Court may disbar a lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014, CECILIA PAGADUAN, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION^* AND REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, RESPONDENTS.

“X x x.

As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,^⁠18  the Court disbarred a lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Similarly, in In Re – Attorney Jose Avanceña,^⁠19 the said lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law due to a conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in GR. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,^⁠20 the Court reiterated that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.^⁠21 

Following the Court’s disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore erred in reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador’s conviction for such crime already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador merely committed a mere error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was involved. Their position was based on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in the first administrative complaint. That could not a valid basis because, as earlier pointed out, the second case was separate and distinct from the first one.

Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime involved moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador’s commission of the crime of falsification of public document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the CA strayed away from the settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will be absurd to insist that Salvador committed a mere error of judgment when the very basis of the second administrative charge against her was a final judgment of conviction where the trial court found otherwise.

Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public document is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to look beyond what is simply apparent from the surrounding circumstances.

X x x.”