Judicial legislation - G.R. No. L-43575

See - G.R. No. L-43575

G.R. No. L-43575             May 31, 1935

JUAN TAÑADA, petitioner,  vs. JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice,  EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of the Thirteenth Judicial District, and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of Alabat, Tayabas, respondents.

"x x x.

Counsel in effect urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in this instance, as in the past, we aim to do. But counsel in his memorandum concedes "that the language of the proviso in question is somewhat defective and does not clearly convey the legislative intent", and at the hearing in response to questions was finally forced to admit that what the Government desired was for the court to insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. That we cannot do. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language use, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing them are able to find their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

x x x."