Power of judicial review; requirements of.

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY. EN BANC, UDK-15143               January 21, 2015.

"x x x.

The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.23

Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal of this petition.

I

The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review

No actual case or controversy

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion."24 As emphasized by this court in Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v. Commission on Elections:25

It is well-established in this jurisdiction that ". . . for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. . . . [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging." The controversy must be justiciable — definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.26

For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a justiciable controversy. Pleadings before this court must show a violation of an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. In the concurring opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa:

Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render an advisory opinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all other constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and organs. We are aware that in the exercise of their various powers, they do interpret the text of the Constitution in the light of contemporary needs that they should address. A policy that reduces this Court to an adviser for official acts by the other departments that have not yet been done would unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. Our power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of law. This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale that defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules on justiciability are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right, but the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed exercise of judicial review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they legitimately represent.27 (Emphasis supplied)

The reason for this requirement was explained in Angara v. Electoral Commission:28

Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.29

Petitioner’s allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law.

Montesclaros v. COMELEC30 involved the postponement of the 2002 Sangguniang Kabataan Elections and the lowering of the age requirement in the Sangguniang Kabataan "to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age."31 Montesclaros and other parties filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.32 One of the reliefs prayed for was:

a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents’ issuances, orders and actions and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.33

This court held that:

. . . petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing resolutions and orders that would lower the membership age in the SK. . . .

. . . .

Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitution alright or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. . . .

. . . .

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.

. . . .

. . . To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government.34 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is "not subject to judicial restraint[.]"35 A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.36The petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this court’s determination. Petitioner has no legal standing

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal standing has been discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:37

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.

Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer."

. . . .

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.38

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.

This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved are of "transcendental importance" to the public. Specifically, this court has stated that:

the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.39

Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v. House of Representatives:40

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.41

A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this court to set aside procedural rules:

Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental importance must be supported by the proper allegations.42

None of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The events feared by petitioner are merely speculative and conjectural.

In addition to the determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown that there is a clear or imminent threat to fundamental rights. In an opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa:43

The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 should not be declared unconstitutional in whole or in any of its parts given the petitions filed in this case.

None of the petitions properly present an "actual case or controversy," which deserves the exercise of our awesome power of judicial review. It is our duty not torule on the abstract and speculative issues barren of actual facts. These consolidated petitions, which contain bare allegations, do not provide the proper venue to decide on fundamental issues. The law in question is needed social legislation.

That we rule on these special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition — which amounts to a pre-enforcement free-wheeling facial review of the statute and the implementing rules and regulations — is very bad precedent. The issues are far from justiciable. Petitioners claim in their class suits that they entirely represent a whole religion, the Filipino nation and, worse, all the unborn. The intervenors also claim the same representation: Filipinos and Catholics. Many of the petitions also sue the President of the Republic.

We should apply our rules rigorously and dismiss these cases. The transcendental importance of the issues they want us to decide will be better served when we wait for the proper cases with the proper parties suffering real, actual or more imminent injury. There is no showing of an injury so great and so imminent that we cannot wait for these cases.44 (Emphasis supplied)

The events feared by petitioner are contingent on the passing of the proposed bill in Congress. The threat of imminent injury is not yet manifest since there is no guarantee that the bill will even be passed into law. There is no transcendental interest in this case to justify the relaxation of technical rules.

II

Requisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus not shown Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Rule 65

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.— When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is ministerial.45An act is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed in compliance with a legal mandate.46 In a petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner to show that one is entitled to the performance of a legal right and that respondent has a corresponding duty to perform the act.47 Mandamus will not lie "to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law."48

In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief prayed for. Hence, this court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of judicial review since there is no actual case or controversy.

x x x."