The incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of registration.

G.R. No. L-31271 April 29, 1974

ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ, spouses, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY and UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS & COMMUNICATIONS,Respondents-Appellees.

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The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the petitioners-appellants is a public stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants' predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the rule of res judicata. It is argued that as the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a petition for review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for the land covered thereby is no longer open to attack under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the matter established by this Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and indefeasible, subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said Act among which are: "liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statute of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the registry."

At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right recognized or existing under the law is that provided for in Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads as follows:

Property of public ownership is:

1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. (Par. 1)

The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for public use, are outside the commerce of men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation. ( 3 Manresa, 6th ed. 101-104.)chanrobles virtual law library

In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, this Court held:

A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains title under the Torrens system which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included.

In Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592, it was also said:

It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate of title No. 329 in her favor because the said certificate does not confer upon her any right to the creek in question, inasmuch as the said creek, being of the public domain, is included among the various exceptions enumerated in Section 39 of Act 496 to which the said certificate is subject by express provision of the law.

The same ruling was laid down in Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil. 644, as regards public plaza.

In Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. L-20300-01 and G.R. No. L-20355-56, April 30, 1965, 20 SCRA 704, it was held that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of registration.

It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the appellants as to the conclusiveness and incontestability of a Torrens certificate of title do not apply here. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners-appellants may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations (Article 1108, par. 4, new Civil Code). The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe. (Republic v. Ramona Ruiz, et al., G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348; Republic v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 47.). 

When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works & Communications under Republic Act 2056 to order the removal or obstruction to navigation along a public and navigable creek or river included therein, has been definitely settled and is no longer open to question (Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works & Communications G.R. No. L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69, 74).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu 992) of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river of the public domain. The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2 appearing in Original Certificate of Title No. 14318 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, from which the present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2 embraced in said title is bounded practically on all sides by rivers. As held by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No. 1247 for injunction filed by the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal Mayor of Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. "L"), Lot No. 2 is a branch of the main river that has been covered with water since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain. This finding having been affirmed by the Supreme Court, there is no longer any doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of petitioners is a river which is not capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription. (Palanca v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 449; Meneses v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 647). Consequently, appellants' title does not include said river.

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