopping. 

In all other respects, the decision of the CA (affirming the RTC, except for moral damages) stands. 

Ratio decidendi (Legal Reasoning)

1. Characterization as contract to sell (not conditional sale).

Although the instruments were denominated “Deed of Conditional Sale,” the Court examined the substantive terms and held that the true intention of the parties was to create contracts to sell, because:

The vendors (Kaws) retained the right to unilaterally rescind upon nonpayment (i.e. a right of rescission). 

The obligation of the Kaws to execute a deed of absolute sale arises only after full and satisfactory payment of the purchase price. 

The features of the deed mirror those of a contract to sell rather than a true conditional sale (i.e. not a suspensive condition in the classical sense). 

Thus, the remedy under Article 1191 (rescission) may be available, as the obligations are reciprocal. 

2. On the remedy of rescission: requirement of substantial (not slight) breach.

The Court reaffirmed that rescission is not available for slight or casual breaches — only fundamental or substantial breaches (i.e., those which defeat the very object of the contract) justify rescission. 

In the present case:

The Kaw spouses alleged that respondents breached by (i) erecting permanent improvements, beyond what was allowed, contrary to supposed verbal limitations; and (ii) leasing cottages to third parties (thus assigning or hypothecating their rights). 

The Court found that the written deed does not distinguish between “permanent” and “temporary” improvements; nor does it specify material limitations. Parol evidence to vary or limit those terms was not sufficiently proven or accepted. 

Regarding the leasing/rental of cottages, the Court held that absent a clear prohibition in the deed, the act of leasing did not necessarily amount to a material breach that defeats the contract’s object. 

Thus, the alleged acts did not constitute fundamental breach; hence the Kaws could not rescind the deed. 

3. On forum shopping and dismissal of duplicative actions.

The Court agreed with the Kaw spouses that respondents (notably Chiquillo and Nodalo) engaged in forum shopping by instituting multiple actions (consignation in MCTC, and rescission in RTC) over the same subject matter. 

The Court held that such duplicative actions pose risk of conflicting results and violate procedural rules. Accordingly:

The consignation cases (MCTC) are dismissed to prevent conflicting rulings. 

The respondents engaged in forum shopping are to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. 

The Court may refer the matter for administrative action against counsel who deliberately engaged in forum shopping. 

4. Consequence: upholding CA and RTC decisions (except modification) and denying petition.

Having found that the Kaw spouses failed to establish fundamental breach and that respondents’ counterclaims should remain, the petition must be denied. The Court merely adjusts for the forum-shopping issues.

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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 1, 2025.

Appointing the Ombudsman

Relevant Constitutional Text

From the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article XI (“Accountability of Public Officers”):

• Section 8.

  The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
  During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.

• Section 9.

  The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.

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Relevant Statutory / Rule Law — JBC Rules

The Judicial and Bar Council has adopted Revised Rules (2020) which implement constitutional mandates. Key provisions:

• The 2020 Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (which cover nominations for, among others, the Ombudsman, Deputies, etc.) include:

  “WHEREAS, the President of the Philippines may appoint from the list of at least three nominees for every vacancy officially transmitted by the Council to the Office of the President” … these Rules are to be considered in the selection and nomination for the offices of the Ombudsman... etc.

• Also, under those Rules, there is a deadline:

  “Vacancies in the offices of the Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsman, and Special Prosecutor … shall be filled within three (3) months from their occurrence.”

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Key Jurisprudence: De Castro v. JBC

The Supreme Court case De Castro v. JBC (G.R. No. 191002 et al., 2010) is the landmark case regarding whether the President can disregard a JBC shortlist or request more nominees in judicial appointments. While it deals with Supreme Court / judicial vacancies (Chief Justice etc.), its reasoning helps illuminate similar issues.

Some relevant holdings:

• The Court held that Sections 8(5) and 9, Article VIII (Constitution) mandate that for judicial vacancies, the JBC must submit a list of at least three nominees to the President. The President must appoint from among those nominees.

• The Court emphasized that once the list is submitted, the President cannot demand expanding the list beyond what the JBC submits, nor pick someone not in the list. The discretion to pick lies within the nominees provided by the Council.

• Also, the Court made clear that the duty of the JBC to prepare and submit the list is ministerial once the constitutional requisites are met: the JBC must act; delay or failure attracts remedy (e.g. via mandamus) – but the content of which nominees to include is a discretionary function of JBC.

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Exact Passages Worth Quoting

Here are precisely relevant bits that bear on whether the President is bound once the list is transmitted:

• From De Castro:

  “Section 9, Article VIII requires the President to appoint from a list submitted by the JBC.”

  “With due respect, the JBC cannot acquiesce to your request to expand the short list of nominees submitted to your office. The decision whether to include three or more than three name in the short list of the nominees exclusively belongs to the JBC … This discretion given to the JBC … cannot be compromised … without impairing the delicate check and balance in the appointment … installed in our Constitution.”

• From the Constitution (Art. XI, Sec. 9):

  “The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.”

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Assisted by ChatGPT AI app,September 16, 2025.

DNA evidence

"DNA evidence plays a very vital role in legal proceedings, especially in criminal prosecutions. Generally, courts order, either motu proprio or on application of a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, the conduct of DNA testing if such is crucial and relevant to the issue/s at hand. Nevertheless, DNA testing may be carried out without a prior court order at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies. To be certain, Section 4 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC dated October 2, 2007, otherwise known as the “Rule on DNA Evidence”, states:

“Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:

“– A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

“– The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;

“– The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

“– The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and

“– The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing.

“This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.” (Emphasis and underlining supplied)

In the situation which you have shared with us, we believe that the DNA evidence, which were collected and tested, may be used in pursuing a criminal case against RR, who agreed in providing his swab sample. It is true that no less than our 1987 Philippine Constitution, specifically Section 17, Article III thereof, guarantees the protection against self-incrimination, viz.:

“Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” However, it must be emphasized that the right against self-incrimination does not encompass all forms of obtention of evidence. Rather, the protection only shields a person against testimonial compulsion. It has been clearly explained in the Per Curiam Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Joel Yatar alias “Kawit”, (G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004):

“x x x The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

“We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

“Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.” (Emphasis supplied)

But this goes without saying that our courts will not simply accept evidence as is. Our courts will still determine the probative value of the DNA evidence submitted before it, ensuring that there were no irregularities in the chain of custody, that appropriate procedures were undertaken in conducting the tests and the qualifications of where and who conducted the tests, as well as the reliability of the results, in consonance with the pertinent provisions of the Rule on DNA Evidence."

Reference:

https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/09/15/legal-advice/dna-collection-and-testing-may-proceed-without-court-order/2184090?fbclid=IwdGRjcAMz1upjbGNrAzPVIWV4dG4DYWVtAjExAAEe6klRWa95sXhyfJq0Cy9XhG4lr9bBG7WQJ0u1K0NjltBfZiqCkdh_2JbTnRQ_aem_b9gs5CleIQAuk-YYyCkzyQ

Interim release of a defendant before the International Criminal Court

Interim Release of a Defendant before the International Criminal Court (ICC), with particular reference to the Rodrigo Duterte situation.

⚖️ I. JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE ICC OVER INTERIM RELEASE

A. Legal Basis for Interim Release Under Article 60(2)–(4) of the Rome Statute, an accused person may request interim release pending trial. The Pre-Trial Chamber must assess:
• Risk of flight;
• Obstruction or danger to investigation or trial;
• Continuing commission of crimes.
If the conditions of Article 58(1) (grounds for arrest) are no longer met, interim release may be granted, subject to conditions.

B. Conditions Imposed by the Court The ICC may condition interim release on guarantees by a “host State”, such as:
• Restriction of movement (house arrest, GPS monitoring, no travel);
• Periodic reporting to local authorities;
• Surrender of travel documents;
• Assurance of return for trial or proceedings.

The Chamber exercises discretion on whether these conditions satisfy the security and procedural safeguards of justice.

🌐 II. ROLE OF THE RECEIVING STATE

A. Consent and Cooperation under Article 93(1)(l) Any State willing to host an accused person on interim release must consent explicitly and guarantee cooperation with the ICC. Under the Rome Statute:
“States Parties shall comply with requests by the Court to provide assistance in the form of... the temporary transfer of persons as provided in paragraph 7 of Article 93.”

A non-State Party (e.g., Philippines, post-withdrawal) is not bound to comply, but a third-party receiving state must be a cooperating state, whether a State Party or one that voluntarily agrees to assist the Court under ad hoc agreement.

B. Legal and Political Considerations of Host States

Host states—reportedly rumored to include Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway—must undertake:
• Legal review of the ICC order in conformity with domestic law;
• Assurance that they will monitor and confine the accused under ICC parameters;
• Political tolerance for international and domestic criticism regarding their support for ICC action in politically sensitive cases.
•
🛡️ III. THE PHILIPPINES' NON-COOPERATION POST-WITHDRAWAL

A. Legal Effect of Withdrawal from the Rome Statute

While the Philippines withdrew from the ICC effective March 17, 2019, Article 127(2) of the Rome Statute clarifies:
"A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from the Statute while it was a Party to it."

Thus, the alleged crimes committed from July 1, 2016 to March 16, 2019 remain under ICC jurisdiction.

However, enforcement cooperation—such as arrests, surrender, or interim monitoring—cannot be compelled upon a non-cooperating State post-withdrawal.

B. Implications for the Duterte Petition

Since the Philippines refuses to cooperate, the ICC must find a third State willing to enforce:
• Conditions of release;
• Monitoring and detention (if necessary);
• Re-arrest or extradition upon ICC order.
Without such a host state, the Chamber may deny interim release due to lack of enforceability and risk of non-return.

🔍 IV. COMPARATIVE PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS
• Jean-Pierre Bemba (DR Congo)
– Granted interim release in Belgium and Portugal under strict monitoring conditions.
– Highlights that European States are often willing to host high-profile defendants when legal and diplomatic assurances are in place.
• Laurent Gbagbo (Ivory Coast)
– Temporarily released to Belgium during his ICC trial.
– Set precedent for cooperation between ICC and States Parties with robust legal systems.
• Charles Blé Goudé
– Hosted by The Netherlands under the ICC's structured release mechanism.
These cases establish that release is only practicable when States agree to enforce ICC restrictions.

📘 V. CONCLUSION

In the matter of Rodrigo Roa Duterte’s petition for interim release, the ICC must resolve the following:
• Whether the procedural and substantive thresholds of Article 60(2)–(4) of the Rome Statute are met;
• Whether a willing third-party state has been formally identified and will legally enforce ICC conditions;
• Whether Duterte poses a risk of flight, obstruction, or continued harm, in light of his past role, influence, and the Philippines’ refusal to cooperate.

If no viable host state is secured with enforceable guarantees, the request is likely to be denied on practicality and enforceability grounds.

📚 SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES CITED

• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Articles 58, 60, 93, 127.
• ICC Precedents: Prosecutor v. Bemba, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé.
• ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 118–119.
• Perplexity and ABS-CBN reports, June 2025.
• Academic: Sadat, Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).
• ICRC Commentary on State Cooperation in International Justice.

Generated by ChatGPT AI app, June 30, 2025. 

Civil Forfeiture under the Anti-Money Laundering Act

Civil forfeiture under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of the Philippines, particularly in relation to Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by R.A. Nos. 9194, 10167, and 10365.

I. Nature of Civil Forfeiture under AMLA

The forfeiture proceedings initiated by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) under Section 12 and Section 13 of RA 9160 are civil in nature, independent of any criminal conviction. It proceeds in rem (against the property), rather than in personam (against the individual).

Key Doctrine:

As reiterated in Republic v. Gloria, G.R. No. 205728, June 27, 2016, the forfeiture of assets under AMLA does not require a prior criminal conviction, unlike criminal prosecution for money laundering itself.

Positive Points in the CA Ruling:

• Reinforcement of Constitutional Rights
• The CA prudently invoked due process and the right to property, cautioning the government against weaponizing forfeiture without sufficient proof.
• This aligns with Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, which stressed that even forfeiture cases must satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process and substantial evidence.
• Clarification of the Required Standard of Proof
• The CA applied the civil standard of preponderance of evidence, as opposed to criminal proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• However, it concluded that even this lower standard was not met.

Mere disproportionality between bank deposits and income, without clear linkage to an unlawful activity, is insufficient to justify forfeiture.

II. Critical Legal Issues and Doctrinal Tensions

The AMLA’s objective is to suppress the laundering of illicit wealth even absent a criminal conviction.

1. Is Probable Cause Sufficient to Sustain Forfeiture?
• Under Sec. 12 of AMLA, the AMLC may apply for forfeiture “upon determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity or a money laundering offense.”
• However, the latest CA decision appears to have raised the threshold to preponderance of evidence regarding the accused’s personal knowledge or participation, which could undermine AMLA’s civil intent.

Conflict: AMLA requires probable cause to initiate forfeiture; yet the CA’s emphasis on actual “knowledge” by the account holders may blur the line between civil and criminal proceedings.

2. Unexplained Wealth as a Basis for Forfeiture

• The AMLC pointed to suspicious transactions far exceeding lawful income—a recognized red flag under AMLA’s Implementing Rules and BSP Circular No. 706 (2011).
• In Republic v. Sandiganbayan and Benedicto, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, the SC upheld forfeiture on the ground that unexplained wealth was prima facie evidence of ill-gotten property.

⚖️ III. Effect of Dismissed Criminal Charges on Civil Forfeiture

Legal Clarification:
Dismissal of the criminal case does not bar the continuation of civil forfeiture under AMLA.
• See Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 195597, April 21, 2014:
“It is immaterial that there is no conviction for any unlawful activity as civil forfeiture proceedings are independent and distinct from criminal actions.”

IV. Suggested Doctrinal Refinement:

• Uphold the CA’s concern for constitutional rights, but decouple civil forfeiture from criminal outcomes;
• Clarify that disproportionate wealth, if unexplained and proven through bank records, may be sufficient to justify forfeiture even without proof of knowledge or conviction;
• Emphasize that AMLA is designed for asset recovery and deterrence, not merely punishment post-conviction.

Key Legal References:
• R.A. No. 9160, as amended – Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001
• Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
• Republic v. Glora, G.R. No. 205728, June 27, 2016
• Republic v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Div.), G.R. No. 195597, April 21, 2014
• AMLC Regulatory Issuances; BSP Circular No. 706, 2011
• FATF Recommendation 4 – Confiscation and provisional measures

Generated by ChatGPT, June 25, 2025.