Friday, September 18, 2015

RA 9262; domestic violence



See - RA 9262: It Is Immaterial Whether The Relationship Had Ceased For As Long As There Is Sufficient Evidence Showing The Past Or Present Existence Of Such Relationship Between The Offender And The Victim When The Physical Harm Was Committed... - The Lawyer's Post


"x x x.

Can Karlo be charged with violation of Republic Act 9262 even if the alleged incident took place after their break-up as lovers?

“The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) “Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner’s assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.

The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless in the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

x x x."


Read -
G.R. No. 193960, January 07, 2013, KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO, VS. PETITIONER, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS­ QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,RESPONDENTS.


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