See - Remedial Law: Earnest Efforts Towards A Compromise Among Family Members…
THE LAWYER'S POST
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“Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
The appellate court’s reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. − Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action. Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr., the Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. − Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action. Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr., the Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia ; res judicata ; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.”
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“Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as “having been given more teeth”21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise, has been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 of the Family Code –
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the respondents were concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss but on the respondents’ insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the subject properties. Nor could it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial Order specifically limited the issues to the validity of the deed and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Respondents not only confined their arguments within the pre-trial order; after losing their case, their appeal was based on the proposition that it was error for the trial court to have relied on the ground of vitiated consent on the part of Dr. Favis.”
x x x."
G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, vs. JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS, Respondents.
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“Indeed, even if we go by the reason behind Article 151 of the Family Code, which provision as then Article 222 of the New Civil Code was described as “having been given more teeth”21 by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rule of Court, it is safe to say that the purpose of making sure that there is no longer any possibility of a compromise, has been served. As cited in commentaries on Article 151 of the Family Code –
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sudden and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.
The facts of the case show that compromise was never an option insofar as the respondents were concerned. The impossibility of compromise instead of litigation was shown not alone by the absence of a motion to dismiss but on the respondents’ insistence on the validity of the donation in their favor of the subject properties. Nor could it have been otherwise because the Pre-trial Order specifically limited the issues to the validity of the deed and whether or not respondent Juana and Mariano are compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis. Respondents not only confined their arguments within the pre-trial order; after losing their case, their appeal was based on the proposition that it was error for the trial court to have relied on the ground of vitiated consent on the part of Dr. Favis.”
x x x."
G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their co-heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS- VILLAFUERTE, Petitioners, vs. JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS, Respondents.
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